Even if we leave Iraq per the ISG’s timetable, that’s the prediction of the Carnegie Endowment’s David Rothkopf, who says that the current war may someday be known as the Second Gulf War.

What, according to Rothkopf, are the “plausible” scenarios that could instigate Gulf War III? He offers a number of possibilities:

  • “The confrontation with Iran—over its regional policies, support of terrorists and desire to acquire nuclear weapons—tops the list . . . The Iranian threat is magnified because it could trigger an arms race for a “Sunni bomb” to offset the “Shiite bomb.” Meanwhile, Israel is unlikely to long tolerate a nuclear capability in a government that has called for its destruction, and in the Arab world, any action by Israel would be regarded as an action on behalf of the United States.”

  • “Washington might also push for an accelerated transfer of the Golan Heights or the accelerated establishment of a sustainable Palestinian state,” which could be “interpreted as a weakening of U.S. support for Israel.” This could tempt the military wings of Hamas or Hezbollah “to push harder against Israel in an attempt to win further concessions or test the viability of an Israeli government operating with a less supportive U.S. ally.”

  • “What if Jordan, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia fell into fundamentalist hands? The perception of the threat, the impact on world energy prices, the reaction of regional rivals—these elements could quickly put the U.S. military on alert, especially if U.S. troops, citizens or bases in the region came under threat. Or what if Iranian troops entered Iraq? Or if another terrorist attack against the American homeland (or U.S. assets anywhere in the world) could be traced to forces in the region?”

Rothkopf says—correctly, in my view—that The Middle East today is infinitely more dangerous than at the start of Gulf War II. The implications:

  • “The Bush administration must plan for likely and possible futures, not just the one it hopes to face.”

  • “While a long-term U.S. military presence in the region may further stoke anti-American passions, it may also make good and prudent strategic sense.”

  • “The American people will need to assess such options based on the country’s overarching interests—which include reducing the likelihood of yet another war in the region—rather than the short-term, feel-good option of bringing the troops home and retreating into a state of semi-isolationism.”

He advocates a “parallel containment” strategy to prevent Gulf War III:

The United States must contain the complex threats it faces in the region, and at the same time try to limit our vital interests there. On the first score, Hezbollah and Hamas must know that the United States is present and stands ready to take action. Iran must know that it will not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, period. Moderates in the region must know that we will stand by them, with economic aid and political support, helping to restore U.S. moral authority in the Middle East. And everyone must know that an attack against Israel will always be considered an attack against America. On the second score, we must embark on the long-term but critical task of reducing our energy dependence on the Middle East. No strategy in any Gulf war could produce more lasting change in the region than a prolonged fall in oil prices. The only dependable formula for ultimate victory in the Gulf wars will come through innovation and conservation right here at home.

Notwithstanding its brevity (or, perhaps, because of it) this is among the most thoughtful pieces on the Middle East I’ve recently seen. While you may disagree with this, that, or another part of his analysis, one thing is certain: Rothkopf, unlike the vast majority of pundits, not to mention the ISG, is looking beyond his nose at the big picture.