Ze’ev Schiff notes that there have already been four cease-fires in south Lebanon—in 1978, 1982, 1993, and 1996:

These agreements were not worth the paper on which they were written. Even withdrawing from Lebanon down to the last millimeter, as confirmed by the UN, did not prevent Hezbollah from continuing its attacks, abducting and killing Israelis, shelling Israeli towns – and no less important, building up a huge array of rockets and missiles, courtesy of Iran and Syria, and digging in very deep along the border. Should Israel’s strategy for ending the war repeat the same scenario? That would be a recipe for suicide.

[ . . . ] The strategy for ending the war with Hezbollah and its supporters must state that the outcome will be deemed positive only if Hezbollah has been dealt a major blow, feels that it has paid a steep price and is isolated in the Arab world. Only that kind of ending will not cause more serious danger in the future. Secondly, Israel needs an address in Lebanon. The Lebanese government is very weak, and in its weakness, it contributed to strengthening Hezbollah – from allowing arms to be transferred to Hezbollah in convoys from Syria and Iran to granting injured Hezbollah fighters the status of Lebanese army veterans. Although the Lebanese government includes ministers representing the organization that has declared war on Israel, in general, Israel should adopt the approach taken by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who accepts UN Security Council Resolution 1559.

The UN resolution is an important point of departure. Despite its lacunae, the principle underlying it is a good one: The Lebanese army moves into southern Lebanon and Hezbollah is dismantled as an armed militia. It is unlikely that the second goal can be attained, certainly not in its entirety. Israel’s goal should be to eliminate Hezbollah’s military deployment in south Lebanon, including its fortifications.

Resolution 1559 has one major drawback: It says nothing about a renewed flow of arms to Hezbollah or about how to prevent this, and it does not view the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon as a foreign militia that must be removed. This is a UN resolution, and if it is not implemented, it will be a failure on the part of the UN. As for an international force – its mandate must be clearly spelled out, and it is important that it also contain an Arab unit.

Resolution 1559 also mentions Shaba Farms, which is considered Syrian territory. Siniora wants the territory handed over to Lebanon. That way, he will be able to tell Hezbollah that it must disarm as a militia because its claim that it is fighting to liberate Lebanese territory no longer exists. For Israel, that is a subject for future discussion.

Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher writes with seeming pride about his role in arranging the 1993 and 1996 cease-fires, conveniently ignoring Hezbollah’s arms buildup during the past ten years:

Twice during my four years as secretary of state we faced situations similar to the one that confronts us today. Twice, at the request of the Israelis, we helped bring the bloodshed to an end.

In June 1993, Israel responded to Hezbollah rocket attacks along its northern border by launching Operation Accountability, resulting in the expulsion of 250,000 civilians from the southern part of Lebanon.

After the Israeli bombardment had continued for several days, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin asked me to use my contacts in Syria to seek their help in containing the hostilities. I contacted Foreign Minister Farouk Shara, who, of course, consulted with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. After several days of urgent negotiations, an agreement was reached committing the parties to stop targeting one another’s civilian populations. We never knew exactly what the Syrians did, but clearly Hezbollah responded to their direction.

In April 1996, when Hezbollah again launched rocket attacks on Israel’s northern border, the Israelis countered with Operation Grapes of Wrath, sending 400,000 Lebanese fleeing from southern Lebanon. Errant Israeli bombs hit a U.N. refugee camp at Cana in southern Lebanon, killing about 100 civilians and bringing the wrath of international public opinion down upon Israel.

This time Shimon Peres, who had become prime minister after the assassination of Rabin, sought our help. In response, we launched an eight-day shuttle to Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem that produced a written agreement bringing the hostilities to an end. Weeks later, the parties agreed to a border monitoring group consisting of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, France and the United States. Until three weeks ago, that agreement had succeeded for 10 years in preventing a wholesale resumption of hostilities.

If Israel were to take Christopher’s advice, it might buy a few more years of “peace.” But during what would amount to nothing more than a truce, Hezbollah would increase the range and destructive power of its missiles. Then there would be another war. And it might be fought in the context of a nuclear Iran.