Gregory Leavy, author of the New Republic article discussed in this post, was Israel’s UN speechwriter and senior foreign communications coordinator for Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert.

Near the beginning of his article, Leavy sets forth this provocative argument:

Saudi Arabia may end up being one of Israel’s most important—albeit secret—allies. Today, the interests of the Israeli and Saudi governments are so aligned that they may have little choice but to work together. What’s more, because the United States currently enjoys an unprecedented level of trust from both states, if it capitalizes on this situation, this convergence of interests could actually bring some major positive changes to the region. In fact, it may already be doing so.

Despite denials from all the concerned parties, Leavy is convinced of the truthfulness of a report in the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot that Jordan recently hosted a secret meeting involving Prime Minister Olmert, the head of Israel’s Mossad, and an unidentified member of the Saudi Royal Family. When an Israeli radio station pressed Olmert on the matter, he answered with a non-denial denial: “We have decided that, on this subject, I am going to deliver a denial, but you don’t have to believe it.”

The subject of the meeting was the threat posed by Iran—and, more generally, the Shi’a ascendency—to both countries.i This community of interest was evinced by the Saudi’s support of Israel during the early days of the Israel-Hezbollah war.

Levey says that there’s another thing the two countries have in common:

If it hasn’t already, the secret Saudi-Israeli dialogue will likely soon extend to another matter: a renewed discussion of the 2002 Saudi peace plan. Bob Woodward’s . . . State of Denial reports that a major reason President Bush initially supported a Palestinian state was because he was urged by the Saudis, who felt pressure from their people to help the Palestinians. With the challenge that Shia Islam poses to their dominance of the Arab world—and with the current sate of chaos in Ramallah—the Saudis are likely feeling the same pressure today.

Further, Levey avers, there are recent signs indicating that talks could “come soon” about the 2002 plan for normalizing relations between Israel and the entire Arab League:

According to M.J. Rosenberg of the Israel Policy Forum, at a recent event in Washington held by the American Task Force on Palestine, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki Al Faisal, seemed to be setting the stage for negotiations on the plan. He said, “In Saudi Arabia, we believe that the path to peace begins with peaceful coexistence between a Palestinian state and an Israeli state, and peace between Israel and the entire Arab world.” In September, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the heir to the Saudi throne, brought up the proposal, insisting that it was the “correct path for the Palestinian issue.” And, all this past week, Arab governments have been pressing Hamas to accept the Saudi plan after several years of letting it lay dormant.

Meanwhile, Israeli Minister Meir Sheetrit, a close ally of Olmert, recently announced that he had told Olmert to “invite the Saudis to come to Israel” to discuss the plan. Within just a few days of his alleged meeting in Jordan with the Saudis, Olmert himself said, “I am very impressed with different processes and statements that are connected to Saudi Arabia—some that have been stated publicly and others as well.”

Levey concludes his article with this:

This is a strange moment for the Middle East and, as always, things could go horribly wrong. Still, the convergence of Saudi and Israeli interests could offer the region some very promising changes and, even if it doesn’t seem likely at this moment (Anwar Sadat’s rapprochement with Menachem Begin never seemed likely, either), it may be the only chance for peace.

Here’s hoping . . .

  1. For a superb discussion and analysis of the Shi’a revival, see Vali Nasr’s The Shia Revival.↩