Unless General Petraeus is a remarkably talented bald-faced liar (as claimed by MoveOn.org), we can safely conclude that the security situation in Iraq is improving. Even more noteworthy than the downtrend in the number of attacks that began in mid-June is the fact that this favorable trend persisted during the most recent two weeks (see page 3 of the Petraeus slides). The militants/insurgents/terrorists have known for as long as have we when Petraeus would be testifying; as well, they have been aware of the doubts in the minds of many Americans regarding the efficacy of the surge. Had they staged a sharply larger number of attacks during the fortnight before the General’s testimony, the rug would have been pulled out from under Petraeus, the doubters would have claimed to have been prescient, and the calls for an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would have intensified. Except for the shouting, it would have been all over.

Now that the surge’s success is undeniable, the advocates of rapid withdrawal must reformulate their argument. Referring to other times during which the security situation showed improvement, they can correctly point out that these promising episodes were short-lived and assert that history will repeat itself. To be credible, this assertion would have to take into account at least two important differences: first, that our military strategy—counter-insurgency—is fundamentally different, and, second, that al-Qaeda has outworn its welcome in Anbar province and elsewhere.

Those who favor rapid withdrawal can also correctly argue that the political progress that was supposed to result from a successful surge is nearly or totally absent. This observation, with which I am in complete agreement, leads to the question which neither General Petraeus nor Ambassador Crocker could satisfactorily answer: even assuming further improvements in the security situation, why should it be believed that the Iraqis will reach a political settlement? And if there is little or no likelihood of such a settlement, why should we stay in Iraq a day longer than is required to safely extricate our soldiers and marines? Why should Americans suffer violence if Iraqis are unable eliminate violence from their dealings with each other?

I have no more confidence in the intentions and abilities of the current Iraqi government than the next man. Therefore, if my analysis of the situation were to take into account only those considerations I have already noted, I would join those who are demanding an early exit. However, there are other considerations, and they persuade me to support the course described by General Petraeus.

The weakness—the critical weakness—of the case argued by the early-exiters is that it fails to consider the possible—and, perhaps, the probable—consequences of a rapid departure. The creation of a power vacuum into which Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Middle East states would be drawn and genocide are two of the most obvious and gravest of these possible consequences. I am unaware of a single instance of an advocate of rapid withdrawal addressing these critical questions. I may disagree with them, but I could respect the views of those (if I could find them) who, having considered and openly admitted the existence of these risks, have decided they are worth taking in return for saving American lives. To favor an early exit without considering the possible consequences is, in my view, irresponsible—especially for politicians.