A year ago, I averred that “[o]ne of the least talked-about but most consequential results of a failure to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power is that it would almost certainly persuade the Saudis to follow suit.” In that post, I quoted Saudi Prince Naef bin Ahmed Al-Saud, a colonel in the Saudi Armed Forces with responsibilities for strategic planning as follows:
Though nations can’t choose their location, they can determine how to deal with geographic realities. Surrounded by states with great ambitions, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is as large as the United States east of the Mississippi and has vast wealth for a relatively small population. Not only does it have huge oil reserves; its extensive coastlines on both the Red Sea and Persian Gulf overlook nearby vital sealanes. It also has long borders with neighbors. Despite its size, most oil fields as well as many ports and urban centers are close to other local powers. Saudi Arabia must weigh the implications of its geostrategic location and international politics as various states pursue dominance in the area.[emphasis added] This applies not only to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, but also to the Horn of Africa, another area suffering from chronic instability.
In an article titled “Eye on Iran, Rivals Pursuing Nuclear Power,” today’s New York Times has this to say:
- Two years ago, the leaders of Saudi Arabia told international atomic regulators that they could foresee no need for the kingdom to develop nuclear power. Today, they are scrambling to hire atomic contractors, buy nuclear hardware and build support for a regional system of reactors.
So, too, Turkey is preparing for its first atomic plant. And Egypt has announced plans to build one on its Mediterranean coast. In all, roughly a dozen states in the region have recently turned to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for help in starting their own nuclear programs. While interest in nuclear energy is rising globally, it is unusually strong in the Middle East.
“The rules have changed,†King Abdullah II of Jordan recently told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. “Everybody’s going for nuclear programs.â€
The Middle East states say they only want atomic power. Some probably do. But United States government and private analysts say they believe that the rush of activity is also intended to counter the threat of a nuclear Iran.
Avoiding nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East is the most important reason to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The possibility of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims—enemies for more than 1,300 years—targeting each other with nuclear weapons is the most frightening future I can think of. Not next year or the year after. But maybe in time for the centennial of the First World War.
The C.I.A. said that having only 6,000 centrifuges in the Iranian cascade is enough for a single nuclear bomb.
The I.A.E.A. says Iran will have enough fissile material within five to six years, tops.
Iran announced that it will complete construction of the first 6,000 of its planned 60,000 centrifuges by the end of this year.
Iranian oil exports have started to collapse (since 2004), greatly increasing internal economic and political tensions in Iran.
By its nature, theofascism (the ‘learned jurisprudent’) in Iran is an ideology which is eternally expansionist, forever hostile, aggrieved by its perception of inferiority even as it struts its moral superiority, and actively seeks confrontation as a measure of its ‘honor.’ The capture of British sailors is but a beginning.
If Iran doesn’t become the larger issue in our 2008 presidential elections than Iraq, events are likely to force the next American president’s hand by 2012. At the most recent projections (December, 2006, National Academy of Sciences), despite sitting on top of the world’s second largest proven reserves, Iranian oil exports drop to zero in 2011.
If you were a fascist government, and suddenly going steadily broke, by your nature what would YOU do?
NY Times article on interview of John McCain:
“No Plan B For Iraq”
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/us/politics/15mccain.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin
Hope Link works. There was no “share” link provided. From that page there is a link to the full interview (but cleaned up for clarity.)
Avoiding nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East is the most important reason to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The possibility of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims—enemies for more than 1,300 years—targeting each other with nuclear weapons is the most frightening future I can think of. Not next year or the year after. But maybe in time for the centennial of the First World War.
As I’ve argued before, I don’t think this is a possible anymore. Our decision to allow both India and Pakistan to become nuclear powers in effect pushed Iran to pursue its own nuclear development. Iran considers itself the regional hegemon in the region, and acquiring nuclear weapons is much more about status than anything else, that is one of the main reasons why even though Iranians oppose the theocracy, they still support the nuclear program. If you look far enough, our decision to allow Israel to maintain a posture of nuclear ambiguity allowed for this sort of proliferation in the Middle East. During the Cold War, when the US and the Soviets could manage their client states Israel’s acquisition of nukes was contained. However, once the Soviet Union excited the scene the strategic landscape changed pushing not only Iran but also Iraq (prior to the First Gulf War) to pursue a nuclear program. The current situation progressed from there, and following our take down of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, only made the acquisition of these weapons more expedient for the regime.
As I’ve argued before, our problem with Iran acquiring nuclear weapons has always been their rulers, after all, we had no such qualms about Iran and nuclear power when we were handing the technology to the Shah. As such, the best way to deal with Iran is to find a means of ensuring that by the time they acquire nuclear power, the theocracy will no longer exists. We know from the Castro example in Cuba, that isolation and sanctions don’t work, and in fact make the regime stronger. In fact, that policy has gotten us the longest serving dictatorship in our hemisphere. As such, we need to find a better strategy for opening up Iran, as that is what Ahmedinejad fears most. The more closed a society is to the outside world, the better the regime is able to control its population.
In the Persian Gulf, we know that our take-down of Hussein and the Taliban helped Iran almost as much, if not more, than it helped us because they were both its enemies. As argued before, we also share a common enemy in the Sunni Salafi Jihadists who threaten us as much as they threaten the Shiite regime. That is one of the main reasons why prior to September 11, 2001 Iran along with India were the biggest financiers to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. In saying this, I am not saying that Iran is “good” rather that me have to recognize that we have shared interests and we should take advantage of these to bring Iran back into the fold.