Two days before the Hadley memo sharply critical of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki was sent to cabinet-level officials, one day before the Congressional elections and two days before his resignation, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld penned a memo, the contents of which directly contradicts his often-stated public positions on Iraq policy. The Rumsfeld memo, among other things, recommends the withdrawal of U.S. forces from “vulnerable positions—cities, patrolling, etc.—and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.” This must put a big smile on Representative Murtha’s face. What puts a big smile on mine is his recommendation to “Position substantial U.S. forces near the Syrian and Iranian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.” This type of repositioning is precisely what I’ve been talking about ever since August.

What isn’t known so far is whether Rumsfeld composed this memo before or after he learned he was on his way out. If he did know, the memo may have been aimed at influencing and improving his treatment by future historians.

Two reactions to the memo are worth noting:

  • Michael O’Hanlon, a defense analyst at the Brookings Institution, said the revelation of the memo would undercut any attempt by President Bush to defend anything resembling a “stay the course” policy in Iraq. “When you have the outgoing secretary of defense, the main architect of Bush’s policy, saying it’s failing, that puts a lot more pressure on Bush,” he said.

  • “There is an element of throwing in the towel and effectively giving up on at least some areas of the country,” said James Dobbins, a former State Department official and director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND.