Should it choose to do so, Japan could easily and quickly become a major nuclear power. Three years ago, an article in Foreign Affairsi stated that Japan then possessed a 38,000 kilogram stockpile of plutonium and that, by 2020, the stockpile will have grown to 145,000 kilograms—enough to produce almost 30,000 nuclear warheads. Needless to say, should Japan decide that the threat environment warranted its joining the nuclear club, the consequences would be incalculable. Japan, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and, undoubtedly, South Korea would all be armed with the ultimate in weapons of mass destruction. Asia would resemble pre-World War I: a powder keg. This time, the powder would be radioactive.

If the Japanese are to be dissuaded from transforming their country from a potential to an actual nuclear power, it is essential that the North Korean nuclear weapons program be eliminated, preferably through diplomatic means, but, if necessary, by force. Since 1998, when Pakistan held its first nuclear test, Tokyo has lived in a neigborhood inhabited by three nuclear states. But Tokyo has not perceived Pakistan, India and China as imminent existential threats. A nuclear North Korea under the control of an unpredictable Stalinist regime and harboring long-standing historical grudges against Japan is another matter entirely. Without question, Kim Jong Il unnerves the Japanese. Depending on Kim’s future actions and the international community’s reaction to them, it is my judgment that Tokyo could decide that it has no choice but to quickly develop a nuclear arsenal overwhelmingly larger than anything of which Pyongyang is capable.

Judged by the recent public statements of key government officials, the current state of the nuclear issue in Japan is that it should be a subject of debate and discussion, but there is no current intention of reversing its anti-nuclear policy of the last sixty years. However, it seems clear that, should doubts arise regarding the American commitment to provide Japan with a nuclear umbrella to deter Pyongyang, pressure would rapidly mount for Japan to develop its own nuclear deterrent.

As will now be documented, North Korea’s recent nuclear test (and the prospect of further ones) has revived and intensified, not initiated, a debate within Japan over joining the nuclear club and, more generally, over strenghtening the country’s military forces.

THE 1998 NORTH KOREAN MISSILE TEST

On August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired its new, two-stage Taepodong-1 missile. The first stage fell into the sea before reaching Japan, and the second flew over Japan, landing in the Pacific Ocean. The Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiromu Nonaka, called the test deplorable and said the firing was an “extremely dangerous act.”ii Sadaaki Numata, a spokeman for the Foreign Ministry, said “We are seriously concerned about this because the deployment of missiles by North Korea does affect Japanese security and it also affects peace and stability in Northeast Asia. It is also of serious global concern, in terms of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”iii

Ten days later, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi said Japan might launch its own reconnaissance satellite to improve the country’s military capacity and make it easier to monitor North Korean missile deployments.iv Hiromu Nonaka, the chief Government spokeman, said Japanese officials had been deeply upset at feeling entirely reliant on other countries [meaning the U.S.] for information about a missile that had flown over its own territory.iii

Japan’s H-2 rocket, intended to put satellites in orbit, could be converted into an ICBM. A 1998 poll by Gallup Japan found that 89 percent of the public believed that Japan did not need to build nuclear weapons. It is not clear whether the poll was conducted before or after the North Korean missile test.

THE 2002 NORTH KOREAN ABROGATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORKv

In October 2002, North Korea confirmed U.S. intelligence reports that it had a clandestine enriched uranium weapons program in violation of the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Two months later, Pyongyang lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based weapons program and expelled IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze under the Agreed Framework.

The Japanese reacted sharply to the North Korean announcements. In February 2003, Japan’s defense minister, Shigeru Ishiba, warned North Korea that Japan could launch a pre-emptive strike to defend itself. According to the previously cited Foreign Affairs article, he repeated the warning on September 15, noting that “the Japanese constitution permits my position. Attacking North Korea after a missile attack on Japan is too late.” Other prominent members of Japan’s government and media followed suit, arguing that their country should prepare to defend itself—including, possibly, by developing nuclear weapons.

Portions of the Foreign Affairs article—published in October 2003—are worth quoting at length:

Not long ago, such comments [as Ishiba’s] would have been unthinkable outside the extreme right wing of Japan’s political discourse. Today, however, this kind of language is becoming more and more common . . . rising nationalism has taken hold in one of America’s closest allies . . . With North Korea growing ever more bellicose, Japan’s nuclear genie may have escaped its bottle for good.

[ . . . ] Open calls for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons—a subject that was once forbidden—provide further evidence of a new nationalism. Various members of Prime Minister Koizumi’s cabinet have joined the deense minister in urging the country to protect itself more vigorously. In mid-2002 . . . Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda argued publicly that the constitution did not prevent Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons, and his comments were quickly echoed by Tokyo’s governor, Shintaro Ishihara—perhaps Japan’s most well-known nationalist.

[ . . . ] Article 9’svi prohibitions have started to erode . . . Soon after his election, Koizumi convened the Japanese legislature’s Research Commission on the Constitution to reconsider the rules on the use of force, and public opinion has started to shift. A plurality of Japanese now [2003] favor turning the country’s SDF into a full-fledged army.

[ . . . ] As a result of such shifts, various nationalist positions once considered radical are no longer thought outlandish. In the last weeks of 2002, Shingo Nishimura, a right-wing member of the reuling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) declared “Kim Jong Il . . . is Hitler and the Japanese government is behaving like Chamberlain. A The Times of London reported on February 22, “a few months [earlier], Nishimura was regarded as an isolated crank,” and “the merest allusion to a nuclear Japan was taboo. But among politicians, academics, and bureaucrats, the possibility is now being discreetly and cautiously discussed.”

THE 2006 NORTH KOREAN MISSILE TESTS

On July 4, North Korea test-fired at least six missiles over the Sea Of Japan, including an ICBM that apparently failed or was aborted soon after it was launched.

The Japanese government reacted quickly, saying that it was considering imposing economic sanctions, including cutting off a significant source of cash for North Korea by cracking down on money transfers from Japan. It also banned the North Korean Mangyongbong-92 ferry—the only regular link between Japan and North Korea and a conduit for transferring cash and supplies—from entering its ports for six months.vii

Unidentified Japanese analysts said that the rising threat from North Korea was likely to help the country’s political leaders persuade the public of the need to strengthen military ties with the U.S., transform Japan’s SDF into a full-fledged military, and eventually revise Japan’s pacifist Constitution.

Within a week after the missile tests, Japanese officials had “openly begun talking about whether Japan should acquire the military capacity to undertake pre-emptive strikes.” Shinzo Abe, the chief cabinet secretary who would soon become prime minister, said “If we accept that there is no other option to prevent a missile attack, there is an argument that attacking the missile bases would be within the legal rights of self-defense.” A day earlier, the head of the defense agency, Fukushiro Nukaga, said Japan should consider pre-emptive strikes “if an enemy country definitely has a way of attacking Japan and has its finger on the trigger.”viii

ABE BECOMES JAPAN’S PRIME MINISTER

On September 27—only a week before North Korea announced its intention to conduct a nuclear test—Shinzo Abe replaced Junichiro Koizumi as Japan’s Prime Minister. At a press conference held immediately after his appointment, Abe told reporters that his goals included revising the Constitution to permit a full-fledged militaryix, closer military cooperation with the U.S., and securing a permanent seat for Japan on the UN Security Council.

Among his cabinet selections was Yuriko Koike, who was appointed to the new job of national security adviser. Ms. Koike has been a vocal supporter of the economic sanctions on North Korea stemming from its refusal to provide information on the fate of Japanese citizens kidnapped twenty years ago.

THE 2006 NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST

Prime Minister Abe reacted to North Korea’s planned nuclear test “in stern terms rarely heard in the cautious language of Japanese diplomacy.”x He said that “Japan and the world absolutely will not tolerate a nuclear test. The international community would respond harshly.”

Soon after issuing this statement, Abe visited China. At a press conference held after his return to Japan, he said that Japan and China had “agreed that a nuclear weapon test by North Korea cannot be tolerated and we confirmed that we shall cooperate closely with the countries concerned to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, including the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks.”xi

At another press conference—this one held after reports that North Korea had carried out its threat to test a nuclear weapon, Abe had these words:xii

When we consider the nuclear weapons development of North Korea together with the ballistic missiles which North Korea is extending their range, it constitutes a grave threat to the international community as a whole, beyond the Northeast Asian region. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and manufacturing technology will impose an additional threat not just to Northeast Asian countries but also to the safety of the international community as a whole. The North Korean nuclear test is a grave challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, an issue the international community as a whole needs to address seriously. The Government of Japan shall immediately embark on consideration of harsh measures and shall also consult with our ally, the United States, and also the countries I am visiting this time, the ROK and China, on the measures to address the situation. I have also instructed the Government of Japan to request the UN Security Council to immediately launch consultations with a view to taking firm action on North Korea’s nuclear test issue. Also, from the viewpoint of security, in order to do our best to ensure the safety of our country and people, Japan shall maintain close coordination with the US to further improve the credibility of the deterrence based on the Japan-US alliance and also shall further promote the Japan-US defense cooperation including the missile defense program.

The day after the nuclear test, the New York Times averred that it could “weaken public support for the pacifism Japan adopted after World War II and prompt it to seek a growing regional security role.” The Times then asked “could the crisis be big enough to force Japan to break what might be its ultimate postwar taboo and go nuclear?” It’s answer was that “for now,” domestic opposition runs “too deep” for Japan to reverse its renunciation of nuclear weapons. The most likely result of the crisis is to improve Abe’s chances of revising the Constitution.

The Times noted, however, that the effects on Japanese public opinion might take time to appear:

When North Korea test-fired a multistage Taepodong missile over Japan in 1998, Japan’s initial reaction was muted, but public opinion ended up moving sharply in favor of building a stronger defense. That allowed Japan to begin adding weapons that once would have been unthinkable, including Japan’s first spy satellite, a troop transport ship now under construction that experts say could serve as a small aircraft carrier, and aerial tankers that would allow Japanese fighter jets to refuel in midair to reach North Korea and other countries.

On October 14, Kenzo Oshima, Japan’s Permanent Representative at the UN, issued a statement at a meeting of the Security Council.xiii He called the North Korean action a “clear and present” danger, adding that “the combination of ballistic missile capability and now, the claim of nuclear capability, in the hands of a regime with a known and proven record of reckless and irresponsible acts and behavior, including as a proliferator, creates a situation that is nothing less than a grave threat to peace and security.”

Oshima also listed the unilateral actions taken by Japan on October 11: (1) Denial of permission to enter Japanese ports to all North Korean vessels, (2) Denial of import of all items from North Korea, and (3) Denial in principle of entry by North Korean nationals into Japanese territory.

That same day, Reuters reported that Japan was considering additional unilateral steps, including (1) a ban on exports of luxury goods, (2) tightening of a freeze on remittances and the transfer of funds from Japan suspected of links to North Korea’s WMD and missile programs, and (3) restrictions on trade in related weapons-related goods through third countries.xiv

THE CURRENT JAPANESE NUCLEAR DEBATE

After the passage of Resolution 1718, reports began to surface regarding the reexamination of Japan’s nuclear weapons ban. Shoichi Nakagawa, chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s policy research council, said he believed Japan would adhere to its policy of not arming itself with nuclear weapons but added that debate over whether to go nuclear was necessary.xv During a television interview, he said

We need to find a way to prevent Japan from coming under attack . . . There is an argument that nuclear weapons are one such option. I want to make clear that I am not the one saying this, and Japan will stick to its nonnuclear principples, but we need to have active discussions.

Nakagawa also said the Constitution does not prohibit the possession of nuclear arms, adding that such weapons might reduce or remove the risk of being attacked.

Two days after Nakagawa’s interview, Foreign Minister Taro Aso said there was nothing wrong with discussing whether Japan should possess nuclear weapons, but stressed that Tokyo has no intentions now of going nuclear.xvi He told a parliamentary panel on foreign affairs that

When a country next to us comes to have [nuclear weapons], we can’t consider, we can’t talk, we can’t do anything, and we can’t exchange opinions. That’s one way of thinking . . . I believe it is important to have various discussions on it [possessing nuclear weapons] as one more way of thinking . . . The reality is that it is only Japan that has not discussed possessing nuclear weapons, and all other countries have been discussing it.

Nakagawa’s and Aso’s remarks represented the first time that “such prominent politicians have spoken so prominently about the need to open the nuclear debate.”xvii As recently as 1999, a deputy defense minister, Shingo Nishimura, was forced to resign after he said in a magazine interview that Japan should consider nuclear weapons.

Later, however, during a joint news conference with Secretary of State Rice, Aso said “The Japanese government has absolutely no intentions now of preparing to possess nuclear weapons . . . There is no need to have nuclear weapons as the Japan-U.S. security framework will be activated for the defense of Japan, and Secretary Rice has just confirmed that.” At the news conference, Rice said “The United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range—and I underscore full range—of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”xviii

Prime Minister Abe gave assurances that Japan would stick to its self-imposed “three non-nuclear principles” of not possessing, producing and bringing in nuclear weapons. Asked by reporters if his cabinet was split on the issue, he said “The cabinet is not split. This talk is already finished.”

  1. Eugene A. Matthews, “Japan’s New Nationalism”, November/December 2003.↩
  2. New York Times, September 1, 1998.↩
  3. Ibid.↩
  4. New York Times, September 11, 1998.↩
  5. The Agreed Framework was signed on October 21, 1994. It specified the actions both countries would take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Under the terms of the agreement, a US-led international consortium promised to help North Korea replace its graphite-moderated reactors with two 1,000MW light water reactors. The international consortium compensated North Korea for the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the new reactors came online. Both countries promised to strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea said it would remain a member of the NPT and allow the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement and monitor the freeze on its nuclear facilities. The U.S. allowed North Korea to retain possession of 8,000 spent fuel rods instead of sending them to a third country for storage, a condition on which the United States had earlier insisted.↩
  6. Article 9 of Japan’s American-drafted constitution essentially commits Japan to pacifism and ensures its staunch anti-nuclear stance.↩
  7. New York Times, July 6, 2006.↩
  8. New York Times, July 11, 2006.↩
  9. Abe’s party’s proposed changes in Article 9 of the Constitution include removing the title “self defence” from the name of Japan’s armed forces and giving them greater flexibility in how they can respond to an attack on the country.↩
  10. New York Times, October 4, 2006.↩
  11. Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Visit to China, October 8, 2006.↩
  12. Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Visit to the Republic of Korea, October 9, 2006.↩
  13. Statement by H.E. Mr. Kenzo Oshima, Permanent Representative of Japan At the Meeting of the Security Council, October 14, 2006.↩
  14. Reuters, October 14, 2006.↩
  15. Reuters, October 16, 2006.↩
  16. Reuters, October 18, 2006.↩
  17. New York Times, October 19, 2006.↩
  18. Associated Press, October 18, 2006.↩