It’s universally anticipated that IAEA chief ElBaradei will report tomorrow afternoon that Iran has not complied with demands to freeze its uranium enrichment program. If so, and given the opposition of Russia and China to imposing sanctions, speculation regarding the possibility of American airstrikes at some point in the future will further increase.

Should the use of force against Iran’s nuclear facilities take place, it must be assumed that it will occur without the approval of the UN Security Council. The question therefore arises as to how our government would justify such an action.

The justification, I believe, would be the Carter Doctrine.

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In his January 23, 1980 State of the Union address, President Jimmy Carter gave voice to the doctrine that would bear his name:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

This never-superseded doctrine was Carter’s response to the Christmas Day 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which took place just seven weeks after the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran.

Earlier in his address, Carter said that the Soviet invasion “could pose the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War.” These alarmist words were a far cry from those he uttered in his Notre Dame commencement speech on May 22, 1977:

Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.

Echoes of Carter’s “inordinate fear of communism” are now being heard. Arising mostly, but not entirely, from the Left, the echoes are sounded by those who believe that Iran is the latest example of threat exaggeration by the Bush administration. For these individuals, an inordinate fear of Iran is the follow-on to an inordinate fear of terrorism and an inordinate fear of Iraq. While the more moderate of the administration’s critics have honest disagreements over such matters as how long it might take Iran to develop nuclear weapons, others argue that threat exaggeration is the means by which Bush is implementing his nefarious scheme to further the concentration of power in the Executive Branch of government.

Carter’s naivite regarding, and subsequent awakening to, the Soviet threat should be a lesson for those who maintain that the threat of a nuclear Iran is being exaggerated—in timing, magnitude, or both. As every student of the Cold War knows, there are two components to threat assessments: capabilities and intentions. By 1977, the U.S. and the Soviet Union each knew that the other possessed enough warheads and missiles to annihilate the other. Carter’s mistake was not due to a flawed estimation of Soviet capabilities. Beguiled by “peaceful coexistence,” he erred in his assessment of Soviet intentions. Prior to their invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets had never dispatched their armed forces into a country outside of Eastern Europe. When their first soldier landed in Kabul, more than thirty years of Soviet behavior was turned on its head. No wonder, then, that Carter could say that the invasion “could pose the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War.”

Without question, the intent of the Carter Doctrine was to warn the Soviet Union that it had better not use Afghanistan as a staging area for a future attack on a post-revolutionary Iran whose ability to defend itself had been severely weakened by a purge of the Shah’s officer corp. Nonetheless, these words from the Doctrine warrant a close reading:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region

While the Doctrine’s intent was specific, its wording was not:

  • It does not specify that American military force could be employed if and only if the “attempt” were undertaken along classical military lines.

  • It does not specify that American military force could be employed if and only if the “attempt” were undertaken by the Soviet Union.

  • It does not specify that American military force could be employed if and only if the “attempt” were to gain control of Iran.

Thus, the Carter Doctrine can be interpreted as also being applicable to unconventional warfare undertaken by any state or non-state actor, including Iran, that threatens any territory in proximity to the Persian Gulf.