The idea of a “Grand Bargain” that would normalize relations between the U.S. and Iran has been floated on a number of occasions over the past decade. In recent years, proponents of such a bargain have seen it as a mechanism for persuading Tehran to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Now, there’s an additional reason for seeking what amounts to a rapprochement: the belief by some, presumably including James Baker and his Iraq Study Group, that negotiations with Iran offer the promise of stopping and reversing Iraq’s slide into civil war.

In the current issue of The Washington Quarterly (WQ), a journal of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Michael McFaul, Abbas Milani, and Larry Diamond, in “A Win-Win U.S. Strategy for Dealing with Iran,” have authored one of the more convincing and palatable arguments in favor of striking a grand bargain with Iran.

The authors, after itemizing the failure of America’s Iran policy during the past quarter-century, describing sanctions as a “dead end” and asserting that a preventive military strike against Tehran’s nuclear facilities would rally the Iranian populace behind their theocratic government, argue that it “is time for the United States to offer the Iranian regime a deal it cannot refuse.”

Washington should propose to end the economic embargo, unfreeze all Iranian assets, restore full diplomatic relations, support the initiation of talks on Iran’s entry into the WTO, encourage foreign investment, and otherwise move toward a normal relationship with the Iranian government.

In return, Tehran would have to agree to three conditions:

  • A verifiable and indefinite suspension of all activities, including uranium enrichment, that could feed into a nuclear weapons development program, with a comprehensive and intrusive international inspections regime administered by the IAEA.

  • Termination of support for terrorist groups and activities, including training, intelligence support, and weapons shipments.

  • Affirmation of basic human rights principles under international covenants and a recognition of the legitimacy of international and domestic efforts to monitor those conditions.

What separates this grand bargain proposal from others with which I’m familiar is the authors’ delineation of preconditions for the substantive negotiations. In my view, the third and—even more so—the fourth of the preconditions are the most important.

  • The “broad parameters” of the U.S. proposal should be announced publicly from the start. This should be done so that (1) the Iranian regime would be unable to manipulate the truth of what the U.S. was offering, and (2) the Iranian people would not fear that America intended to sell out their aspirations for democracy.

  • The talks should proceed alongside and in coordination with the ongoing discussions being conducted by the EU-3.

  • At least a limited and temporary suspension of uranium enrichment must be obtained to prevent Tehran from trumpeting the U.S. offer to negotiate as a victory for its intransigence.

  • To prevent Iran from dragging out the negotiations indefinitely to stall for time to perfect and expand its nuclear weapons program, a time limit should be placed on the negotiations.

Another distinguishing feature of this grand bargain proposal is that it considers the possibility that Tehran will reject the proposal and the consequences of it so doing:

If they rejected such an offer, the regime in Tehran would pay a significant price domestically. The vast majority of the Iranian people yearn for more engagement with the West and the United States in particular. Iran’s economy urgently needs foreign investment, new technologies, and greater trade opportunities for the nonenergy sectors. A government that openly rejects such inflows will face a potent popular backlash.

[ . . . ]

[The] mullahs would face a more internationally legitimate U.S. foe if they rejected this comprehensive agreement. After offering everything outlined above but receiving no positive
response from Tehran, Washington would be in a better position internationally to pursue tougher policies, including serious sanctions against the Iranian regime.

Here’s why the authors describe their strategy as “win-win” for the U.S.:

Iran’s current leaders might not reject the offer. They might believe they have the ability to manage greater interaction with the United States and the West. They might judge that such a direct dialogue with the United States would vindicate their previous policies and legitimate their regime at home and abroad. They might opt for the considerable practical benefit to Iran of everything being offered. In other words, the United States would gain if Tehran either rejects or accepts a comprehensive agreement.

The McFaul-Milani-Diamond strategy isn’t an exercise in wishful thinking. It should be seriously considered in Washington.