In an op-ed in last Thursday’s New York Times, Peter Rodman and William Shawcross take aim at those opponents of the Iraq war who “are toying with the idea of American defeat.” Their most scathing words are directed at critics of the war who take a “strange comfort” from the Vietnam war’s outcome, from which, aver the critics, the U.S. recovered and for which “no lasting price was paid.”
While it’s true that the dominoes didn’t fall, the idea that “no lasting price was paid” is a myth. When the last helicopter lifted off from the rooftop of the our embassy in Saigon, Afghanistan wasn’t on the list of potential falling dominoes. Less than five years after that event and with a American president who had earlier proclaimed that it was time to end our “inordinate fear of communism,” the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Would they have done so if our involvement in Vietnam had otherwise ended and the ensuing revulsion against the use of force had not taken place? While there’s no categorical answer to this question, common sense argues that one of the most important components of the Soviet leaders’ risk/reward calculations was their perception of how the United States would react to the USSR’s first-ever military intervention outside of Eastern Europe. Our defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent isolationist sentiment made it easier for the Soviets to decide to take the risk.
Without engaging in historical determinism, it’s fair to say that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan set in motion a chain of events that culminated in 9/11. In the minds of bin Laden and his compatriots, the jihadists had defeated one of the world’s two superpowers and were responsible for its collapse. Having destroyed the godless Soviet Union, it was time to take on Judeo-Christian America.
If the Iraq war ends in a fashion similar to the Vietnam war, it’s certain—yes, a certainty—that al-Qaeda will take credit for it. A propaganda campaign of unprecedented proportions would follow. And, for many, the message would be irresistible: within the span of a single generation, the Soviets had been defeated in Afghanistan and the Americans in Iraq. What better evidence could there be that history (and Allah) is on al-Qaeda’s side?
History isn’t a sequence of unconnected chapters. World War I set the stage for World War II; the second of the two world wars prepared the way for the Cold War. While I don’t question the motives of those for whom defeat in Iraq is acceptable (or even desirable), I do question their wisdom. Opposition to our military intervention in Iraq isn’t a justification for countenancing defeat. Unfortunately, this is a widespread sentiment, as these excerpts from letters to the New York Times editors attest:
“The fact is that the United States has already been defeated in this war, that the defeat was predictable, and was in fact predicted even before the invasion. More important than military defeat, the United States has been morally disgraced both for starting the war and for its conduct of the war, unleashing unfathomable levels of death and misery on Iraqis.”
“A continued United States presence in Iraq will be interpreted only as oil theft or, more generally, as obstinate imperialism. Our only just course of action is the long and arduous task of apologizing for our unilateral aggression, offering full reparations for the human disaster we have caused, and, of course, withdrawing our military from Iraq.”
“Peter W. Rodman and William Shawcross are correct to say that losing the war in Iraq will further destabilize the Middle East, but the time to avoid this calamity was before the United States invaded Iraq.”
“America’s defeat in Iraq occurred the moment we decided on a unilateral invasion based on known false information. It already threw the entire Middle East into greater upheaval. It has also diminished our stature as a nation for many years to come, if not forever.”
Bush has been roundly and soundly criticized for ignoring and misjudging the consequences of invading Iraq. That being the case, isn’t it equally important to assess — not sweep under the rug — the consequences of defeat in Iraq?
Just prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I herad a reporter in Iraq describe the attitudes of the peopel there:
“Before 1991, the Iraqis saw the U.S. in a Vietnam context, as a paper tiger that could not fight. Desert Storm changed that attitude and now they are afraid of what a war with America will bring.”
That says it all, doesn’t it? The loss of Vietnam caused every tin pot dictator in the world to think they need not worry about the U.S. In an interview with the CBS 60 Minutes show in the mid 70’s, Col Kaddafy of Libiya said “You used to be able to rattle your swords and get people to do things, but now your swords are rusty.” After Operation Iraqi Freedom began that same dictator called the Prime Minister of Italy and said “I saw what the Americans did in Iraq and now I will do whatever they want.” That statement clearly made it to the White House. A ship loaded with the material for Libiya’s WMD programs left for the U.S. shortly thereafter; not a shot had been fired.
Much of the suffering in the world can be traced to the results of the loss of Vietnam. The fact that some of us refused to take that loss lying down and ultlmately turned a lost battle into a war won does not change that fact.
Marc, you said, “While I don’t question the motives of those for whom defeat in Iraq is acceptable (or even desirable), I do question their wisdom.”
I do question their motives. The people who desire US defeat in Iraq are completely committed to the destruction of American influence in the world, which they view as wholly inimical. Whether or not they are US citizens, they are enemies of America. I’ve tried to look at things from their perspective and all I can see is that they wish us to be defeated and subjected to rule by some trans-national group of “progressive” elites. I refuse, and I think any truly patriotic American must refuse.
Democrats and Iranian Revolutionary Guard agree on strategy!
Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the former Iranian defense minister and current chairman of the Iranian High Council of Strategic Defense:
“The Guard’s commanders prefer a strategy of low-intensity operations and proxy wars against the United States and its regional allies, notably Israel. Shamkhani has described the strategy as one of “bleeding the enemy slowly over a long period.”
Low-intensity operations and proxy wars sap the morale of the enemy without giving it a pretext for using its superior military might against the Islamic Republic.”
http://www.nypost.com/seven/06122007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/iran__generals_who_fear_a_fight_opedcolumnists_amir_taheri.htm
“Top House Democrats, working in concert with anti-war groups, have decided against using congressional power to force a quick end to U.S. involvement in Iraq, and instead will pursue a slow-bleed strategy designed to gradually limit the administration’s options.”
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0207/2751.html
Not on topic but a favorite of Marc’s:
Tony Blair delivers his final lecture in the Our Nation’s Future series; image copyright Reuters 12 June – PM reflects on role of media
The Prime Minister has delivered his eighth and final lecture in the “Our Nation’s Future” series.
The speech focused on the changing relationship between politics and the media in the 21st Century.
* Read the transcript at:
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page11923.asp
See the webcast at:
http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/about/news/news_item/article/a_conversation_with_tony_blair_event_co_hosted_by_reuters_and_the_reuters_institute_on_12_june_2007.html
* Our Nation’s Future – the lecture series
transcripts and video of all eight lectures are available at:
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page10318.asp
Looks like my html didn’t go through. Here’s a second attempt.
From NY Times
As in Indochina more than 30 years ago, millions of Iraqis today see the United States helping them defeat their murderous opponents as the only hope for their country. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have committed themselves to working with us and with their democratically elected government to enable their country to rejoin the world as a peaceful, moderate state that is a partner to its neighbors instead of a threat. If we accept defeat, these Iraqis will be at terrible risk. Thousands upon thousands of them will flee, as so many Vietnamese did after 1975.
This is a misreading of what is going in Iraq. The current phase of the Iraq campaign is not so neat as this. It isn’t something that can be divided between good Iraqis vs. bad Iraqis (al Qaeda affiliated), rather it is far more complicated.
First, when we look at Iraq today we can plainly see that there is more than one conflict going on. The main conflict is not between Iraq and al Qaeda, rather it is between Sunni Iraqis and Shia Iraqis. Even this conflict is not so clear, in Shia Iraq, we have the Badr organization squaring off against the Mahdi army, both undermining American influence and control in their region. The conflict in the south is also one between Ali al Sistani and Muqtada al Sadr, the latter of which believes in the Khomeneist model of governance, while the former opposes such a project in Iraq. Additionally, in the south we also have a conflict between Iran and the US, playing out and affecting all of these other conflicts. However, even then the lines are not clear cut as both the Badr organization and the Mahdi army are heavily influenced by Iran.
Moving north, we have the Kurds attempting to recover lands from which they were expelled by Hussein, and who have tried to do so by intimidating all non-Kurds into leaving the region. Among these are Christian Arabs, Turkmen, Shiites and others who in turn have joined the ranks of the Sunni insurgency, or have called upon Southern Shiites (particularly the Mahdi Army which opposes Kurdish autonomy) to stave off further Kurdish intrusions into their territory. The Kurds are also trying to deal with the PKK and Turkey, its affiliate and Iran, while also attempting to keep the instability in the rest of Iraq from spilling into Kurdistan.
In the rest of Iraq, we have diverse groups fighting both each other, the US and the Shiite controlled government. The 1920’s brigade and the Islamic Army of Iraq are mainly composed of ex-Baathists and Iraqi (Sunni) nationalists who oppose our presence in the country. These are divided further between the hard core Baathists who want to return the country to the days of Hussein and those who only seek to keep the country united but do not necessarily view another dictatorship as the end goal of their effort. Many of these just want a fairer distribution of power, oil revenues, constitutional reform and the disarmament of the Shiite militias that have wreaked havoc throughout the Sunni community. Further, there is also the al Qaeda-Islamist component to the insurgency. Al Qaeda has since the beginning had trouble establishing itself as a unifying force in Iraq; the reason for this is that under Hussein Iraq was for the most part secular. The only reason al Qaeda got any traction was because it had funding and training pivotal to any successful insurgency. Since then, however, al Qaeda’s excesses and zeal have alienated many parts of Iraq’s Sunni insurgency (as detailed recently in various news reports). The result of this is that some groups have sought American aid in combating al Qaeda, while at the same time demanding that the US give them a timetable for withdrawal. In other words, many Sunnis see the US, al Qaeda, and the Shiite government in Iraq as enemies. They cooperate with one against the others depending on who they see as the most threatening. Initially, they saw the US as the biggest threat. More recently that perception has changed to both the Shiite government in Iraq (and Iran) and al Qaeda. However, while they see both of these as threatening, they also want the US out of Iraq, hence, in order to cooperate with us against al Qaeda many Sunni groups are refusing to do so until the US sets a timetable for withdrawal. The reason for this is that they don’t believe we will ever leave; our Baghdad embassy doesn’t give them much confidence either. The Sunnis also want us to pressure the Shiites and Kurds to modify the constitution and recalculate the oil revenue formula, things which the Shiites and Kurds have been dragging their feet on even while continuing to allow the Shiite militias to exact a heavy toll on the Sunni population.
The picture that brief and generalized picture paints, is far more complex that the single sentence assumption made by both authors to the NY Times piece. In short, we are in a conflict were we are being shot at from all sides. Everyone is fighting their own conflict and we are stuck in the Middle. What’s more, many of these sub-conflicts have little to nothing to do with al Qaeda or our War on Terror. What many of us, who advocate a plan for repositioning our forces outside of Iraq (or like you Mark, quarantining Iraq) want is a strategy that allows us to disentangle ourselves from the myriad of conflicts in Iraq that do not advance our aims one way or another, while either containing the violence within Iraq or looking to ways in which to achieve our main aims in the country. These are, denying al Qaeda a sanctuary in the country, containing Iranian influence, preventing a larger conflagration between Turkey and the Kurds. Some would add establishing a stable government in Baghdad that can rule the country and make it prosper. In the short term, I do not believe that is possible and think that the most we can do is to either separate the sides along the lines of Sen. Biden’s plan. Having a strong central government in Baghdad won’t work, first, the Kurds don’t want one, the Sunnis won’t trust it so long as the Shiite militias and parties such as SCIRI, DAWA and Sadr’s party control it, and the Shiites in the government cannot create one so long as they continue to focus on religious-tribal identity as the main characteristics desirable for promoting leaders. Already there are signs in Southern Iraq that the opium trade is further splintering Shiite groups who are now fighting for control of the lucrative trade, the more instability, the less likely that a functioning government will emerge.
Will thousands of Iraqis flee the country? Yes, but millions have already done so. The problem with framing the issue in this way is that it makes this into a contest between al Qaeda and the US, when the reality of it is much more complex; understanding that reality can point to a way to withdraw without loosing the larger war. If we understand that the Sunnis just want us to withdraw, then we can deal with the majority of them. The price: Get them to fight and expel al Qaeda. The loot: We give them a timetable for our withdrawal, contingent upon their fulfillment of their pledge.
As for the argument on being misguided by looking at Vietnam, this is incorrect. Looking beyond Vietnam is what allowed Nixon to split the Sino-Soviet alliance, and establishing a security umbrella over East Asia, allowing for the rise of the Asian tigers. Why? Because Nixon and Kissinger looked beyond the myopic focus on Vietnam to larger strategic considerations.
Less than five years after that event and with a American president who had earlier proclaimed that it was time to end our “inordinate fear of communism,†the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Would they have done so if our involvement in Vietnam had otherwise ended and the ensuing revulsion against the use of force had not taken place?
That is only part of the argument, the Soviets also invaded Afghanistan because they misjudged the level of support Moscow enjoyed in the country. They assumed that Afghanis would welcome Moscow with open arms and flowers, this since the Soviet Union had for years provided financial aid and assistance to the government in Kabul. They did not expect the backlash they encountered there. They also did not expect that the U.S. would move to aid Afghan mujaheeden covertly in an attempt to give the Soviets their own Vietnam, which we did. The fact that the Soviet Union collapsed shortly after their defeat in Afghanistan has as much to do with US involvement (if not more) than with the involvement of OBL and the foreign mujaheeden who came to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad against the Communists.
While it is true that the defeat of the Soviets had a great impact on OBL and led to the creation of al Qaeda, it wasn’t because of what happened in Vietnam, rather the direct cause of the rise of al Qaeda was that after the end of the Cold War, both Republicans and Democrats wanted to cash in the peace dividend. As such, we abandoned Afghanistan to its own devices, allowed the Kabul government to fall, Pakistan to play kingmaker and finally the rise of the Taliban. In short, it wasn’t Vietnam that led to the rise of al Qaeda, it was our own disinterest in the aftermath of the Soviet defeat and withdrawal that allowed that to happen.
If the Iraq war ends in a fashion similar to the Vietnam war, it’s certain—yes, a certainty—that al-Qaeda will take credit for it. A propaganda campaign of unprecedented proportions would follow. And, for many, the message would be irresistible: within the span of a single generation, the Soviets had been defeated in Afghanistan and the Americans in Iraq. What better evidence could there be that history (and Allah) is on al-Qaeda’s side?
While this is a possibility, it matters more on how we end the Iraq war. What do I mean by this? If we continue with a failed strategy, or refuse to accept that the “new†strategy has failed, then this is a certainty. As I argued above, recognizing what we are dealing with in a realistic fashion is more important than sloganeering. Reducing the Iraq campaign to just a conflict between al Qaeda and the US gives our enemies a power they do not have, and makes the end point these authors fear far more possible. Notice in my own description of what we are facing in Iraq that the battle lines are not so clear cut. If we recognize this, and craft a strategy based on such a more realistic assessment of what the Iraq campaign is, we can see opportunities (such as engaging and negotiating with Iraqi Sunnis to defeat al Qaeda) that looking at this solely through the US and Iraqis vs. al Qaeda lens does not make possible.
Hence, when some people (including me) call for a strategic redeployment, it isn’t because I want us to be defeated in Iraq, rather it is because I do not believe that our ultimate aims are served by fighting a myriad of conflicts that have little if anything to do with the war on terror. As such, I am looking for a strategy that addresses the danger of al Qaeda in Iraq, while also disentangling us from the other conflicts outlined above in a way that not only allows us to contain them, but also to refocus on the larger war on terror, which at the end of the day encompasses a battle space that stretches far beyond Iraq, and whose ultimate outcome (although influenced by Iraq) will not be dictated by it.
What don’t you get about the fact—and I think it is a fact and an abvious, glaring one—that the United states has already lost the war in iraq. Its not about considering the consequences, its about coping with the defeat, learning from the countless mistakes made, and trying to repair the damage done to he Iraqi and American victims, the region and the US position in the world.
Deal with it. Its over but for the killing and dying. We lost. the era of American global dominance is coming to an end and just as well. The world isn’t ours to dominate. We aren’t a goddam shining city on a hill. We aren’t a beacon unto the nations or any of that American exceptionalist nonsense. We commit acts of aggression. We target civilian populations. We torture prisoners of war. We send our brave and loyal young men and women into battles on false pretenses and keep them there because people like all of you care more your nationalist fantasies than you do the lives of your neighbors children. Your delusions are not a good enough reason to kill our kids and empty our treasury. US out of Iraq NOW.
Let’s accept your premise that we’ve lost. Tell me what you think the consequences are. I assume you care what the consequences are. Or am I wrong?
It is patently ridiculous to label the US invasion of Iraq as a war which can be “won” or “lost”. I challenge anyone to define either situation. What is “victory” in Iraq? It is clear that many equate withdrawal with surrender; surrender to whom? If you are unsure, look up the word; surrender implies submission to another. To whom would “we” be submitting? With whom would we negotiate the terms of victory? In fact, how can this be considered to be a war? With whom are we at war? When was war declared?
Here is yet another misnomer: “We” are not in this conflict. Note carefully the contrast. Iraqis are in it, with no choice as to their participation. American citizens are not involved for the most part—unless you count observation, interpretation, and commentary as involvement.
It is a powerful demonstration of sentimentally-tinged, infantile logic to compare Iraq to Viet Nam. Both are embarrassing. The sources here are beyond laughable, including the non-existent source for the crackpot theory that the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan because of US withdrawal with no results in Viet Nam. Go back and read what was said of the now-defunct Evil Empire during its Afghani Adventure: “Didn’t they learn anything from Viet Nam?” pretty much sums it up. I notice that the result of that drawn-out invasion with no positive results is conveniently ignored. And how did they leave Afghanistan? Was it a breeding ground for Taliban terrorism before they invaded?
The consequences of having spent billions of dollars and indelibly altered thousands of American lives in Iraq are dire. We are living them now. Have you ever seen someone try to resist arrest? The US looks like the stereotypical redneck fool, shirtless and drunk on the porch of a trailer home, threatening the police. The jig is up; “We” are merely in profound denial. The difference is that our country is being run by people who do not recognize any higher authority than their own foolish and stubborn pride.
It seems as though all that you’re concerned with here is America’s reputation. That was trashed years ago, when “We” ignored the UN, i.e., the rest of the world. The consequences are economical and social; “We” will be in debt for the war for decades to come, and “Our” citizens’ mistrust of government is at an all-time high. On the bright side, the conflict’s thousands upon thousands of wounded is already bringing about a revolution in cybernetics.
The ultimate price to pay will be division. Deep disagreements which already existed will be sealed for generations based on the interpretation of the outcome of the invasion. Iraq is already a breeding ground for terrorists—that, as we say here in Texas, is a done deal. The only question is how much longer “We” will continue to avoid the obvious. I understand that it’s very difficult to admit failure; recall that failure is not the opposite of success. It is often a prerequisite.
If Iraq is not a war, please inform us what it is?
If there is no victory or defeat in Iraq. then how do you define the end for Iraq?
If your recognized end in Iraq is failure. What will happen as a result of the failure?
Why can’t you tell us the likely end product of your analysis?
Why don’t you say that it will result in a humanitarian disaster on a scale far worse than the present struggle? A result called “Iraq plus” by some. Or are you so short sighted that you cannot consider or comprehend that such a result is likely.
Just curious, but is America also responsible for Hamas defeating Fatah in Gaza?
I think that something being glossed over here by the “we’re already beaten” apologists is that we are not only fighting militant Islam rampant (and if you don’t recognize that fact we have nothing more to discuss—your worldview is so far from obvious reality that we literally don’t speak the same language), we are also fighting an international movement of socialists and other extreme leftists that is opportunistically trying to weaken America in any way possible. This movement is largely in control of the mainstream international media and isn’t even pretending to be even-handed in its treatment of American actions. It is waging a disinformation war against America as surely as the Islamists are waging a violent one. And it is having significant success in convincing even Americans of the truth of its assertions even when those assertions can be proven to be inaccurate.
The sad fact is that this second front isn’t being contested by anyone in authority. It’s left to those of us who recognize its existence to try to stanch the flow of misinformation.
Considering the Consequences of Withdrawal from Iraq…
Peter W Rodman and William Shawcross argue in a NYT op-ed that the consequences of defeat in Iraq would be as disastrous for the region and for the United States as the 1975 Communist victory in Vietnam was for Cambodia and Vietnam.Defeat would embolde…
English pop group…
Take That is an English pop band formed by Gary Barlow, Howard Donald, Jason Orange, Mark Owen, and, formerly, Robbie Williams. All perform primarily on vocals though each have some instrumental talent/song-writing capability….