An editorial in The Times is highly—and rightfully – skeptical of the potential efficacy of Annan’s and Blair’s proposal to send a multinational force to southern Lebanon:
It is hard to see how ground troops, presumably under UN auspices, could stop Hezbollah’s Iranian-made rockets, with a range of 50 miles, from sailing overhead. Besides, there is already a 2,000-strong UN mission in the area, where it has been since 1978, although it does not have the power to enforce peace. Any new force, presumably with a stiffer mandate, could take months to form and then mobilise. This may be an honourable idea, but it does not look like a solution.
And on Iran and Syria, the paper is correct in stating that
Although history suggests that the region’s problems are intractable, the parameters of the current crisis are simple. Iran, with help from Syria, is trying to maximise its influence. Its arming of Hezbollah with rockets that can reach deep into Israel gives the radical militia group, and ultimately Tehran, the power to sabotage any Israeli-Palestinian peace plan. It is of widespread interest, particularly to the Arab world, that this “Shia crescent†is not allowed to become the region’s powerbroker. This includes Syria.
In his op-ed in The Times, David Aaronovitch is highly critical of David Clark, the former adviser to Robin Cook, wrote yesterday: “The key to resolving the situation in Lebanon lies, as it did throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in finding a solution to the Palestinian question.†This is apparently because, with no suffering Palestinians to emote over, Hezbollah will quickly lose its support and therefore its potency. This reductiveness — taking as it does no account of the regional ambitions and fears of countries such as Iran and Syria — leads to analytical error. Clark ends up by arguing that Israel has launched its attack on Lebanon to forestall the possibility of a Palestinian peace effort, to be led by Mahmoud Abbas.
On the issue of proportionality, Aaronovitch has this to say:
do we think that Israel’s response is “proportionate� By the way, if it isn’t, then the Falklands campaign, in which deaths actually exceeded the population of the contested area, can only be described as grossly disproportionate. Dead kids in a blasted car can never be described as a price worth paying, even if — in effect — all sides actually think they are. And there are so many false trails here. On the BBC yesterday I heard a reporter in the bombed port city of Tyre being told by a local man: “No Hezbollah in Tyre!†Which — as the reporter didn’t say — will come as extraordinary news to everyone in Lebanon.
Both the editorial and the op-ed are—as they say in Britain—spot-on.
I wonder what influence popular imagery has on people’s perceptions of this crisis. On one hand, there are the suicide bombing, rocket-launching and stone-throwing Palestinians. On the other hand, the hot babes from the Cedar Revolution.
Just on a visceral level, the instinctive appeal of one so greatly outweighs the other, I think David Clark should tell Hamas, instead of anti-tank missiles and bomb-makers, to start smuggling in tank-tops and plastic surgeons.
There is already a UN peacekeeping mission in place there. It has been ongoing for the last 60 years. How will a new mission be more successful than the old one? Larger? More expansive mission? More robust ROE? What?
On a more positive note, the plan might offer an opportunity to begin a new version of the highly popular Oil-For-Food program….
A UN force might yet be valuable. I believe they can stop—or at least greatly diminish the rocket attacks if they put sufficient troops with the proper mandate in the area.
Doing so will help the Lebanese government, which is being badly undermined by Hizbollah’s actions. As Hizbollah is also a political party, they gain from their military wing’s actions. There is large voter appeal in the “punish Israel” tactics of Hamas and Hizbollah, so slowing the rocket attacks will help the young and fragile democracy, which is of prime importance now lest Syria again gain control.
I understand that having the UN would severely restrict Israel’s ability to respond to Hizbollah’s provocations, which are sure to increase, but in theory this can be negotiated.
I share the scepticism of many who have seen Darfur and are wholly justified in their lack of faith in the UN peacekeeping force. Sending such a meek, ineffective group would only serve to appease the collective consciousness of the world community that they believe something “substantiative” and “helpful” has been done.
The other alternative is to enlist the aid of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq (and indirectly, the U.S.) in consolidating a security force with potent military capabilities (the IDF may share an auxillary role) to defend Lebanon’s border with Syria. All of these nations are deeply concerned about Iran’s ascendance, though for entirely different reasons.
What matters is that Iran and Syria – who seek to gain sympathy and galvanise the Arabs in order to declare a regional war against Israel – will think twice about endangering the lives of fellow Arabs – those they are trying to persuade to join their cause – who are protecting Lebanon’s border. While they are constricted by this predicament, and as the impetus fades, the regimes will slowly and inevitably collapse, because they thrive on confrontation which by then would be unnecessary.
U.N. peacekeeping forces don’t work.
Now, U.N. warmaking forces, as in Korea in 1950, can work pretty well.
“The other alternative is to enlist the aid of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq (and indirectly, the U.S.) in consolidating a security force with potent military capabilities (the IDF may share an auxillary role) to defend Lebanon’s border with Syria”
that is the absolute craziest thing i have ever read in my entire life.
No, the current craziest thing people are reading about is the one with Richard Cohen calling Israel a “mistake”.
However, I understand your scepticism, lester1/2jr. Of course, with the history of Arab factionalism, fundamentalism and fanaticism telling, it seems entirely out of the question.
However, it is also known that Arabs will risk conflict with their own brethren if need be, to advance their own agenda.
Egypt doesn’t want Hamas and Hizbollah to gain even more popularity because of the domestic support for its own opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia wants to export Sunni Wahhabism and prevent the formation of an Iran-centric Shia Crescent (ala Shi’ite Caliphate). Jordan has shown that it prefers peace with Israel, while for the U.S., it has done rather well training the Iraqi army.
The probability that the Arab nations would actually synergise and work together is undoubtedly minute, but if only for their vested interests, they might be willing to overlook their differences this time.
so when you say “egypt” or “saudi arabia” you mean the corrupt regimes we are paying billions to keep in place, not the actual people in those countries
As I said before, the possibility is minute. The U.S. policy of appeasing Arab regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia stems from the various compromises it has had to make in exchange for cooperation in dealing with more urgent problems.
I’m not saying it should be condoned or encouraged. The reality lies in the fact that these are tough times for Israel and the U.S., and whatever help they need, they will seriously consider, even if it means propping up such regimes.