The New Republic’s Spencer Ackerman is concerned that Zarqawi’s demise may work to Al Qaeda’s benefit:
Painful as it may be to admit, the biggest beneficiary of Zarqawi’s death may very well be Al Qaeda. Last year, Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman Al Zawahiri—a figure whose profile in jihadi circles far eclipses Zarqawi’s—wrote Zarqawi a letter gingerly instructing him to stop his seemingly indiscriminate murder of Muslims, since it was costing Al Qaeda valuable Islamic hearts and minds. (When the letter surfaced, Zarqawi defensively insisted it was a fraud.) Zarqawi’s practice of declaring fellow Muslims infidels led him and Al Qaeda into strategic miscalculation, as with his November bombing of Jordanian hotels that led to widespread anti-Al Qaeda demonstrations in the streets of Amman. He even declared in his last propaganda message that Hezbollah was an agent of Israel. Whereas once Zarqawi allowed Iraqi Sunnis a face-saving way to distance themselves from murderous jihadis, in death he may allow Al Qaeda to mend fences with Muslims and perhaps even other terrorist groups that his “excesses” have alienated. Zawahiri’s extraordinary letter suggests that Al Qaeda—following an obligatory statement praising Zarqawi as a martyr—will do exactly that.
In Iraq, such a jihadist opportunity may come fairly quickly. Today Maliki announced the long-delayed appointment of the interior and security ministers. Most importantly from the perspective of Iraqi sectarianism, the interior ministry will remain in the hands of the ruling Shia faction, which Sunnis will most likely see as a sign that Shia death squads will continue operating under the ministry’s auspices. With perceived besiegement by the Shia continuing, the next Al Qaeda “prince”—the group has already announced a replacement for Zarqawi—can turn to Sunni insurgents and offer to turn over a new leaf, discarding the baggage of Zarqawi in the face of a shared sectarian threat. With any luck, that overture could be rejected, owing to tensions between Al Qaeda and the Sunnis outliving Zarqawi—but that may take luck, as opposed to a sense of divergent interests.
Marc,
I think Spencer’s comments are caught in a vaccum. This operation didn’t just nab Zarqawi, but it also resulted in 17 other raids which have apparently provided “a treasure trove of intelligence.”
Al-Qaeda in Iraq was beaten, but not out. If what has been reported about recent intelligence is true, we might be able to knock them out for good. Regardless of al-Zawihiri’s sage advice, even if they found someone with like ideology, they aren’t going to replace Zarqawi’s effectiveness at terrorizing the population.
It isn’t important that we got him in as much as how we got him. We got him by dismantling his network and establishing solid HUMINT —eventually he ran out of safe places to hide.
I wouldn’t exactly be thrilled about being named the next Emir of Iraq if I were a jihadist right now.
There was a piece in the Times (not NYT) that implicated Zarqawi in the internet recruitment of the Canadians arrested. I don’t have the link, but it may have been the Wed. edition.
Here’s the address:
http://www.ttimesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2214663.html
If there’s a typo in this the link is at Die Welt’s Free West.
It was not Zarqawi himself but supporters in Europe who were responsible for the online recruitment of the Canadians. The recruiters were caught last fall.
[...] Some, for example Spencer Ackerman in New Republic (hat tip: Marc Schulman), have suggested that Zarqawi’s demise will accrue to al-Qaeda’s benefit: Painful as it may be to admit, the biggest beneficiary of Zarqawi’s death may very well be Al Qaeda. Last year, Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman Al Zawahiri—a figure whose profile in jihadi circles far eclipses Zarqawi’s—wrote Zarqawi a letter gingerly instructing him to stop his seemingly indiscriminate murder of Muslims, since it was costing Al Qaeda valuable Islamic hearts and minds. (When the letter surfaced, Zarqawi defensively insisted it was a fraud.) Zarqawi’s practice of declaring fellow Muslims infidels led him and Al Qaeda into strategic miscalculation, as with his November bombing of Jordanian hotels that led to widespread anti-Al Qaeda demonstrations in the streets of Amman. He even declared in his last propaganda message that Hezbollah was an agent of Israel. Whereas once Zarqawi allowed Iraqi Sunnis a face-saving way to distance themselves from murderous jihadis, in death he may allow Al Qaeda to mend fences with Muslims and perhaps even other terrorist groups that his “excesses” have alienated. Zawahiri’s extraordinary letter suggests that Al Qaeda—following an obligatory statement praising Zarqawi as a martyr—will do exactly that. [...]
I like to turn these “analyses” around and see if they mnake sense. As in “if the fact that the stock market has been going up rapidly for the past sveral months is a cause for concern then would it going down just as fast be a basis for joy?”
So if Zarqawie’s demise produces dangers, then if we had missed him again, would that be just great?