In his aptly named Washington Post op-ed (“After Diplomacy Fails”), Mark Helprin paints an all-too-believable scenario:

Iran’s claim of innocuous nuclear ambitions comports both with the Islamic doctrine of taqqiya (literal truth need not be conveyed to infidels) and the Western doctrine of state secrecy (the same thing), and it is part of a strategy of deception and false compromise deployed to buy time. After almost three years, the Bush administration has maneuvered the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council, where it will fall under the protection of Russia and China, which will make any resolution meaningless or veto it outright. In the event of sanctions, Iran can sell oil to China in exchange for all the manufactures it might need, trade on the black market and eventually reenter the world economy after the inevitable unveiling of Iranian nuclear weapons stimulates the resignation of the West.

As for Russia,

Were Russia not playing a double game, it would not have agreed in December to upgrade the Iranian air force and sell Iran 29 SA-15 SAMs for the protection of key facilities . . . the agitation that they support roils the smooth surface of the Pax Americana to their maximum opportunity and relief. For example, chaos in the Middle East makes Russia in comparison a stable supplier of energy and shifts European resources and dependency to Russia’s advantage.

Helprin’s is clear—not wishful—thinking.

So is Gerard Baker’s. Writing for RealClearPolitics, he asks how likely is it that the world will stand firm against Iran. His answer:

You can forget China and Russia, obviously, those two giants of global stability that foreign policy realists would have us embrace . . . That will leave Europe . . . Thus far, it is true, the European Union has sounded admirably tough . . . The rhetoric is encouraging, but consider the actual state of Europe this week and ask yourself: is this a continent that is demonstrating political will?

The French government couldn’t muster the political strength to face down a terrifying army of bourgeois students . . . In Germany, Mrs Merkel and her Christian Democrat colleagues make all the right strategic noises but are still dependent on the professional hand-wringers of the Social Democratic Party not only for parliamentary survival but for crucial daily decision-making in the field of foreign affairs. Italy has once again demonstrated its unique capacity to do a reverse Creation and conjure chaos from Order at the drop of a ballot box. And even Britain . . . is in a state of creeping political insolvency . . .

How plausible is it that this depleted and demoralized army of European governments is going to spring into battle – metaphorically or literally, with tough economic sanctions or tougher military action – to divert the Iranians from the doomsday path . . . does anybody really think, when the hard decisions have to be made to face down the next threat, that anyone other than the US will be in the coalition?

Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush 41, would have us believe that the solution to the crisis lies in an improved process. In The Australian, he recommends that

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council should be prepared to make the following offer to Iran. Acknowledging that Tehran has every right to exploit nuclear energy for civilian use, Iran should be guaranteed an adequate supply of nuclear fuel for its reactors in return for abiding by all International Atomic Energy Agency regulations. This, in turn, should serve as the basis for a new international fuel-cycle regime that applies to all countries.

Scowcroft then asks whether this proposal could serve as the basis of a workable settlement with Iran:

Having the international community . . . take at face value Iran’s claims that it needs a civilian nuclear energy program to reduce reliance on diminishing hydrocarbon reserves and cut down on a growing pollution problem caused by fossil fuels places more pressure on the Iranian Government to demonstrate its good intentions.

A US-led international front that starts out by recognising that Iran has legitimate rights and concerns can go far in depriving the present regime of its ability to use Iranian nationalism in this crisis.

And should the Iranian Government reject an international proposal that implicitly recognises and safeguards its rights to a nuclear energy program under the NPT, it would become easier to convince other leading states of the need for sanctioning the regime.

He also wants to “strike deals” with the other large powers to take their interests into account:

In particular, China is caught between its stated desire not to see Iran become a nuclear weapons state and its growing energy dependence on Iran. The US and other countries should be prepared to guarantee to China that if, as a result of pressure placed on Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program, oil and gas supplies to China are affected, all efforts will be undertaken to minimise the disruption to the Chinese economy and that China would suffer no more than anyone else.

What Scowcroft doesn’t describe is the nature of these efforts and how the promises could be made credible to the Chinese. As bad as this oversight is, it pales in comparison with his most serious omission: no where does he ask, much less answer, whether Iran is intent on developing nuclear weapons and to use them to become the Middle East’s dominant power. “Process” ended the Cold War. Scowcroft thinks it can work again. I doubt it.

A Washington Post editorial serves as a rebuttal to Scowcroft:

Mr. Ahmadinejad’s provocative grandstanding also offers an answer to those who argue that his government would abandon its breakneck dash for an enrichment capability if only it were offered the right incentives—such as security guarantees and “a political dialogue” with the United States. Not only has Tehran shown no interest in previous carrots dangled by Europe and Russia, but its president clearly relishes a confrontation with the West. His answer to those Iranian moderates who worry that the country might be isolated, or economically harmed, is to point to the Security Council’s record thus far, which suggests there is no danger of such action.

The editorial also notes the possibility that Iran could have a nuclear weapon by the end of next year:

Though the technological breakthrough Mr. Ahmadinejad touted . . . leaves Iran well short of the means to build a nuclear bomb, it is significant. It ought to prompt some rethinking about how long it might be before the Iranian regime can back up, with a nuclear weapon, its president’s threat to wipe Israel from the map. Some in Washington cite a U.S. intelligence estimate that an Iranian bomb is 10 years away. In fact the low end of that same estimate is five years, and some independent experts say three. Iran has announced plans to install 3,000 centrifuges at its plant in Natanz by the end of 2006; according to former nuclear weapons inspector David Albright, that many working centrifuges could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in less than a year. [emphasis added]

For a round-up from the blogosphere, visit The Glittering Eye.