From The Washington Realist, a guest post by Alexis Debat, terrorism consultant for ABC News, a senior fellow at The Nixon Center and a contributing editor to The National Interest:
Jordanian intelligence officials say that Abu Ayyub al Masri (aka Abu Hamza al Muhajir) is in his late thirties, and was born and raised in Egypt, were he joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (aka “al Jihad”) in the 1980s. There, according to the same sources, he operated alongside Ayman al Zawahiri, who was also a member of “al Jihad”, and eventually became one of his protégés . . .
The same Jordanian sources add that when Abu Musab al Zarqawi joined Al Qaeda in Afghanistan after his release from prison in Jordan in 1999, he was “taken under the protection of Zawahiri, Atef and Al Adl, who despite Osama Bin Laden’s strong animosity toward the Jordanian, trained and financed his nascent terrorist organization, then named “Jund as Sham”. One of the militants in charge of this training was Abu Ayyub al Masri, then a senior aide to Muhammad Atef and an explosives expert at Al Qaeda’s al Farooq training camp near Kandahar (where al Masri also trained Mukhtar al-Bakri, one of the indicted members of the “Buffalo cell” here in the US).
After the US intervention in Afghanistan in November 2001, al Masri and Zarqawi both crossed into Iran via South Waziristan and Baluchistan in Pakistan), along with Saif al Adl and several other fellow Egyptians close to Zawahiri, including Abdallah Muhammad al Masri, Abu Muhammad al Masri and Abdel Aziz al Masri.
According to Jordanian intelligence sources, these individuals were highly instrumental in setting up Zarqawi’s network in Iraq in 2002. Abu Ayyub al Masri, for example, was reported by the US military to have set up Zarqawi’s first cell in Baghdad in mid-2002. This Egyptian group, led by al Masri, is reported to have played a critical role in Al Qaeda in Iraq, which cell structure and modus operandi are almost identical to those of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1980s . . .
European intelligence sources indicate they believe that sometime in 2004 al Masri was put in charge of some of Zarqawi’s international networks. He sent “envoys” all over the Middle East, North Africa and even Europe, where he struck an informal relationship with the Algerian GSPC, to raise money and recruit international volunteers for the jihad in Iraq . . .
Al Masri is also strongly suspected of having played a key role in the bombings in Egypt’s Sinai peninsula in 2004, 2005 and 2006, all of which were reported to have been instigated by Egyptian elements close to Zarqawi.
The emergence of Abu Ayyub al Masri as a successor to Abu Musab al Zarqawi could be extremely significant. The new leader’s nationality, ideology, skills, and past responsibilities within Al Qaeda in Iraq will greatly impact the organization’s operational focus. It is likely, for example, that the terrorist organization will be more closely managed by “Al Qaeda global” and Ayman al Zawahiri, who publicly vented his frustration with some of Zarqawi’s tactical choices (such as his focus on anti-Shi’a operations). And considering both Zawahiri’s broad strategic goals and al Masri’s past responsibilities in Al Qaeda, the latter will most likely put a greater emphasis on operations abroad. But whoever takes charge will have to significantly reorganize Al Qaeda in Iraq’s the command structure and modus operandi, as well as find new sources of funding for an increasingly cash-strapped organization (in the past 12 months volunteers from abroad were asked to join the organization with their own cash, usually by selling all of their belongings prior to cross into Iraq). This crisis, as well as the succession, presents the US and Iraqi governments with a significant window of opportunity to score decisive – and potentially definitive- points against the jihadi phenomenon in Iraq.
All emphases are mine.
I like the analysis by Debat. However, I do have a minor problem with an assertion he makes. He says that “Abu Musab al Zarqawi joined Al Qaeda in Afghanistan after his release from prison in Jordan in 1999.” If by that he means that he went to al Qaeda training camps after being released from prison, then that is true. But if he is implying that Zarqawi joined the al Qaeda organization, then that is likely not true. Zarqawi’s group, which became Tawid wa Jihad (spelling?)or Monotheism and Jihad was a group autonomous from al Qaeda. They shared some goals, but clashed on others. Debat alludes to this, in his description of the animosity between the al Qaeda leadership and Zarqawi over his targeting of Shiites. Zarqawi and al Qaeda became allies more recently, and it was a marriage of convenience between Zarqawi who needed funds to fight the “infidels” and al Qaeda which needed to have a presence in Iraq (and to tie itself to Zarqawi’s success). By that I mean, not success in defeating us, which clearly he did not do, but rather in bleeding us and making our struggle in the country far more bloody and difficult than it otherwise would have been. The organization was established by Zarqawi, and it isn’t surprising that many al Qaeda affiliates became part of Zarqawi’s group as he aspired to rise in the ranks of al Qaeda and become the leader of global jihad. The al Qaeda people with him, however, likely retained their allegiance to bin laden and Zawahiri and once Zarqawi was no longer necessary (indeed an obstacle and hindrance) to the insurgency, they could plan for his martyrdom. It has been speculated elsewhere that Zarqawi was killed not only due to our work in Iraq, but also because al Qaeda wanted him dead. I can’t say one way or the other, but given his almost toxic persona and the manner in which he managed to alienate other insurgent groups from his own, his death benefited us as much as it benefited al Qaeda in Iraq.
As for al-Masri, you will recall that I made a similar point regarding his rise to leadership in the organization and how he would make AQ in Iraq far more subservient to al Qaeda international. In addition, there has been speculation, particularly in al Jazeera that the picture of the man we are calling al-Masri is actually that of a militant whose real name is Yusif al-Dardiri, an Egyptian in his mid-30s from the southern Egyptian city of Sohaj. This probably means, one of two things, either al Dardiri is also al-Masri (meaning the Egyptian) and al-mujahir (meaning the foreigner), or we have a dispute as to who the leader of AQ in Iraq actually is. Additionally, the question as to who the leader of AQ in Iraq is, is also being flamed by the fact that Abu Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, the head of the Mujahidin Shura Council is also claiming the leadership of al-Qaeda. This would be great news for us, because it would mean that there is an internal struggle within AQ in Iraq between native Iraqis and its foreign components for the leadership of the organization. It could also mean that al-Masri is trying to make the Iraqi component of Al Qaeda far more visible in order to attract a new following, and repair frayed relations with other insurgent groups. It’s too early to tell where things are going, although from the looks of it, the insurgency has not abated one bit. We’ll have to see how events develop within the next couple of weeks to a month to see where we stand and where we go from here.
I’m guessing you highlighted the thing about Iraq as a last ditch effort at a saddam -al queda connection. Obviously, the guy went to Iraq to wait for the american invasion. which was pretty much obvious by 02 and one of al quedas goals.
Lester,
I never have bought into the al-Qaeda-Saddam connection. In fact, my response to Marc’s post goes against that very grain. Mainly, Zarqawi was not affiliated with al Qaeda at the time when the President argues there was a link between the two before the war. If anything, Zarqawi was outside of the reah of Baghdad and Hussein’s security services.
I tend to agree with the 9/11 Commission, mainly that there wasn’t enough evidence to suggest a link between Iraq and al Qaeda. That said, post-invasion, did al Qaeda come into Iraq? Yes. Are they there now? Yes, they might not make up the bulk of the insurgency, or even be the most dangerous but they are there, and would stay there even after we left. So, while you are right Lester when you say that there was no Iraq-al Qaeda connection prior to the invasion, that is not the case today. It was partly our fault, because in refusing to provide enough soldiers for the occupation we allowed them to fill part of the security vaccuum in the country, and hence our current situation.
nykrindc- I’m sorry . I was referring to the original posting, the article itself.