Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post, “A Moment to Be Seized in Lebanon”

. . . everything remains in place awaiting the order to restart the war when the time is right. That arrangement is essentially a return to the status quo ante—precisely what the United States had said it would not permit because that would represent a strategic disaster for the forces of democracy and moderation in the region . . . We are headed for a complete repudiation of the bottom-line American position . . . What is most at stake, from the American perspective, is Lebanon. Lebanon was the most encouraging achievement of the democratization project launched with great risk with the invasion of Iraq . . . Hezbollah is not just returning to being a “state within a state.” It is becoming the state, with the Siniora government reduced to acting as its front . . . This is no time for the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to be saying, when asked about the creation of an international force, that “this really is a responsibility of the Secretariat.” Maybe officially, but if we are not working frantically behind the scenes to make sure that this preposterously inappropriate body gets real troops in quickly, armed with the right equipment and the right mandate, the moment will be lost. And with it Lebanon.

Kim Murphy, Los Angeles Times, “Lebanon’s Renewal Is Dashed in Weeks”

The [Lebanese] government review shows that Israel has largely avoided some types of targets: major power plants, water treatment facilities, telephone systems, central government buildings and most factories . . . most of the damage in Beirut has been limited to a single square mile of the southern suburbs . . .

David Makovsky, New York Daily News, “Iran’s Militia Mayhem”

. . . by funneling its oil money to Hezbollah, arming a fierce band of fanatical fighters, Iran has honed a strategy that, if seen to succeed, could replicate itself all across the Arab world . . . A perceived victory for Hezbollah today will spawn clones tomorrow. That’s why it is time for the international community to make it crystal-clear that democratization cannot be built on the false legitimacy of a militia.

Farah Stockman, Boston Globe, “View of common fears drives US-Israel policy”

For the first time in Israel’s history, key figures in the US government believe that the same forces that threaten Israel—Islamic terrorists and a nuclear-armed Iran—also present the greatest strategic threat to the United States.

The Economist, “Only Lebanese Pressure Will Disarm Hizballah”

If Hizballah is ever to give up its weapons and become just another political party, it will be through the pressure of the other Lebanese, not as a direct result of Israel’s war. The trouble for Israel is that in peacemaking, as well as in war, the enemy gets a vote. What the well-meaning protesters who have been marching in Europe in praise of Hizballah refuse to acknowledge is that today, as in the 1940s, Israel still has some neighbors who continue to deny its very right to exist as a Jewish state . . . Hizballah and Iran seriously propose to destroy Israel is hard to tell, but it is what they keep saying – and they have imitators. The Palestinians’ ruling Hamas movement has not yet dared to say out loud that it accepts even the principle of sharing Palestine with a Jewish state. Hamas, after the Lebanon war, is in danger of subscribing anew to the old illusion that Palestine can be liberated by force . . . Hizballah has now killed stone dead the idea of Israel giving up territory again without cast-iron security assurances. So there will be no leaving any of the West Bank until there is a deal.

Oliver Kamm, The Guardian, “Diplomacy has a limit”

British political debate about Israel’s intervention in Lebanon has, with rare exceptions, run the gamut of opinion from A to C, but with a unifying theme that Israel’s actions have been disproportionate to the provocation. In reality, the principal ethical question concerning Israel’s military campaign is whether it has been curtailed too soon . . . Israel’s acceptance of security council resolution 1701 is comparable in aim to its acceptance of the Oslo accords 13 years ago. It knows that lasting peace requires diplomacy . . . diplomacy, it turned out at Oslo, has a limit as well as a role. That limit will be tested and reached if the enemies of peace draw comfort from the curtailment of Israel’s actions against Hizbullah. On that point, the auguries are not encouraging . . . Israel’s critics will claim that military action has strengthened Islamist militancy in Lebanon and the region. But this is question-begging. Hizbullah and its state supporters also claimed vindication from Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon under the dovish government of Ehud Barak.

Barry Rubin, Jerusalem Post, “Cease-fire on verge of collapse”

The Monty Python Prize for Arab politics must go to Emile Lahoud, the well-known Syrian puppet who also happens to be Lebanon’s president. Hizbullah, he explains, “is part of the Lebanese army.” Rather than disarm Hizbullah, he is saying, Lebanon’s army should fight alongside of it. Israel, by his account, should turn over southern Lebanon to the joint Lebanese army-Hizbullah forces . . . If the war restarts, Hizbullah is going to face far greater pressures, especially since the Israeli government’s leaders have already been harshly criticized for going too slowly in the ground offensive . . . Hizbullah may face a two-front war. Lebanese Christians, Druze and Sunnis, the majority of the population, are largely angry at how Hizbullah dragged their country into a war and is increasingly subjugated it to Iran and Syria . . . The Saudis are eager to fund anti-Hizbullah forces in Lebanon . . . And what about the international community? It is not going to be happy about Hizbullah, with the help of its Iranian and Syrian backers, wrecking the UN peace effort. It is going to be hard to criticize Israel for taking military action under such conditions.

Nahum Barnea, Ynetnews, “No Victory”

The truth must be told: We did not win this war. This can be proven by the following hypothetical question I heard yesterday from one former Israeli leader: If Nasrallah would have been asked a month ago if he would have started this war knowing it would end with his organization in the state it currently is, he would likely have answered “yes.” And what if Israeli government ministers had been asked a month ago if they would have approved this operation, knowing the war would have led to the current state of affairs? They would have hemmed and hawed and looked to move on to the next question.