Suppose you were the President of the United States, and like President Bush, you were (1) committed to preventing Iran from becoming a member of the nuclear weapons club, (2) seeking to persuade Iran to stop meddling in Iraq, (3) uncertain as to whether an air attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities using conventional weapons would result in more than a minor setback to Iran’s program, (4) facing domestic and international opposition to the use of force against Iran, and (5) concerned about the impact of your actions on the price of oil.
In what manner and under what circumstances would you choose to act?
For reasons that will later become apparent, an excellent way to begin to answer this question is to look back at the measures short of war undertaken following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. In doing so, I rely on Freedman and Karsh’s The Gulf Conflict, a book widely recognized as the definitive account of that war.
IRAQ, 1990
Within hours after the invasion, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 660, which demanded that Iraq “withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.” Four days later, in Resolution 661, the UNSC, invoking Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, decided that all member states must prevent the “import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution.” [emphasis added].
On August 25, the UNSC, noting that it was “gravely alarmed” that Iraq had failed to comply with its earlier resolutions, adopted Resolution 665, which called upon member states deploying naval forces “to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances . . . to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions relating to such shipping laid down in resolution 661.”
With this act, the UNSC sanctioned an embargo of Iraq and Iraq-occupied Kuwait. By so doing, the flow of oil from two of the world’s principal oil-producing countries was abruptly and completely stopped.
Only weeks before the embargo was authorized, OPEC had agreed to increase the price of oil from $18 to $21 per barrel. By the time Iraq’s takeover of Kuwait was an established fact, the price had risen to $23. Fear that Saddam’s next stop was Saudi Arabia pushed the price up to $27. This sharp price increase led to fear of a worldwide recession, as had occurred following the quadrupling of oil’s price in late 1973 and its doubling in early 1979.
A potential mitigating factor was the fact that a number of oil-producing countries had surplus production capacity. In particular, Saudi Arabia could pick up two-thirds of the production shortfall resulting from the embargo. Six days before Resolution 665 was adopted, the Saudi Oil Minister announced that the Kingdom would increase its production by 37%. Other OPEC countries followed suit. By December, oil’s price had fallen to $20 per barrel. Fear of an economic crisis evaporated.
IRAN, 2007
As I have previously noted, the January 19 issue of the Wall Street Journal reported that, for the first time in 20 years, oil consumption by the 30 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) declined in 2006. The Journal, it can be safely surmised, has close ties to the Bush Administration, and it is within this context that the following excerpt pertaining to a recent statement by the Saudi oil minister should be viewed:
- In remarks to reporters in New Delhi this week, Mr. Naimi said the kingdom’s spare-capacity cushion would expand to three million barrels a day by Feb 1 . . . That is a half-million barrels a day more than is exported by Iran, whose nuclear-research standoff with the U.S. has stirred jitters about supply disruptions in the Persian Gulf.. [emphasis added]
The Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland reacted to Naimi’s remarks by saying that they “seemed to give teeth to recent warnings issued in private by Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi national security adviser, that the kingdom will now respond to Iranian hostility with its own confrontational tactics.”
As in 1990, then, the Saudis are able to compensate for the interruption of oil shipments from other suppliers and, equally important, are signaling their intention to do so should the situation warrant. The situation this time, of course, would be the disruption of Iranian oil shipments, which could happen at the behest of the Iranian government or, more to the point, as a result of American (and allied) actions. The question is whether these actions would or would not be measures short of war.
The Saudi statement came only a few days after Bush’s January 10 address, which made no mention of negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program, its involvement in Iraq’s sectarian conflict, or its support of Hezbollah and Hamas. With that policy option having been removed from the board, he said that the U.S. “will seek out and destroy” the Iranian and Syrian networks “providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq. Continuing, the President said that (1) he had “recently ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group to the region,” (2) the U.S. will “expand intelligence-sharing and deploy Patriot air defense systems to reassure our friends and allies, and (3) “we will work with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region.”iii
Mustafa Alani, a military analyst with the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center, commented on Secretary of State Rice’s meetings with America’s Middle East allies by saying she “is promising the U.S. will stand firm against Iran. But without a show of force, without backing these words with muscle, no one will take the U.S. seriously, whether in Tehran or any Arab capital.” Alani added the escalating U.S. combat power did not mean that Washington was headed toward a showdown with Iran; rather, the Pentagon may be preparing for tough U.S. action against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and the retaliation that could follow. [emphasis added]
Bush’s critics were quick to pounce upon his rejection of the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation that negotiations be opened with Iran and Syria. For its part, the New York Times said “The nation needs an eyes-wide-open recognition that the only goal left is to get the U.S. military out of this civil war in a way that could minimize the slaughter of Iraqis and reduce the chances that the chaos Mr. Bush unleashed will engulf Iraq’s neighbors. What it certainly did not need were more of Mr. Bush’s open-ended threats to Iran and Syria.”iii It is unclear whether the “open-ended threats” was a reference to carrier strike group deployment. Presumably, the deployment of air defense systems could not be construed as such a threat.
Five days after the President’s address, Defense Secretary Gates embarked on a trip to Europe and the Middle East. Speaking to reporters at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Gates said that the U.S. was building up its forces to demonstrate its resolve to remain in the Persian Gulf: “The Iranians clearly believe that we are tied down in Iraq, that they’re in a position to press us in many ways . . . We are simply trying to communicate to the region that we are going to be there for a long time.”
Soon thereafter, at a meeting in Bahrain, Gates played down the possibility of American military action against Iran and said it was not the right time for diplomatic engagement: “Frankly, right at this moment there’s really nothing the Iranians want from us, and so in any negotiation right now we would be the supplicant.” He told the emir of Qatar that the U.S. did not intend to retreat from its commitments to defend the region’s Sunni Arab governments. At the same meeting, a senior Defense department official said “Our Arab friends tend to see Iraq in the context of the new challenge from Iran. That’s clearly the Saudi perspective. So the secretary was able to reassure them that we want an Iraq that is a barrier against Iranian expansionism.” [emphasis added]
Between the first and second of Gates’ statements, America’s Persian Gulf allies endorsed the goals on Bush’s new Iraq strategy. The six foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), along with those of Egypt and Jordan, issued a statement that “welcomed the commitment” of the U.S. to stabilizing Iraq. Asked about regional worries about Iran, Sheik Muhammed of Kuwait said the ministers had agreed to a “call for all countries to refrain from interfering in Iraqi internal affairs” and added “This is something that we are all concerned about.”
While the U.S. was reassuring its Arab allies and rounding up their support, Iran’s Ahmadinejad was encountering criticism from the mullahs. In a January 18 article, the New York Times reported that he “appears to be under pressure from the highest authorities in Iran to end his involvement in the country’s nuclear program.” For the Times, this is “a sign that his political capital is declining as his country comes under increasing international pressure.”
Two of Tehran’s “hard-line” newspapers, including one owned by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called on Ahmadinejad to stay out of “all matters nuclear.” Reacting to his comment that the December 23 UNSC resolution is “a piece of torn paper,” Khamenei’s newspaper said the nuclear issue requires its own diplomacy, “sometimes toughness and sometimes flexibility.” The second newspaper, run by an aide to Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijini, also pressed him to end his involvement with the nuclear program.
The same Times article also reported that the Iranian economy is in trouble:
- In a letter, 150 lawmakers criticized the president for his economic policies, which have led to a surge in inflation, and for his failure to submit his annual budget for next year in time.
- Iran’s stock market, which was already in a slump, continued to decline more rapidly in the past month as buyers stayed away. The daily Kargozaran reported last week the number of traders decreased by 46 percent since the UNSC resolution was passed. “The resolution has had a psychological effect on people,†said Ali Hagh, an economist in Tehran. “It does not make sense for investors not to consider political events when they want to invest their money.â€
- The Kargozaran also reported that a group of powerful businessmen, the Islamic Coalition Party, met with Mohammad Nahavandian, a senior official at the Supreme National Security Council, and called for moderation in the country’s nuclear policies to prevent further damage to the economy.
- Eight major European banks have severed their business ties with Iran. Economists say that move by the banks will also lead to a further increase in the inflation because importers must turn to complicated ways to finance purchases.
In a recent op-ed, Jim Hoagland commented on Iran’s economic woes: “The United States wants European Union nations to deny export credits to Iran and to encourage their banks to join a campaign led by the U.S. Treasury to squeeze Iranian financial institutions linked to their government’s support for terrorism in the Middle East. Iran’s poorly managed oil fields are in desperate need of new foreign technology and investment, making Iran vulnerable to this kind of pressure.”
The latest example of America’s effort to squeeze Iran’s economy was earlier this month, when the Treasury Department barred American financial institutions from doing business with Bank Sepah, which it concluded had been involved in illicit weapons programs. Last year, the United States took similar action against Bank Saderat, another of Iran’s major institutions, citing what it said was the bank’s involvement in financing terrorism. Both Bank Saderat and Bank Sepah, cited for financial transactions linked to weapons proliferation, are state owned or controlled. Though the two banks have virtually no direct links to American banks, the designation means that no American bank can help facilitate—by transferring dollars, for example—any transaction between a European bank and Bank Sepah. Thus if an Italian or German bank wanted to supply dollars for a transaction involving Bank Sepah, it would be unable to do so because American banks would be barred from transferring them.
NOW AND THEN: A COMPARISON
The most sensitive and objective indicator of the likelihood of U.S. military action against Iran is the trend in the price of oil. After Bush’s speech and before the Saudi statement regarding its spare production capacity, oil traders, had they believed that military action against Iran was in the cards, would have boosted oil’s price. No such event took place, as shown in the following graphic:
When the UNSC authorized an embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil in 1990, oil’s price was trending upward. Now, it is in a downtrend. Thus, from the perspective of the health of the world economy, the risks associated with the imposition of an embargo are lower now than they were then.
Because of the massive debts incurred during its war with Iran during the 1980s, Iraq’s economy was a mess when it invaded Kuwait. However, because Saddam was a totalitarian dictator, he did not have to worry about discontent among the people; any displays of public outrage over economic conditions, had they occurred, would have been ruthlessly suppressed. As indicated by the above-noted indications of concern regarding the economic repercussions of Ahmadinejad’s histrionics, such is not the case in Iran. In my view, then, the imposition of an embargo would intensify the growing opposition, resulting, perhaps, in his removal from office.
Conditions are ripe, then, for embargoing Iranian oil, and the deployment of the second carrier task force to the Persian Gulf should be viewed in the context of enforcing an embargo. Should an embargo take place, it is unlikely, in view of the positions of Russia and China, that it would be authorized by the UNSC. Far more likely, it would result from an agreement among the U.S., Great Britain, France, and Germany. In positing this, I am recalling that, because of Russia’s opposition, it was NATO, acting without UN authorization, that dislodged Serbian forces from Kosovo. The dispatch of Patriot air defense systems to America’s Middle Eastern allies is being taken to protect them from Iranian retaliation for the possible imposition of an embargo.
Perhaps the conditions are being created for negotiations with Iran. In return for abandoning its uranium enrichment program, the U.S. and its European allies will not impose an embargo on Iranian oil.
- The San Diego Union-Tribune reports that the aircraft carrier Stennis and its supporting ships are expected to reach the Persian Gulf in about a month, joining the Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier strike group and it will be the first time since the invasion of Iraq that two carrier battle groups are stationed simultaneously in the Gulf.↩
- The commander of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain has said that two carriers will be kept in the Middle East “as long as the situation demands it.” A typical carrier deployment lasts six months.↩
- Notwithstanding its indictment of his speech, the Times, in a subsequent editorial, averred that the expanding power of Iran “is profoundly unsettling to the conservative Sunni-led governments in most of the Arab Middle East that have been America’s traditional allies in the region.”↩
I think this is a good, tough, sensible thing to do and, consequently, we won’t do it.
As you know, I am partial to negotiating with Iran, precisely because of what you have cited above. Mainly that Ahmedinejad is losing support among all sectors of Iranian society, including the leadership which actually controls Iranian foreign policy and its nuclear program. In addition, young Iranians are craving the end of the theocracy, but since they have been unable to tear it down have made a bargain with the mullahs that basically says “you pretend to rule” and “we’ll pretend to listen.”
That said, and given our current imbroglio in Iraq, the perception in Iran is that we are weakened and hence they have more leverage to set the terms for any negotiations. As such, I would support moves to strengthen our position so that we can improve our position.
However, one problem you did not address in this discussion is what happens to Afghanistan. Already, there are reports that Iran is stepping up its involvement in Afghanistan following a similar strategy to that it has followed in Iraq, mainly to tie us down as much as possible to prevent any American moves against it. At the same time, due to Afghanistan’s diplomatic spats with Pakistan over support for the insurgents, Iran is the only available route for imports and exports to make it out of the country, hence, if we embargo Iran, we destroy what little there is of Afghanistan’s economy.
This is important because spring is coming soon, and with it, a more vigorous Taliban offensive in the country, that would seek to take advantage of any economic down turn fto further enhance its position vis a vis the Karzai government.
Similarly, while Patriot missiles can protect our allies in the region from Iranian conventional threats, we cannot protect against unconventional guerrilla or terrorist attacks on vital choke points for oil coming from the Middle East, such as the Straits of Hormuz. In recent history al Qaeda disabled one of our ships (USS Cole) with a dingy rigged with explosives, Iran probably has better resources to accomplish something equally horrific but instead of targeting American military vessels it could target oil tankers. After all, what good is Saudi Arabia’s additional reserves if they can’t get to the market?
In addition, Iranians being such a nationalistic people, it is also likely that rather than erode Ahmedinejad’s power, we enhance it. The reason, the nuclear program is popular in Iran whether for energy purposes of armaments. It is viewed as a nationalistic enterprise and any attempt by the West to stop it will be seen by Iranians as an imposition on their national interest and they will act accordingly. That is in fact, one of the sources of Ahmedinejad’s power, he uses virulent rhetoric to isolate Iran and then tags anyone within who disagrees with him as American/Jewish spies. This makes it harder for moderates and even conservatives who oppose his brand of populism to attack him or argue against his views.
Knowing who holds real power in Iran (not Ahmedinejad) gives us a better means of crafting strategy. It is obvious that even Khamenei does not want to take the country down the path Ahmedinejad wants to go. The Op-eds in his newspaper and Larjani’s suggest that they are both a signal to Ahmedinejad and to the west that there are other voices (with far more power) willing to negotiate and find a way out of the impasse.
nykrindc
Every policy, including the threat, if not the actuality, of an embargo carries risks, as you have pointed out.
You seem to be suggesting that we negotiate with the “real powers” in Iran and that this would be preferable to an embargo. Since to negotiate means to be willing to compromise and to make concessions, what compromises and concessions would you be willing to make? In particular, are you willing to concede to Iran’s demand that it continue uranium enrichment?
“You seem to be suggesting that we negotiate with the ‘real powers’ in Iran and that this would be preferable to an embargo.”
In addition, he doesn’t mention exactly who these “real powers” might be or how to go about contacting them.
The real problem is one of Ahmedinejad’s faith. I believe that he sincerely believes that his actions will precipitate the coming of the 12th Imam. He believes that if he must follow through with these actions which may include attacking Israel. He believes the 12th Imam will then appear to set things right.
Folks, we have a religious maniac with potential access to nuclear weapons who feels that the use of those weapons will fulfill prophesy. We have no effective deterrent for that mind of madness. In fact, he will see turoil in Iraq as further evidence of the coming of the Mahdi.
* he 6th Shi’a Imam, Jafar al-Sadiq, is reported to have said:
“Before the appearance of the one who will rise, peace be upon him, the people will be reprimanded for their acts of disobedience by a fire that will appear in the sky and a redness that will cover the sky. It will swallow up Baghdad, and will swallow up Kufa. Their blood will be shed and houses destroyed. Death will occur amid their people and a fear will come over the people of Iraq from which they shall have no rest.”
1). The greatest threat to the export of Wahhabism (“religious imperialism”) is the export of Khomeinism (“theofascism”, or what Mike Ledeen for 28 years has called “clerical fascism”). Which viper do we embrace to hold the other at bay?
2). The “Shi’a Crescent” (King of Jordan’s phrase) is shaped like a scimitar across the sea lanes of the Middle East. As Admiral Mahan wrote long ago, whoever has controlled the sea lanes for the past three hundred years controlled the planet. The choke-point is the Straights of Hormuz.
3). Iran has finally started to receive Russia’s state-of-the-art TOR-1 anti-cruise, anti-stealth, anti-aircraft batteries. And if Iran’s just-tested super-cavitation torpedos are all they are cracked up to be (200 MPH), then the Straights of Hormuz might become an underwater graveyard for our Nimitz class carriers (Sweden, by the way, already has technology which has successfully ‘killed’ every Nimitz carrier in joint war games: Ouch!).
4). The Iranian nuclear cascade will be completed in nine more years (at 6,000 centrifuges per year). At exactly the same time, Iran’s oil exports evaporate to zero. Not exactly a recipe for ‘stability.’
5). Ahmadinejad’s a nut-case, and the mullahs know it. Trouble is, he is as populist as he is devout, and his respected religiosity is also millenialist, making him just about the last person in Iran we would want to back into a corner. He has already seen the green glow of approval from the 12th Iman, so everything he does and says comes with divine approbation. A killing combination: populism, idealism, and determinism (see Marx and Hitler).
5). What to do? First, toss the useless (India) NNP Treaty out the window, then open up U.S. diplomacy to assisting ‘friendly’ Muslim states develop peaceful nuclear power, if they desire. France and Germany and Russia would fall all over themselves trying to horn in construction contracts. Second, the Navy better have a well-considered plan of what to do when the Tor-1’s are operational. If the Nimitz carriers of today are about to become the battleships of yesterday undone by new technology, then sailing more battle groups into the Gulf isn’t the answer: Nuclear submarines, though… Third, Iran definitely sees its ideology now as ascendent, and the U.S.’s philosophy as descending. Theofascism is NOT an ideology which is patient or normative; they will strike if we are weak, and they will strike if provoked, and they will strike if they ever come to believe that they are perceived to be weak. Fascism, by its aggressive and expansionist nature, has never been contained once it captured a government, and it is utterly unresponsive to power politics or diplomacy. Fourth: Counter-intuitively, pick a fight after the millenialist, Ahmadinejad, is no longer in office. Choose where and when. Tell the Iranian military it’s coming anyway, so, as Mr. Reagan snarled at Mr. Gorbachev, ‘Let’s do it.’ But Iran’s theofascism will never back down as Mr. Gorbachev did (his military told him it was hopeless), so don’t ever threaten Iran without a complete willingness to engage in a devastating war. Put the Iranian military on the hot seat: they are intensely patriotic, but also want to survive; it’s the mullahs who seek suicidal death (Abraham’s ‘sacrifice is a virtue’). Frankly, a military coup, even a military dictatorship in Iran, is far better for us, for the Iranian people, for the entire Midddle East than a fanatically religious theocratic government of “the learned jurisprudent” with a millenialist in charge. If Iran has a Pinochet in the wings, let’s play nice (Kirkpatrick’s research shows right-wing dictatorships evolve into democracy earlier than left-wing; theofascism is, however, a new breed).
Essentially: wait out the end of the term of office for the fanatic Ahmadinejad, prepare for non-invasive war (another Kosovo) while developing Iranian democratic dissidents, threaten the existential survival of Iran’s military if they continue to follow the mullahs, and if all that doesn’t work, pick a fight sometime early in the next decade…and fight to win, which means nobody from any generation of the Bush family is invited.
You seem to be suggesting that we negotiate with the “real powers†in Iran and that this would be preferable to an embargo.
No, I agree with you that we need the threat of an embargo to dispel Iranian perceptions that we are weak and too tied up in Iraq to go after them in any manner military. Then to negotiate with the real power behind Iran’s government, mainly Ayatollah Khamenei, who seems to be suggesting (in allowing these op-eds to be published) that he does not like Ahmedinejad’s course of action and is willing to go a different route. That’s enough to begin to make contacts, and in so doing undermine Ahmedinejad’s power further by displaying his very real impotence with regard to International Relations and the nuclear issue. Khamenei makes all final decisions on these two subjects and we should use Larjani, and Kharrazi, and even conservatives such as Rafsanjani to prod for any possible concessions particularly if as you say, they are feeling the pinch.
Since to negotiate means to be willing to compromise and to make concessions, what compromises and concessions would you be willing to make? In particular, are you willing to concede to Iran’s demand that it continue uranium enrichment?
I’ve already addressed these points here in various comments, and in my own blog. Mainly, we go in with an open mind, see what the Iranians want from us (if anything) and what we are willing to offer. I suspect they will want us to deal with the issue of Kurdish separatists operating from Iraq to attack Iranian installations, and other militant grous, which we have labeled as terrorists from having bases in Iraq. Another issue, will likely be economic, as in removing sanctions and allowing foreign companies free reign to invest in Iran and jump start its economy. Also, give guarantees of non-aggression (theirs in Iraq, ours against them) so that China can be confident that its oil and natural gas supplies from Iran are protected and not in danger from US attack. Given the revenue they already receive and the potential yet to come, I suspect this could be a good incentive. China would pressure Iran on this front as it would like nothing more than to secure its energy supplies and fears a further conflagration between the US and Iran. Additionally, now Iran is now engaging in actions that are damaging not only to us, but to them in the long term (supporting Sunni insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq because they want to keep the US busy and away from Iran). These insurgents are many times virulently anti-Shia so in essence, in the long term they are shooting themselves in the foot.
I’ve laid out other things we could negotiate, some more controversial, others less, but we at least have to talk to them to find out if there’s an opening anywhere and if there is, to exploit it. This since, if Syria sees us talking to Iran, they will get caught in a prisoner’s dilemma where they will fear being left out of any deal and hence more likely to seek one of their own. Already they have tried with the Israelis, who knows what would happen if they see Iran and the US engaging as opposed to letting Ahmedinejad (a man with no power on either the nuclear issue or International Relations other than his bluster) control us and prevent us from seeking accommodation as we did with the Soviets (who had hundreds of missiles aimed at American cities). Iran knows that we can obliterate them with nukes so a threat to us won’t apply, and Israel’s arsenal is varied (air, ground and sea nukes) so they have MAD situation on their hands. The Ayatollah has already proven he’s a rational actor pursuing what he sees as the best interests of the country, while also being flexible to negotiations (under the right circumstances, meaning where he does not loose face).
Here are my posts on the subject.
Iran Opportunity and PerilMore reasons to rethink our Iran strategy, Barnett revisiteda href=”http://nykrindc.blogspot.com/2006/04/response-to-iranian-threat-part-i-at.html”>Response to The Iranian Threat-Part I at American Future
Folks, we have a religious maniac with potential access to nuclear weapons who feels that the use of those weapons will fulfill prophesy. We have no effective deterrent for that mind of madness. In fact, he will see turoil in Iraq as further evidence of the coming of the Mahdi.
Crosspatch,
Ahmedinejad has no power on the nuclear issue, war, or International Relations other than his bluster. He is as powerless as Khatami was. All power ultimately rests on Khamenei, and he although anti-American is not stupid. Already he is asserting his authority over these issues, as Marc’s post points out. The election for the council of Majlis, where Ahmedinejad’s choice for Ayatollah (one that would have given him real power), lost. More allies of Khamenei, Rafsanjani (all rivals of Ahmedinejad) as well as reformers won while Ahmedinejad suffered many humiliating defeats. His bluster is an attempt to shore his power at home, but everyone knows he is loosing popularity and even Khamenei no longer respects him.
[...] Kaplan’s explanation makes sense and illuminates much. For instance, it clarifies the meaning within Marc’s quotation of Gates: [...]
“he although anti-American is not stupid”
I have seen nothing so far that would validate that comment. The next few months will tell the story, I suppose.
[...] American Future, “On the Possibility of an Embargo of Iranian Oil†[...]
Marc-
Great post, I like your thinking. However, and I don’t know the answer to this, did you look into Iran’s pipeline capabities (present and immediate future) to neighboring states? I can only see an embargo without UNSEC support (a likely situation given Russia and China’s action’s to date) being a naval blockade, and that will be clearly undermined if the Iranians are able to pipe out oil to markets like, China, Pakistan, and India.
Scott-
I have yet to look into Iran’s pipeline capabilities, but will do so.
No embargo is 100% effective, and need not be so. Even if, say, a quarter of Iran’s oil production could be delivered via pipelines, an embargo would still exact a heavy toll on Iran’s economy, its funding of its nuclear program, and its financial assistance to Hezbollah and Hamas.
There is a pipeline project between Iran, Pakistan and India (with China possibly added to the mix) which would supply Iranian natural gas to these three countries. However, the project is currently on hold pending resolution of the rates Iran wants to charge for LNG to each country. Iran is also suffering from red tape which is also inhibiting the project from moving forward.
However, blockading Iranian oil and natural gas supplies would mean that we would threaten China’s economy and the economy of East Asia as the region relies heavily on Iranian energy resources. Unless we can find an alternate source for these consumers, they are unlikely to support any such measures.
[...] The Watcher’s Council has announced its picks for the most outstanding posts of the preceding week. The winning Council post was American Future’s post, “On the Possibility of an Embargo of Iranian Oilâ€. Check it out for a good backgrounder. Marc does a masterful job, as usual. Second place honors went to The Colossus of Rhodey’s post, “Teacher Merit Payâ€. [...]
[...] I’m pleased to report that my “On the Possibility of an Embargo of Iranian Oil” took the top spot among Council posts in this week’s poll of the Watcher’s Council. Next in line among Council posts was The Colossus of Rhodey’s “Teacher Merit Pay.” [...]
[...] The votes are in from this week’s Watcher’s Council and the winner in the Council category is “On the Possibility of an Embargo of Iranian Oil” by American Future. Finishing second was “Teacher Merit Pay” by The Colossus of Rhodey. [...]
[...] In a recent post, I argued that conditions are ripe for embargoing Iranian oil. They may be even riper that I thought, in light of the following depiction of economic conditions in Iran: [...]
[...] On the Possibility of an Embargo of Iranian OilAmerican Future [...]