The U.S. obtained unanimity for the UN Security Council resolution in July that condemned North Korean missile launches by dropping Chapter VII language to which China and Russia objected. Earlier today, the U.S. circulated a revised draft resolution on North Korea to the Security Council today and pressed for a vote by tomorrow. While softened from the original, the revised resolution still calls for international inspections of cargo going into and out of North Korea to block transport of weapons-related material and cites the need for drafting the resolution under Chapter VII.
Per the New York Times, Russia and China immediately signaled their opposition to the measure and said they needed more time. In a reference to the danger he thought the American position posed, Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin said “As we know in this problem and in this part of the world, some strong statements made by others in the Security Council have hurt the entire thing and have aggravated matters so we do not want to repeat this on the level of the Security Council.†The Chinese ambassador, Wang Guangya, said the North Korean test of a nuclear device was an “irresponsible action†which had to be “firmly opposed and condemned,†but added that “More important, it should be helpful for leading to a solution of this issue by peaceful means. It should also create conditions for the parties to once again engage in negotiations to settle this issue.â€
Like an old-fashioned record stuck in a groove, the Security Council’s song is “cross the line, negotiate . . . cross the line, negotiate . . . cross the line, negotiate . . .” The most attentive listeners to this song of appeasement are North Korea and Iran.
The U.S. doesn’t think this is groovy. A spokesman for Ambassador Bolton pointed out that the Russians and Chinese were already blocking Security Council action on Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran and Myanmar and said “It’s all right to keep talking if you are really going to get action, but not if it’s just delay and delay and delay.â€
Asked if the United States would settle for a less than unanimous vote, Bolton said, “We would always like the highest number of votes in the Security Council and we have not given up on our efforts to achieve that, but we have also said that it’s important that we send a very clear signal. We’re still trying to persuade China of the overwhelming sentiment of the other members of the Council to support these provisions.â€
As for the latest draft resolution,
- It still includes steps calling for an embargo on permitting movement of all material related to North Korea’s nuclear, ballistic missile and unconventional-weapons programs, a ban on travel by North Koran officials and a call on Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks involving South and North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. North Korea left the talks 13 months ago.
- It drops Japanese amendments prohibiting North Korean ships from entering any port and North Korean aircraft from taking off or landing in any country. However, Japan is imposing its own new sanctions on North Korea, including a limit on imports and a ban on North Korean ships in Japanese waters.
- Regarding international inspections, Bolton said the U.S. already had the power to inspect cargoes under the American-led Proliferation Security Initiative, a group of more than 70 countries that have pledged to seize illicit weapons as they move across oceans or are transported by air. But he said the U.S. wanted language reinforcing it in the resolution so that it would be binding on all member states of the UN.
- Regarding illegal financial transactions by North Korea, Bolton said the new resolution was being wrongly interpreted as having dropped earlier demands for sanctions. He said a remaining passage in the section calling for a freeze of North Korean assets included mention of “other illicit means,†and he said that was a reference to counterfeiting and drug trafficking activities engaged in by Pyongyang to raise money.
The Washington Post reports Bolton as saying “”There are still differences on some important aspects of the resolution. We’re going to continue to work on it, but we’re not going to work on it at the cost of losing sending a swift and strong response.”
In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao indicated that China is not embracing a travel ban and financial sanctions. He said the UN should make North Korea understand it had made a mistake by apparently testing a nuclear weapon, but that “punishment should not be the purpose” of the UN response, the AP reported. Instead, the aim should be to bring North Korea back to the six-party talks.
The text of the revised draft resolution is available here.
Remember the descriptions of Adolf Hiltler’s ‘Salami Strategy’?
“First, you cut off one thin slice, too small to be worth fighting about. Then, you cut off another thin slice, but not enough to fight over. Then you slice off another thin slice… And pretty soon, all that’s left is the string, and who’s going to fight over that?”
I think North Korea and Iran were paying attention when they read their ‘Mein Kampf”.
Marc,
I think you are leaving something very important out of this conversation. Mainly, is the reason behind the objections made by Russia and China. China does not want a nuclear North Korea (that’s why they are mad) because a nuclear NK gives Japan and South Korea (not to mention Taiwan, Australia and others) ample reason to themselves pursue nuclear weapons. This means that a North Korean bomb increases China’s insecurity in the region in the long run. At the same time however, and this is the important part, China does not want to see the Kim Jong Il regime destabilized to the point where it collapses.
Why? Because both China and Russia (not to mention South Korea) would be left holding th bag. They know that were the regime to fall, refugees would stream accross the Chinese and Russian borders with North Korea, and south to Seoul. Given our bang up job in Iraq’s reconstruction, and our commitment of troops to the region, the Chinese know that if the North Korean regime were to collapse, they would have to be the ones to deal with the attendant humanitarian crisis. They fear that a large enough influx of North Korean refugees (they already have problems with the limited number that streat accross the border) could destabilize the Chinese provinces closests to North Korea. They also fear that any such collapse and the failed state that would emerge would also dampen investment in the region affecting the Chinese economy directly.
Alternatively, the thought of having a unified democratic Korea on its border also gives the Chinese pause as that would mean that contraband items, tv shows, etc. could make their way with more ease through the porous border.
Plus, the Chinese feel that we haven’t offered them anything in return for taking on Kim. That is, they want something that this administration is likely not prepared to give them; recognition of their role as the hegemon in the region and a new security regime that institutionalizes this such as an Asian NATO. China has in the past called for just such an organization, but thanks to the Taiwan and North Korea issues, in addition to the Cold War lense this administration uses to view China (as the next peer competitor) prevents such an accomodation with China. In short, China wants to deal in order to get rid of Kim and we seem unprepared or unwilling to do so.
This Tom Barnett post encapsulates this argument in much better form as it ties China’s reluctance to our inability to win the peace in Iraq.
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/003819.html
nykrindc,
Your analysis of Chinese and Russian motivations are spot-on and you’re correct that I haven’t included a consideration of those motivations in my posts.
But Russia and China also have motivations for blocking Security Council action on Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran and Myanmar.
The issue isn’t whether Moscow’s and Beijing’s actions are consistent with their leaders’ perceptions of their national interests. The issues are that (1) their national interests clash with ours, and (2) because they have veto power, they can prevent the Security Council from acting in a manner consistent with our national interest.
This problem is most obvious in the case of Iran. America, not Russia or China, is the Great Satan, and our interests—much more so than Russia’s or China’s—would be threatened if Iran joins the nuclear club.
In the case of Sudan, the humanitarian interests of the democratic members of the Security Council are being blocked by the non-humanitarian interests of the semi-autocratic and autocratic members.
The bottom line is that, in every situation, Russia and China will tolerate only the bare minimum of intervention. Never is there a transgression that warrants an intervention strong enough to solve the problem. So what we wind up with is “cross the line . . . negotiate . . .” In the end, the thumb in the dike won’t be strong enough to hold back the on-rushing water.
Russia and China: The UN’s Weak Links…
It is worrisome to see the continued resistance from China and Russia within the UN in sanctioning Iran and North Korea. They appear to be the United Nation’s weak links. They risk unimaginable danger by their perpetual impediment on imposing sanction…
But Russia and China also have motivations for blocking Security Council action on Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran and Myanmar.
Yes, they do, and they relate to their own national interests. For China, Sudan, Iran and Myanmar provide access to oil and natural gas that it needs to run its economy. Both see them as markets not cornered by America, or Europe and hence theirs for the taking. In creating policy, we cannot ignore the concerns of these two powers. China is no different than the US in dealing with dictatorships because it needs their petroleum resources, look at us in Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, etc.
As for “they can prevent the Security Council from acting in a manner consistent with our national interest.” That is what the Security Council was set up to do, to ensure that none of the major powers could impose its will on the others, that is why they all got veto power in the first place. We need to recognize that reality and find a way to deal with it in such a way that we can bring Russia and China along by offering them incentives and ways in which they can still satisfy their needs. As an example we can look at Iran. China depends on Iranian oil and gas, and we want to get Iran to give up its nuclear program. One alternative, to ensure that China continues to receive Iranian oil and gas would be to negotiate with them and Iran directly, letting China know that if Iraq would give up its nuclear program the West would not only do away with all sanctions against Iran, but would also re-engage it economically, politically etc. acknowledging its role as the regional hegemon and opening the way for its acceptance into the WTO. In return for this (which would secure China’s gas and oil supplies from Iran since Iran would no longer have to worry about sanctions or regime change from the west, we would expect China to press Iran to accept the deal the west has offered which would involve them opening up their program to UN inspectors so that we can verify that they are not pursuing nukes, and to recognize Israel. Given how much China depends on Iranian oil, the Chinese would exert great pressure on Iran to accept it. This would turn the tables around on Iran who is able to resist the pressure we are bringing to bear on them simply because its trade relations with China and Russia remain unaffected. In essence, we allow them to play east and west against one another, rather than using the East’s dependence on Iran as a means to exert more pressure on them.
Sorry, hit submit too soon.
In short, what I’m getting at is the fact that we will need to take their interests into account and find a way to address them and make them work to our advantage.
nykrindc,
Your argument regarding China and Iran is quite persuasive. I read it as a possible “Grand Bargain.” If Tehran is rational (by our definition), they should be willing to accept it if it were offered to them.
But I’m not sure that the mullahs are rational. The worst possible outcome would be for the US to offer a Grand Bargain predicated on Iranian rationality, for Tehran to agree to it, and then to subsequently learn that the rationality assumption was wrong. The historical analogy, of course, is Chamberlain saying that Hitler was someone he could do business with—a statement that completely ignored the radicalism of Nazi ideology.
Obviously, the ideological foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran is what we would consider to be radical.
So the questions that the Grand Bargain raises are these: (1) before the Bargain is offered, what should be the criteria for deciding whether Iran continues to be a rational actor after it agrees to the Bargain, and (2) if we determine, using these criteria, that Iran has deviated from rationality, what do we do about it?
I think the rationality of Iran is less important than what we are able to give to China. If we give Iran the almost everything it wants, and tell China, Russia and India that we are doing so if only they give up their weapon’s program and recognize Israel, then pressure will come to bear on Tehran from the East, almost as much as the West. If the East sees Tehran pass up the opportunity of the Grand Bargain, they will likely begin to see Iran in a new lite, because rather than safeguarding their interests in their gas and oil, it would have chosen to follow an irrational course.
Further, this is not a Chamberlain-Nazi Germany situation because we are still the world’s preeminent power, Israel has nuclear weapons and as such we are in a much stronger position than Nazi Germany was in the Middle of the 1930’s.