The clear messages from Zawahiri’s letter are that Zarqawi is too radical for his (and, presumably, bin Laden’s) taste, and the two kingpins of al-Qaeda are short of both information and money.

Zawahiri’s and bin Laden’s Situation

If I could find a way to you, I would not delay a day . . . we are following your news, despite the difficulty and hardship . . . the real danger comes from the agent Pakistani army that is carrying out operations in the tribal areas looking for mujahedeen . . . I want to keep corresponding with you about what is going on in dear Iraq, especially since we do not know the full truth as you know it . . . many of the lines have been cut off. Because of this, we need a payment while new lines are being opened. So if you’re capable of sending a payment of approximately one hundred thousand, we’ll be very grateful to you.

Zawahiri’s Overall Perspective

It has always been my belief that the victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq; however, the center would be in the Levant and Egypt . . . As for the battles that are going on in the far-flung regions of the Islamic world, such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia, they are just the groundwork and the vanguard for the major battles which have begun in the heart of the Islamic world.


The Jihad’s Goals in Iraq

In Zawahiri’s “humble opinion,” the jihad requires several “incremental” goals:

The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq.

The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate- over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni areas, is in order to fill the void stemming from the departure of the Americans, immediately upon their exit and before un-Islamic forces attempt to fill this void, whether those whom the Americans will leave behind them, or those among the un-Islamic forces who will try to jump at taking power.

The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.

The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

Zawahiri then says that it is “extremely important” that

. . . the mujahedeen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal. We will return to having the secularists and traitors holding sway over us. Instead, their ongoing mission is to establish an Islamic state . . .

The Issue of Popular Support

Zawahiri (and, by implication, bin Laden) sounds very concerned that Zarqawi does not recognize the importance of popular support and that his actions are diminishing, rather than enhancing, al-Qaeda’s prospects in Iraq.

On the importance of popular support:

If we look at the two short-term goals, which are removing the Americans and establishing an Islamic amirate in Iraq, or a caliphate if possible, then, we will see that the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy . . . is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries. So, we must maintain this support as best we can, and we should strive to increase it . . .

Zawahiri goes so far as to say that the goal of establishing a caliphate “will not be accomplished by the mujaheed movement while it is cutoff from public support, even if the Jihadist movement pursues the method of sudden overthrow.” Furthermore, “in the absence of this public support, the Islamic mujaheed movement would be crushed in the shadows.”

He then draws this conclusion, which includes his first “ignorance of the masses” reference:

. . . the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve, if there is no contravention of Sharia in such avoidance, and as long as there are other options to resort to, meaning we must not throw the masses-scant in knowledge-into the sea before we teach them to swim . . .

Warnings to Zarqawi

Zawahiri prefaces his list of warnings by predicting that the “Americans will exit soon” and continues by advocating an elected theocracy:

it’s imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in governance and in the Shura council and in promulgating what is allowed and what is not allowed. In my view . . . this must be achieved through the people of the Shura and who possess authority to determine issues and make them binding, and who are endowed with the qualifications for working in Sharia law. They would be elected by the people of the country to represent them and overlook the work of the authorities in accordance with the rules of the glorious Sharia.

    Political Inclusiveness

Citing Vietnam, Zawahiri warns that “things may develop faster than we imagine,” and that it is therefore necessary to take political, not just military action:

The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam-and how they ran and left their agents-is noteworthy. Because of that, we must be ready starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them. We must take the initiative and impose a fait accompli upon our enemies, instead of the enemy imposing one on us . . .

This authority, or the Sharia amirate that is necessary, requires fieldwork starting now, alongside the combat and war. It would be a political endeavor in which the mujahedeen would be a nucleus around which would gather the tribes and their elders, and the people in positions, and scientists, and merchants, and people of opinion, and all the distinguished ones who were not sullied by appeasing the occupation and those who defended Islam.

He’s learned a lesson from the Taliban and is clearly worried that Zarqawi is making a similar mistake:

We don’t want to repeat the mistake of the Taliban, who restricted participation in governance to the students and the people of Qandahar alone. They did not have any representation for the Afghan people in their ruling regime, so the result was that the Afghan people disengaged themselves from them. Even devout ones took the stance of the spectator and, when the invasion came, the amirate collapsed in days, because the people were either passive or hostile. Even the students themselves had a stronger affiliation to their tribes and their villages than their affiliation to the Islamic amirate or the Taliban movement or the responsible party in charge of each one of them in his place. Each of them retreated to his village and his tribe, where his affiliation was stronger!!

In addition to expressing concern that Zarqawi is insufficiently inclusive, Zawahiri is worried that Zarqawi is deliberately exclusive. He warns Zarqawi to not “highlight the doctrinal differences which the masses do not understand,” as “there may be in the world a heresy or an inadequacy in a side which may have something to give to jihad, fighting, and sacrifice for God.” Accordingly, “we must find a means to include them and benefit from their energy.”

    The Shia

From here, the natural next step is to talk about the Shia, who he condemns as a “danger to Islam” and for having “cooperated with the Americans in the invasion of Afghanistan. He believes, as a matter of historical necessity, that there will be a “collision between any state based on the model of prophecy with the Shia.” However,

. . . the majority of Muslims don’t comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it. For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won’t be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.

This is where Zawahiri really opens up with Zarqawi by saying that questions are circulatiing “among mujahedeen circles and their opinion makers about the correctness of this conflict with the Shia at this time.” The questions include:

Is it something that is unavoidable? Or, is it something can be put off until the force of the mujahed movement in Iraq gets stronger? And if some of the operations were necessary for self-defense, were all of the operations necessary? Or, were there some operations that weren’t called for? And is the opening of another front now in addition to the front against the Americans and the government a wise decision? Or, does this conflict with the Shia lift the burden from the Americans by diverting the mujahedeen to the Shia, while the Americans continue to control matters from afar? And if the attacks on Shia leaders were necessary to put a stop to their plans, then why were there attacks on ordinary Shia? Won’t this lead to reinforcing false ideas in their minds, even as it is incumbent on us to preach the call of Islam to them and explain and communicate to guide them to the truth? And can the mujahedeen kill all of the Shia in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill ordinary Shia considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance? And what loss will befall us if we did not attack the Shia? And do the brothers forget that we have more than one hundred prisoners – many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries – in the custody of the Iranians? And even if we attack the Shia out of necessity, then why do you announce this matter and make it public, which compels the Iranians to take counter measures? And do the brothers forget that both we and the Iranians need to refrain from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us?

    Scenes of Slaughter

The media-conscious Zawahiri warns Zarqawi that

Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable . . . are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages . . . we are ina battle, and . . . more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media . . . we can kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts. We don’t need this.