During today’s press conference, President Bush referred to an agreement reached with North Korea on September 19, 2005:

Last year, North Korea agreed to a path to a better future for its people in the six-party talks. September of last year, we had an agreement with North Korea. It came about in the form of what we call the six-party joint statement. It offered the prospect for normalized relations with both Japan and the United States. It talked about economic cooperation and energy trade and investment.

In that joint statement, North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and to adhering to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. The United States affirmed that we have no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. We affirmed that we have no intention of attacking North Korea.

With its actions this week, North Korea has once again chosen to reject the prospect for a better future offered by the six-party joint statement. Instead, it has opted to raise tensions in the region.


The key portions of the September 19 agreement are as follows:
For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, the six parties held in a spirit of mutual respect and equality serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks and agreed in this context to the following:

The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning at an early date to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards.

The United States affirmed that is has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

[ . . . ]

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactor to the DPRK.

[ . . . ]

China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK.

Committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in northeast Asia, the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

[ . . . ]

The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action”.

The six parties agreed to hold the fifth round of the six-party talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.


In view of subsequent events, it’s essential to note that the agreement was a statement of principles and objectives to guide future negotiations and it was these negotiations that would translate words into deeds. In his press conference, the President glossed over this important distinction.

Whether or not Pyongyang ever had any intention of implementing the agreement is obviously open to considerable doubt. Even so, the fact that North Korea was willing to enter into that agreement presents a formidable obstacle to Bush Administration critics who claim that the invasion of Iraq persuaded Kim Jong Il to accelerate his nuclear weapons program. In addition, as will now be shown, the United States, in the months leading up to the September agreement, showed diplomatic flexibility: first, by being willing to hold bilateral talks (albeit, within the context of the six-party negotiations) with North Korea; and, second, by altering its position on Pyongyang’s insistance on retaining the right to construct a nuclear reactor for generating electricity.

Background to the September 19th Agreement

On February 10, 2005, Kim announced that North Korea had nuclear weapons and was indefinitely suspending participation in the six-party talks (no talks had taken place since June 2004). But just 11 days later, he said “We will go to the negotiating table any time if there are mature conditions . . . [and expressed] hope that the United States would show trustworthy sincerity . . .” He didn’t define “mature” or “sincerity,” nor did he give any indication of what should be the substance of the resumed talks. Clearly, the announcement that North Korea was a member of the nuclear club was intended as a bargaining chip.

In June 2005, North Korea told U.S. officials in a meeting at its UN mission that it was committed to returning to the stalled negotiations but declined to set a date for new talks. Later that month, Kim Jong Il vowed to return to the six-party talks “if it is certain that the United States is respecting the North as a partner” and said “There is no reason to keep nuclear weapons . . . I will open it all. [The IAEA] can come and see.” (IAEA inspectors were expelled on December 31, 2002—before the start of the Iraq war.)

North Korea, on July 9, 2005, agreed to return to the talks. On that day, Pyongyang’s deputy foreign minister Kim Gye Gwan told Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill that North Korea was willing to attend talks in Beijing during the week of July 25. In what U.S. officials took as an encouraging sign, Kim said that the purpose of the talks would be the “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” North Korea’s official KCNA news agency added that “The U.S. side clarified its official stand to recognize the DPRK as a sovereign state, not to invade it and hold bilateral talks within the framework of the six-party talks.” The KCNA statement was consistent with the Bush Administration’s stated policy that it would not hold bilateral negotiations except as part of the six-party talks.

Two days later, the U.S. responded by stating it was willing to alter the terms and conditions of its June 2004 proposals if Pyongyang constructively outlined its concerns when talks resumed. The June 2004 proposals had been rejected because the North Koreans would have been required to disclose all of its nuclear programs and have its claims verified before the U.S. would have taken any steps in return.

The new round of talks began on July 26. At the opening session, Kim Gye Gwan reiterated his government’s declared willingness to work for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. negotiator, said “We view DPRK sovereignty as a matter of fact. The United States has absolutely no intention of invading or attacking the DPRK . . .”

The talks adjourned on August 7 without agreement. The main sticking point was North Korea’s unexpected insistence that, under any denuclearization plan, it would still have the right to build light-water nuclear reactors. The U.S. position was that the North Koreans shouldn’t be allowed to retain reactors for civilian use because it had turned the Yongbon research facility into a weapons-grade plutonium production center after the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

As late as September 16, the North Koreans were still demanding that the outside world build it a light-water reactor before it would dismantle its nuclear weapons. Christopher Hill was decidedly pessimistic, saying that “No country is going to provide North Korea with a light-water reactor. So we have reached a bit of a standoff.”

Then, three days later, an agreement was reached stipulating that, as already noted, the parties agreed to “discuss at an appropriate time the provision of light-water reactor to the DPRK” and “provide energy assistance to the DPRK.” In other words, a compromise was reached by postponing decisions on the nuclear reactor issue.