Note that I did not say it will work. Only those with powers far beyond those of mortal men could claim to know whether it will work.
As far as I’m concerned, the most encouraging part of the President’s speech is that, with the agreement of the Maliki government, U.S. and Iraqi forces will conduct military operations in all—not just Sunni—neighborhoods.
This will be the ultimate test for the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government. Has it, to use Bush’s words, “made the choice for freedom,” or, as has been the case until now, will its choice be revenge towards the Sunnis under whom the Shi’a suffered for decades?
The best indicator of the Iraqi government’s choice will be whether or not its army takes decisive and sustained action against al-Sadr’s militia. Since al-Sadr is a participant in the government, this course of action will almost certainly split the government. It’s highly unlikely that al-Sadr will order his militia to lay down its arms and, even if he were to do so, recent reports indicate that not everyone in the militia he formed is still loyal to him. Accordingly, if Maliki is true to his word and has the power to control the army, the most likely outcome will be an intra-Shi’a conflict resembling, perhaps, the conflict between the PLO and Hamas. No wonder Bush, in his speech, warned that much violence lies ahead.
It sounds like the U.S. has, at long last, adopted a true counterinsurgency strategy—at least in Baghdad. But that’s a subject for a post I plan on writing after I return home this weekend.
With a full awareness that the strategy may be too little, too late, I support it. We’ve reached this point because of past mistakes. That being the case, it’s the least bad of the alternatives that are now available. Nobody any longer supports staying the course. Withdrawal, I believe, would entail all of the negative consequences mentioned by Bush.
More speech reaction…
Althouse wants to know if we are satisified?Marc at American Freedom says “It could work”.With a full awareness that the strategy may be too little, too late, I support it.
We’ve reached this point because of past mistakes. That being the…...
If anyone is to take on al-Sadr’s Mahdi militia, it will have to be the Shi’ite government in Iraq. In early 2007 and after more than three years of war into Iraq, it is now much too late for American troops to go into Sadr City or Basra without causing all the various quarreling Shi’ite factions to unite against a common enemy: us. Taking on al-Sadr now, so late in the game, simply unites the Shi’ites, which will have the unintended consequence of bolstering Iran.
Hopefully, the new counsel Mr. Bush has surrounded himself with after the November elections will suggest he focus on isolating Iran by winning in Iraq, rather than follow a course of action against al-Sadr’s minions which will further deny victory.
This is Mr. Bush’s very last chance. The leash is short and tight: eighteen months, tops. If he starts to take on al-Sadr, the war will be lost. Al-Sadr is now a long-term problem of Iraqi internal politics; Mr. Bush must deliver some short-term, positive military results—say, within ninety days—or the American people will eviscerate any final vestige of the Bush Doctrine.
Marc, reading your last paragraph, I think you neglect to consider other alternatives – namely, increased mobilization of the reserves and National Guard to augment active forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bush is still not committing the necessary force to solve the problem. So he settles Baghdad – for how long? And what about Akbar province?
While withdrawl would result in all the negative consequences mentioned by Bush, you don’t consider whether his plan will also avoid all those negative consequences. I’m not convinced that he’s got the best alternative nor will his plan avoid the same outcome – only delayed – as a pullout by mid-late 2007.
al-Sadr’s presence – regardless of whether he is dormant or active – emboldens Maliki to defy the US when it comes to dealing with the real problem of the militias. Remove al-Sadr and Maliki’s government may very well collapse. True, but the Iraqi Army will remain intact: the political cost is painful but ultimately necessary, because we don’t need a quiescent puppet of al-Sadr to run the country; as long as al-Sadr stays, pretty soon, the entire strategy of clear-and-hold will crumble as Sadrist infiltration starts permeating from the nexus of Sadr City – all with the clandestine aid of Maliki. Remember: al-Sadr is Maliki’s safety net. If the former lives, the latter will always have an option not to cooperate with us.
That said, I believe Bush feels that he must at least portray that we are exhausting all options before either something decisive is done, or – horror of horrors – we decide to withdraw unequivocally. Maliki has this one chance – do it or screw it.
Contrary to what a duoist has suggested, I believe that it now depends entirely on Maliki – if he fails to act against the militias, then that will be a clear sign that the Iraqi government has failed, and its authority should be overriden. Maliki should then be replaced. The onus has been transferred from Bush to Maliki, and now all eyes are trained on the prime minister of Iraq. He can no longer blame the US for not supplying enough forces to strengthen the Iraqi Army.
As such, perhaps the American public will perceive this as Maliki’s failure rather than Bush’s, since the latter has staked it all in this final surge and has nothing to lose. Bush has done what he could have done despite the seemingly irrescuable situation – hopefully the American public realise that any sort of withdrawal would be disastrous in comparison.
a duoist, agreed that Iran needs to be dealt with, but it seems Bush might be attempting to do both simultaneously – not exactly sure how wise that is, but at least he’s taking action that has been long due.
With the Eisenhower patrolling the waters near Iran, the C-130s flying over Somalia – perhaps something’s cooking.
If at any juncture during the execution of this strategy, Maliki betrays his unwillingness to crack down on the militias, that is where we would be tying up loose ends: we starve the patrons of Iranian funding by targeting the source itself. Without the safety net of depending on either the Sadrists or the Badrists for political cover, Maliki will surely be more willing to cooperate, and that is to the best of his interests as well.
Disruptive strikes of high intensity and widespread nature aimed at Iranian oil and gas pipelines will hasten the decline of Iran’s deteriorating propensity to refine, export and meet domestic demand for oil, gas and gasoline.[More]
As the desperation within the regime grows with regard to escalating domestic demand for oil, gas and gasoline, Ahmadinejad and the mullahs would have to choose between going all out in a blaze of glory by upping the deluge of funds (ironically, we could call it a surge) to Hezbollah, Hamas, Madhi Army, militias, just to name a few; or focus instead on investing in upgrading infrastructure and refining capabilities to prevent the catastrophic collapse of the economy.
The American military can do pretty much whatever they please given the orders and expanded rules of engagement. When it comes to war every action has a reaction. The largest failing in Iraq is the failure to anticipate the breadth and depth of these reactions. Has our military and the Executive branch anticipated and are they ready for the reactions this time? Unless they have, and unless they and the Maliki government have the fortitude to directly and robustly confront the reactions, then whatever is done is not going to “work”.
General Keane of the Kagan/Keane AEI report, which so obviously forms the basis of Mr. Bush’s new strategy for winning in Iraq, has been sharply recommending that the U.S. not take on al-Sadr in Sadr City. His reasoning is entirely based upon implementing a strategy which, for the first time in three years, focuses upon “winning” as the U.S. goal in Iraq. His strong argument is, U.S. entry into Sadr City to take on the Mahdi militias will actually result in the U.S. losing the war, mainly because the five-brigade small surge of 20,000 must operate with surgical precision in a very brief length of time to be effective, and taking on Sadr’s 60,000-men Mahdi Army will be an enterprise that is neither surgical nor brief. We would win against al-Sadr, yes, but as in Viet Nam where our troops won every battle, we would ultimately “lose the war,” which is a Keane quote.
The time for the U.S. to take out al-Sadr is past. We had plenty of opportunities to do so, even up to late 2006, but now Iraqi politics will have to deal with him. Mr. Bush MUST win this war, so if ‘going around’ al-Sadr enhances the chances of victory, then by all means, “go around.”
The new goal is winning…finally. The prior goals of ‘minimal footprint’ and ‘turn it over to Iraqis’ is swept aside. Anything which compromises that goal, including the long wish list of all that hasn’t been done over the past three years, should be sternly set aside. If Mr. Bush stays focused upon his new priority—winning—the troops will deliver.
Leave al-Sadr to his fellow Iraqis in the Shi’ite government. We have a war to win, and frankly, arguably without enough troops but certainly without much time left to do so.
We did not go after al-Sadar for one reason: Sistani said not to. Whether he thought that he could forge an alliance with his main rival, or was trying to establish a principle that clerics are inviolate (as the guys at Iraqi the Model claimed) or had just decided there had been enough killing, that is what he said. And we could not afford to upset both Al-Sadar’s and Sistani’s supporters – which together constitute most of the country’s population.
But the biggest thing the President said was that our forces had in the past been too constrained by “Political and other considerations” and would not be so limited in the future. Hooray! About damn time!
If the idea behind the troop surge represents a bold new tactic the change in constraints – affecting both U.S. and Iraqi troops – represents a sea change. We are not just talking about revising the fabled Rules of Engagement – we are talking about eliminating safe havens for the enemy and kid gloves for our own troops. We are talking about even the Iraqi troops not shirking from taking out both Sunni and Shiite death squads.
“We did not go after al-Sadar for one reason: Sistani said not to”
I’ve heard—from reliable sources but ones that wouldn’t have had complete information—that this is not the case. Sadr first came to our attention as a problem, AFAIK, when his militia started intimidating members of the local councils the US set up. When American lower-level officials requested that the military take some action, they were told that not enough troops were available in the event of a backlash. I do think you’re right about what happened later in the game, but I’m not sure that the answer is quite so simple in the early stages.
I agree with J. If Bush were serious, he’d be pushing for a much more significant mobilization of US manpower and resources. This isn’t a change in strategy, but a stopgap effort to keep things from completely collapsing before he hands the reigns to whomever is unlucky enough to be the next President.
Jihadists have fought not because they hope to win on the battlefield, but to strengthen the antiwar lobbies in the United States and Britain.
http://www.nypost.com/seven/01122007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/how_iraqis_see_ws_new_plan_opedcolumnists_amir_taheri.htm
“Jihadists have fought not because they hope to win on the battlefield, but to strengthen the antiwar lobbies in the United States and Britain.”
Amir Taheri
http://www.nypost.com/seven/01122007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/how_iraqis_see_ws_new_plan_opedcolumnists_amir_taheri.htm
Sorry, should have put in the quotation marks.
[...] Within minutes after the President concluded his Wednesday evening speech, I published a post (“It Could Work”) in which I said “the most encouraging part of the President’s speech is that, with the agreement of the Maliki government, U.S. and Iraqi forces will conduct military operations in all—not just Sunni—neighborhoods.” At the same time, I expressed reservations about the reliability of the Iraqi government, stating that the best indicator of the Iraqi government’s intentions “will be whether or not its army takes decisive and sustained action against al-Sadr’s militia.” News reports since Bush’s address have done nothing to ease my skepticism. [...]
Short of making Iraq a vast wasteland it will be more of the same old, same old even with the surge. The insurgentents will figure out new ways of attack. It would take between 500,000 and 600,000 men 10 years to get the results Bush wants. Again, cheap rhetoric devirates attention from the real problem and necessary solution. The bottom line: it is not going to happen.