I strongly recommend taking a Prozac (or another antidepressant of your choice) before reading the ISG report. It’s one thing to read about this, that, or another problem in Iraq, but it’s quite another to see them all—and all at once—in a single document.

Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq

Here’s some examples:

  • Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army is clashing with another Shi’a militia—the Badr Brigade—in southern Irad. The Badr Brigade is associated with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) in Iraq, which has long-standing ties with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is an example of the fissures that have emerged with the ruling Shi’a coalition.

  • Of Iraq’s 10 planned army divisions, those that are even-numbered are made up of Iraqis who signed up in a specific area, and they have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. As a result, elements of the army have refused to carry out missions.

  • Iraqi soldiers are given leave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave. Unit readiness are often at 50 percent or less.

  • The state of the Iraqi police is even worse. It has neither the training nor the legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower to take on organized crime, insurgents, or militias. The police routinely engage in sectarian violence and are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruption and militia infiltration.

  • There is no clear Iraqi or U.S. agreement on the character and mission of the police. U.S. authorities do not know with precision the composition and membership of the various police forces, nor the disposition of their funds and equipment. Their are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for use in sectarian violence.

  • Each Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard infrastructure. These units (the “Facilities Protection Service”) have questionable loyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Transportation—controlled by al-Sadr—the Service is a source of funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army.

  • While Iraq’s leaders often claim that they don’t want a division of the country, the ISG found that key Shi’a and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to national reconciliation. As an example, when the ISG visited Iraq, the leader of the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Irai flags and the raising of Kurdish flags.

  • The government sometimes provides services—e.g., electricity—on a sectarian basis.

This is by no means an exhaustive list. In a word, Iraq is a mess—an even greater mess than I, for one, had realized.

Courses of Action Rejected by the ISG

Before setting forth its recommendations, the ISG outlined some alternative courses in Iraq and rejected all of them:

  • Precipitate Withdrawal—A premature withdrawal would almost certainly result in greater sectarian violence, a power vacuum, regional destabilization, and a threat to the world economy.

  • Staying the Course—Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at high cost.

  • More Troops for Iraq—Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence, which is the absence of national reconciliation.

  • Devolution to Three Regions—The costs would be too high. Because Iraq’s population isn’t neatly separated, regional boundaries can’t be easily drawn. There would be mass population movements, a collapse of Iraqi security forces, a strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neightboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions.

The ISG’s Overall Perspective

The ISG’s approach is summarized on pages 43 and 44 of the report:

The United States must build a new international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region.

In order to foster such consensus, the United States should embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other countries in the region. This support structure should include every country that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors—Iran and Syria among them. Despite the well-known differences between many of these countries, they all share an interest in avoiding the horrific consequences that would flow from a chaotic Iraq, particularly a humanitarian catastrophe and regional destabilization.

A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is clear that the Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing, defending, and sustaining itself by relying on U.S. military and economic support alone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed by relying only on U.S. military support in conjunction with Iraqi military and police capabilities. Some states have been withholding commitments they could make to support Iraq’s stabilization and reconstruction. Some states have been actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve a political solution within Iraq, a broader international support structure is needed.

I highlighted a portion of this quote for two reasons: first, it is the third time in the report that the assumption, without any supporting evidence, is made that all actors in the region would prefer a stable to a chaotic Iraq; and, second, I criticized this assumption in a recent post:

It is indisputable that, so far, worsening violence has been a boon to Iran’s and Syria’s interests. The burden of proof, then, rests upon the negotiation advocates, who must convincingly argue that, beyond a certain point, violence in Iraq, instead of being helpful, will be inimical to Iran’s and Syria’s interests. No such proof, and no attempt to define that point, has been forthcoming. Another way of looking at this is to ask why our potential negotiating partners would want to reduce the strains on our military, when, by doing so, our ability to intervene to prevent the realization of their designs would be enhanced.

The ISG report doesn’t address these critical questions.

Incentives for Iran and Syria to Negotiate

On page 51, the ISG report lists some possible “incentives” to Iran, Syria, or both:

  • An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors and the region.

  • The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan.

  • Accession to international organizations, including the World Trade Organization.

  • Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United States.

  • The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating regime change.

  • Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement as part of a broader initiative on Arab-Israeli peace.

Dealing with Iran

Two pages later, the report lists some steps that Iran could “usefully” take:

  • Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to any group resorting to violence in Iraq.

  • Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its government.

  • Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to encourage national reconciliation.

  • Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic reconstruction of Iraq.

Note that all of the proposed useful steps deal only with Iran’s relationship with Iraq. Evidently, ending or at least reducing its support of Hezbollah and Hamas isn’t considered to be useful. Most tellingly, while the report talks about incentives and useful steps, it has nothing whatsoever to say about demands that should be placed on Iran. The topic of the U.S. negotiating position is ignored. It would seem that the U.S. should approach the Iranians with its hat in hand.

Interestingly, the ISG isn’t optimistic about Iran’s response to our entreaties:

Our limited contacts with Iran’s government lead us to believe that its leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctance to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran.

With these words, the ISG has contradicted itself. If, as it assumes, Iran is gravely concerned about regional destabilization resulting from a civil war in Iraq, would that not trump its worries regarding America’s advocacy of regime change?

Dealing with Syria

Syria, which holds fewer cards than Iran, is treated more harshly by the ISG. The reason is linkage. Inexplicably, Syria is viewed as a key player in a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, while Iran, despite its support of Hamas and Hezbollah, Ahmadinejad’s anti-semitic rantings and its nuclear weapons program, is not.

Syria, says the ISG, should be persuaded of the merit of such contributions as the following:

  • It can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.

  • It can establish hotlines to exchange information with the Iraqis.

  • Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq.

The ISG doesn’t demand anything of Iran, but sets forth eight demands on Syria, just one of which pertains to Iraq:

  • Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.

  • Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.

  • A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to Hezbollah.

  • Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers.

  • A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected government of Lebanon.

  • A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups.

  • A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.

  • Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.

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The ISG report is disappointing, but how could it be otherwise, as it represents what five Republicans and five Democrats could agree upon. After repeatedly assuming that, with respect to Iraq, Iranian and Syrian objectives are congruent with ours, it then expresses skepticism that Iran can be persuaded to enter into negotiations. It demands nothing of Tehran, the would-be Middle East hegemon, but comes down hard on Damascus, which is nothing more than the transshipment point for the terrorism exported from Iran.