If George Orwell were still alive and had read Anatole Kaletsky’s op-ed in The Times, he might be tempted to revise 1984. To “War Is Peace, Freedom Is Slavery, Ignorance Is Strength,” he could add “Defeat Is Victory.”
The international community, says Kaletsky, is now “totally powerless in its nuclear confrontation with Iran.” Sanctions—most notably those aimed at curbing investment in its oil industry—would make matters worse. Lower Iranian oil production would fuel another surge in oil’s price. If Iran were to react by blocking the Strait of Hormuz, the price of oil would go through the roof. Sanctions, then, “would provide President Ahmadinejad with even more money to buy popularity among his domestic voters, and unleash an even greater torrent of oil money to finance Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon and anti- American Shia in Iraq.”
As to threatening military action, Kaletsky’s advice is to forget about it:
Militarily, America and Israel have now shot their bolts in Iraq and Lebanon respectively. They have neither the firepower nor the willpower to do anything to stop Iran’s nuclear programme — and even if they did have the capacity to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, they could not afford the risk of destabilising their other Middle Eastern interests even further by taking military action.
Using force would also cause “potentially catastrophic disruption to the world economy when the American public is already turning against the Iraq adventure and Republicans face a potentially disastrous electoral defeat.”
If neither sanctions nor military action are viable, what is to be done?
The answer is clear: concede defeat. Iran has won this tussle and there is no point in pretending otherwise. Instead of trying to stop Iran’s nuclear programme, the international community must bring Iran back into the civilised world. The only way to do that is to stop issuing empty threats and to start offering Iran real incentives for co-operative behaviour — non-aggression guarantees from America and Israel, removal of the residual US economic sanctions dating back to the 1980s and the prospect of steadily improving treatment in investment and trade.
In other words, promise lots of carrots, let Iran have the Bomb, and trust that, in return for the carrots and the Bomb, Iran will stop supporting terrorism and won’t brandish their nukes.
Most amazingly, this outcome doesn’t really concern Kaletsky, who avers that
Defeat is never pleasant, but often it is better to lose than to win. Defeat in the Second World War was the best thing that ever happened to Germany and Japan in their thousand years of recorded history.
Similar thoughts were in Neville Chamberlain’s mind when he returned from the Munich Conference and announced “Peace in Our Time.” Appeasement didn’t cure Nazi Germany’s ideological illness. It won’t cure Iran’s, either.
If the U.S. appeases Shi’a Iran, would Sunni Egypt and Sunni Saudi Arabia be confident that Washington would rush to their aid if they were threatened by the nuclear mullahs? The pressures on Cairo and Riyahd to acquire their own nukes would be immense. Just imagine an eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear confrontation between Sunnis and Shi’as.
Denying nuclear weapons to Iran will come at a price. But that price will be smaller than the one that will someday be paid if Kaletsky’s advice is taken. Just ask Neville Chamberlain, who lived long enough to see his dream of peace shattered.
First of all, there is no lack of firepower to take Iran out.. it owuld be the rebuilding part that would suffer. to inflict a purely military defeat on Iran would be quite a quick process. If Iran tried to block the Straights as suggested, it wouldnt be too difficult to get them reopened.
But if we are to really entertain what is being proposed, surely this would mean getting Israel to agree to cease to exist , which i think might be a stumbling block in bringing Iran into the real world…
Pre-emptive surrender, much better than appeasement, this way we can “live” like zombies. Only if the Brits and the Americans had thought of that then our troops wouldn’t have to die in Normandy. We might not even have troops for that matter. No American hegemon. No great Satan. Bushitler, a compliment. How utopian!
My solution. Put Kaletsky in a Clockwork Orange rig and force him to repeatedly watch Braveheart. The man’s a catamite.
Danegeld
Defeat was a good thing for the Nazis, Italians and Japanese in WWII because WE beat them. They were defeated by a Christian nation with a very positive outlook and one that was convinced that it was destined to lead the world into a bright new future, one defined by symbols such as the Statue of Liberty and Norman Rockwell’s images of Freedom.
More moral equivalence from someone who has decided that “war stuff” is just too hard to do and it has to just go away if he and his kind are to regain power.
That having been said, Mr. Kaletsky is wrong in almost every single fact and inference. Among his factual problems:
– the extent of Iran’s cash reserves – Iran’s control of the Straits of Hormuz – Iran’s economic independence – lack of U. S. ability to stop Iran’s program by force
Among the problems with his inferences:
– he overestimates Western vulnerability – he underestimates Iranian vulnerability – he takes Iranian access to cash as a given
That the United States has the ability to stop Iran’s nuclear development program by force is a fact: we have the ability to kill every man, woman, and child in the country. That we will stay our hand is an inference (and it’s one I agree with). But the two should not be confused.
The hinge of Mr. Kaletsky’s argument is that Iran is better able to do without the rest of the world than the rest of the world without Iran. I don’t believe that’s true but whether it’s true or not depends both on facts and inferences. He’ll need to do better on both to convince me.
Iran could close the straight of Hormuz and the oil would go to 200 dollars a barrel. The ship channels are less then 10 miles from the coast of Iran so whoever thinks Iran could not hit the passing oil tankers is foolish. They could hit them with artillery shells! They have very advanced cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles from France,Russia and China, Advanced anti-ship mines,the world’s fastest torpedo(Russian) and many fast attack boats armed with these weapons listed above.
If war comes it will be at a very high cost fo everyone!
Once they’d stopped the flow of oil out (and gasoline in) what would they use for revenue?
Iran would not be able to close the Strait for long. In the meantime, the US, Britain, South Korea, and Japan and maybe a few others would open their Strategic Oil Reserves (billions of barrels available to normalize the market), all at once if things are bad, or with a coordinated oscillation if things are manageable. Our naval assets would be able to open the Strait in weeks, and, except for the first day or so, the price of oil would not rise significantly.
We also wouldn’t have much trouble taking out Iran’s nuclear program. Using Network Centric Operations, Spec. Operation Forces, Close Air Support, and our precision weaponry, we could destroy the top nuclear sites in the country and occupy the oil fields for the duration of hostilities. Israel’s Baalbek raid shows that we could place SOF’s onsite after a bombing to verify that the target was destroyed, and get them out again without hardly any casualties.
The problem with this scenario actually has nothing to do with Iran proper. We could neutralize Iran’s CnC, air, naval, and ground assets within 72 hours. The problem lies in Iraq and a wider regional conflagration.
In this way, Israel’s bombing of Hezbollah, however ineffectively, and Maliki’s raids against Shia extremists are important steps in the preparation of the battlefield.
As an addendum, we would not destroy anything in Iran accept nuclear sites and regime retaliatory assets. We would also conduct information operations upon completion of the military mission, aimed at humiliating the regime. The nationalist anger at our attack, without any Americans to take it out on, would fade in days and weeks. Then, perhaps with a little help from Uncle Sam, all that negative attention would shift to the Mullahs.
For some reason, people assume that Iranian anger at the US and Iranian anger at the Mullahs are two mutually exclusive propositions. They are not.
Iran might try to disrupt shipping in the gulf, but it will be no more successful now than when they tried to do it in the 80s. At the link below is an excellent account of the tanker war of the late 80s which involved surface combat between American and Iranian ships, SEAL operations and air combat by the Army’s 160th SOAR to counter Iranian mine laying, speedboat raids and missile attacks. It’s a good story that is not often told and definitely worth the read.
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=5442
Excellent comments, Aristides, although I don’t see why we can’t start the information warfare aspect way ahead of any military operations. Starting, maybe like yesterday.
In a rare fit of pique I left a comment on the site that Anatole was a cheese eating French surrender monkey.
The moderator did not see fit to let it be published but I will keep a stiff upper lip!
Putting aside for the moment Kaletsky’s mind-boggling ignorance about the complex strategic-military-political circumstances and conditions affecting the situation he addressing, I want to draw attention just to his recommendation.
He advises we should permit Iran nuclear weapons AND give them the bribes for not developing nuclear weapons. What’s wrong with this picture?
Another dimwitted ignoramus masquerading as an intellectual. What would the world do without Ivory Tower Chair Queens?
[...] Read the rest of this post [...]
‘Blow of Zolfaqar’ War Games a Message of Peace, Friendship
[...] Bill Emmott (a former editor of The Economist) doesn’t go quite as far as Anatole Kaletsky does. Emmott, like Kaletsky, thinks that imposing sanctions won’t prevent Iran from joining the nuclear weapons club. But, while Kaletsky avers that “Defeat is never pleasant, but often it is better to lose than to win,” Emmott simply says: Get used to it. Iran is becoming a nuclear power. What everyone needs to do now is to work out how to live with that fact. “Everyone” doesn’t include Emmott, who fails to provide any suggestions. [...]
[...] While The Times, with this editorial, adds its voice to the growing chorus of those who doubt the efficacy of imposing sanctions on Iran, it—unlike Kaletsky and Emmott—recognizes the resulting dangers: From having its back to the wall three years ago, when the invasion of Iraq intimidated the ayatollahs next door, Iran has emerged as an influential power through little more than opportunism and the miscalculations of its enemies. How then can it be expected to take seriously the threats of the United Nations security council to punish it with economic sanctions this week for refusing to stop enriching uranium, a process that can be used to make fuel for nuclear power but also material for bombs? [...]
[...] With apologies to the Beatles, I can’t think of a better description of Sheikh Nasrallah’s song. From his interview on Lebanese TV, it’s clear that the Iranian-funded effort to buy the support of those who lost their homes during the war has failed. Why else would the terrorist-in-chief say this about the kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers on July 12? We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11… that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not. And why else would he utter these words about the future? The current Israeli situation, and the available givens tell us that we are not heading to another round. Kudos to Amir Taheri, Brendan Simms, David Warren, and Dan Gordon for getting it right. A defeat for Hezbollah is a defeat for Iran (and Syria). What will Anatole Kaletsky and Bill Emmott have to say now? This entry is filed under Iran, Israel, Lebanon. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site. Leave a Reply [...]