Please excuse the lag between posts; I’ve been a bit busy lately. Thanks to everyone who has sent in e-mails and links to articles, I am still working through them all. A lot has happened in the international arena since my last post, and Marc has done his usual admirable job of covering current geo-political events (I sometimes wonder if he ever sleeps.) For this post I am going to flash back a little bit to the Dubai ports deal and the current Dubai issue (see Dubai, Again) and offer my thoughts on what these situations might mean for the future.

Let me start by saying that I think the Dubai ports issue was poorly handled from the get go. Port security is, of course, a key element of our overall national security—but this deal was never about port security. It was about port management, and no private firm has port security as part of its portfolio; that responsibility rests with the U.S. government (Homeland Security, Coast Guard). In addition the vast majority of our ports, up to 80% of them, are managed by international firms. Our leadership and the media failed us when it comes to the facts and potential import of this deal on both our security at home and our efforts abroad.

The idea that any other foreign interest should not be involved in managing our infrastructure is probably the correct one (setting aside the fact that we currently lack the ability to manage our own ports). Our handling of this issue, however, was childish and dangerous. We singled out Dubai from among the many nations managing our ports because it is an Arab nation, plain and simple. What message do you think the average citizen on the “Arab street” took away from this? The fact that no rational voice arose from either side of the political aisle calling for a calm appraisal of the situation does not bode well for the future relationship between the United States and the Arab world. While I am well aware that Dubai is not a model of democracy or freedom, it is far and away one of the most liberal countries in the region, and our military presence in the Middle East depends in large part on our relationship with the government of the emirate.

The frenzied reaction the Dubai port deal was reminiscent of the protests we see whenever the WTO or other global finance organization meets—albeit a little bit better dressed and more polite. Both the street protests over globalization in general and the political wave making over this deal are based on emotional response- we mock the rock hurlers who oppose McDonalds but think nothing of hurling thoughtless sound bites. In this “globalized” age we will be hard pressed to draw the line at where foreign involvement in the business of America ceases to be appropriate. In doing so we must apply rational thought and not emotion—while at the same time realizing that this is an emotional issue at home and abroad. This is no easy task; it will require strong leaders and commitment.

Our leaders and media must ensure that we are presented with information over emotion and that when a decision is reached to exclude foreign interests from markets critical to our national security that such decisions are clearly explained to all parties involved. Our national security rests as much on the goodwill, or at least lack of enmity, of the rest of the world as it does on our policy. I have said repeatedly that we are losing the battle of public perception in the Middle East, and this latest go around is yet another shot in the foot for our public diplomacy efforts in the region. The port deal collapsed under its own weight, but there has been no resolution of the issue—the Doncasters deal mentioned at the top of this post is likely to become round two in our struggle to define where free markets end and security interests begin. Unfortunately the only message that most of the world will has taken away from this “debate” so far is that reason holds no sway in our decision making.

The time has come for both political parties to grow up and to cease their efforts to out “security conscience” the other and for them to get to work defining how our true security concerns come into play where foreign investment is concerned. Once the line is drawn we must then quickly move forward with explaining to the world how that decision was reached and what it means, for both our allies and our enemies.

One can always dream, I suppose.