Time heals. It also induces complacency. On Election Day 2004, 19 percent of Americans thought that terrorism was the most important issue we faced; in a recent poll, only five percent thought so. We do feel safer, after all.

Complacency isn’t confined to the general public. Joseph J. Ellis, a professor of history at Mount Holyoke College and the author of “His Excellency: George Washington” recently asked whether 9/11 deserves the historical significance it’s achieved. Here’s his answer:

. . . where does Sept. 11 rank in the grand sweep of American history as a threat to national security? By my calculations it does not make the top tier of the list, which requires the threat to pose a serious challenge to the survival of the American republic.

Here is my version of the top tier: the War for Independence, where defeat meant no United States of America; the War of 1812, when the national capital was burned to the ground; the Civil War, which threatened the survival of the Union; World War II, which represented a totalitarian threat to democracy and capitalism; the cold war, most specifically the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which made nuclear annihilation a distinct possibility.

Sept. 11 does not rise to that level of threat because, while it places lives and lifestyles at risk, it does not threaten the survival of the American republic, even though the terrorists would like us to believe so.

Of course, as the threat from terrorism recedes in the public’s mind, it’s replaced by the concern that civil liberties are threatened by actions taken to prevent further terrorist attacks:

In the summer of 2002, according to a CNN survey, only 11 percent of Americans thought President Bush’s war on terrorism had restricted civil liberties too much. Now, 38 percent say so—double the number that say he should restrict them more. In December 2001, 64 percent of Americans thought a wartime president should “have the authority to make changes in the rights usually guaranteed by the Constitution.” This month, it was only 36 percent.

This swing in the security-versus-freedom pendulum stemming from a perceived lessening of the terrorist threat isn’t surprising; in fact, it’s exactly what should be expected. Memories of 9/11 have faded, so much so that the public now chooses to ignore a warning from Bin Laden that al-Qaeda is preparing a new attack on America:

The new operations of al-Qaida has not happened not because we could not penetrate the security measures. It is being prepared and you’ll see it in your homeland very soon . . .

This warning didn’t prevent Glenn Greenwald from issuing this specious comparison in a recent post:

The total number of Americans killed by Islamic terrorists in the last 5 years—or 10 years—or 20 years—or ever—is roughly 3,500, the same number of deaths by suicide which occur in this country every month.

If, in addition to looking backwards instead of forwards, the severity of the terrorist threat is judged by making a quantitative comparison such as this one, the following conclusion logically follows:

This is the overarching threat around which we are constructing our entire foreign policy, changing the basic principles of our government, and fundamentally altering both our behavior in the world and the way in which we are perceived.

Foremost among those “basic principles of our government” to which Greenwald refers are the NSA’s surveillance activities.

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In an earlier post, I gave credit to Greenwald for uncovering the fact that the Bush Administration didn’t endorse legislation introduced by Senator DeWine in June 2002 that proposed substituting “reasonable suspicion” for “probable cause” as the standard for obtaining a FISA warrant. I agreed with him that the Administration should have welcomed the proposed change to FISA. I asked what issues prevented the Administration from supporting the proposed legislation.

Subsequently, I cited the opening statement of James Baker, the Justice Department’s Counsel for Intelligence Policy before the Senate Intelligence Committee on July 31, 2002, and averred that the Administration was concerned that courts would decide that the “reasonable suspicion” standard was unconstitutional, and, should that occur, investigations and prosecutions using that standard would be put at risk:

    The Department’s Office of Legal Counsel is analyzing relevant Supreme Court precedent to determine whether a “reasonable suspicion” standard for electronic surveillance and physical searches would, in the FISA context, pass constitutional muster. The issue is not clear cut, and the review process must be thorough because of what is at stake, namely, our ability to conduct investigations that are vital to protecting national security. If we err in our analysis and courts were ultimately to find a “reasonable suspicion” standard unconstitutional, we could potentially put at risk ongoing investigations and prosecutions. [emphasis added]

What has been lacking in the debate over the legality and constitutionality of warrentless surveillance is context. In late 2001 and early 2002, 9/11 and the anthrax scare were fresh in everyone’s mind, not the least of which in the Bush Administration’s. It was at this time that the Administration decided to initiate its end-around on the FISA Court. Why was this course of action chosen? Was it part of a nefarious scheme to concentrate power in the hands of the Executive Branch, or were there problems, at a time when there was considerable fear of another terrorist attack, with FISA and the FISA Court that couldn’t be fixed quickly?

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The FISA Court was an object of much attention in 2002.

The Court’s May 17 Ruling —In the first ruling it ever published (in August 2002), the Court determined that portions of guidelines issued earlier in the year by Attorney General Ashcroft on intelligence sharing violated federal law. The court said the policy established by Ashcroft, who cited the Patriot Act for his authority, shortcut the Constitution and FISA by replacing existing surveillance requirements used for criminal prosecution with the more lax FISA requirements.

In its ruling, the court cited the constitutional right to privacy of U.S. citizens, saying Ashcroft’s policy “was not reasonably designed or ‘consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, or disseminate foreign intelligence information’” as mandated by FISA. Prior to the Patriot Act, FISA had been interpreted by attorneys general and the FISA Court as having mandated a “wall” between the criminal and intelligence sides of an investigation. In this ruling, the FISA Court felt that the new procedures issued by the attorney general had illegally dismantled that wall.

The FISA Court also said the powers given to criminal investigators by Ashcroft might allow the government to illegally use intelligence information in criminal cases. It noted that the Department of Justice, under the Clinton administration, had abused the FISA process and misled the court at least 12 times and that the government had admitted FBI officials had provided erroneous information to the court on more than 75 requests for warrants and wiretaps.

The Court of Review’s November 1 Ruling—Later in 2002, the FISA Court of Review, convening for the first time ever, overturned the lower FISA Court’s ruling:

We think that the FISA as passed by Congress in 1978 clearly did not preclude or limit the government’s use or proposed use of foreign intelligence information, which included evidence of certain kinds of criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution.

The Court of Review noted that the idea of the “wall” came from a 1995 Attorney General directive entitled “Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations,” and not from FISA law.

On September 10—the day after the Court of Review began its review of the lower Court’s ruling, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing.

The USA Patriot Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process

In his opening statement, Chairman Leahy (D-Vermont) soundly criticized the FISA process, singling out the FBI for special condemnation:

. . . before the 9/11 attacks, we discovered [in the course of earlier hearings] the FISA process was strapped by unnecessary layers of bureaucracy and riddled with inefficiencies. Some of these inefficiencies had to do with legal issues that we addressed in the USA PATRIOT Act, but many did not. They related to the same problems that this Committee has seen time and time again at the FBI: poor communication, inadequate training, a turf mentality, and cumbersome information management and computer systems that date back to the Dark Ages. Even a cursory read of the unanimous [May 17th] FISA Court opinion bears that out. The FISA Court was not frustrated with the state of the law. Instead, all seven Federal judges were concerned about a track record marred by a series of inaccurate affidavits that even caused them to take the extraordinary step of banning an agent from appearing before the court in the
future. I continue to support Director Mueller’s efforts to address these problems, but the going will not be easy.

Leahy closed his statement pessimistically, drawing attention to the problems posed by secrecy:

. . . I have become more convinced there is no magic elixir to fix these problems. It is tempting to suggest further weakening of the FISA statute to respond to specific cases, but the truth is that the more difficult systemic problems must be properly addressed in order to combat terrorism effectively. Furthermore, given the secrecy of the FISA process and the law relating to the FISA, it is impossible to intelligently address the problems that do exist without risking doing more harm than good.

Senator Hatch (R-Utah) spoke of the FISA Court’s decision that had just entered the appeal process:

In March of this year, the Justice Department adopted revised guidelines governing intelligence sharing and criminal prosecutions, and then sought FISA Court approval for these revisions. The FISA Court approved most of these modifications but rejected a portion dealing with the role of criminal prosecutors in providing advice and direction to the intelligence investigations.

Miscommunication between the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General was the focus of Senator Specter’s (R-Pennsylvania) remarks:

It would have seemed logical that, after the extensive examination of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the Wen Ho Lee case, there would have been an understanding of its application. And there was a miscommunication at the highest levels between the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General, which we corrected by statute . . . suffice it to say that the Department of Justice was on notice as to what FISA required.

The failure to obtain a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for Zacarias Moussaoui was a matter of enormous importance . . . And as we are working now to prevent another 9/11, there is a continuing question as to whether the FBI is properly applying a probable cause standard in seeking a FISA warrant.

Reviewing the record, Specter reached the following conclusion:

. . . we are dealing with a situation where, by all indications, the FBI and the Department of Justice are not being as aggressive as they should be and can be with an appropriate standard for probable cause.

I’m in complete agreement with Greenwald that Senator DeWine (R-Ohio), who introduced the bill that substituted “reasonable suspicion” for “probable cause” as the standard for obtaining a FISA warrant, assumed that the Administration was bound by FISA in its eavesdropping activities. As Greenwald said: “why else would he bother to liberalize FISA unless he thought that it actually governed what the Administration could and could not do?”

Thus, there’s no reason to believe DeWine was acting as an Administration mouthpiece when he said this at the Judiciary Committee hearing:

. . . unless we fully understand how the FISA law is being interpreted by the court, this Congress cannot fulfill its constitutional duty—its constitutional duty of oversight and its constitutional duty after we pass a law to see how it is working, to see how the courts are interpreting it, and then to make a rational public policy decision as to whether or not that law should be changed.

With only two written FISA decisions—that I am aware of, at least—in 24 years, that is impossible to know. It is impossible for this Congress to know how the law is being interpreted, and that has been true for previous Congresses.

Now, some of us believe, although we certainly cannot prove it because of the fact of the secrecy involved, that the interpretation of the original FISA law has become tighter and tighter and more burdensome and more burdensome over the years and that the relationship between the Justice Department and the courts . . . has resulted in an interpretation of a law that has been very strict. I believe that this interpretation may have been stricter than Congress may have intended it or that maybe Congress would have allowed to continue. [emphasis added]

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The Senate hearing informs us that (1) the FISA process had always been shrouded in secrecy, (2) the process was in serious need of repair, and (3) there was no silver bullet that could quickly make the repairs.

If the Senate Intelligence Committee was aware of these deficiencies, so must have been the Bush Administration. Recalling the sense of urgency that prevailed at the time, is it any wonder that the Administration concluded that FISA’s rules and the FISA Court couldn’t be counted on to protect Americans from future terrorist attacks?

So far, so good. But what about the Administration’s failure to support DeWine’s legislative initiative or to propose a liberalization of FISA’s rules and procedures? Had either of these paths been taken, considerable time—probably measured in months—would have passed before the new rules and procedures went into effect. While the Congressional debate was taking place and/or after the revisions became law, it’s possible, if not likely, that the ACLU and other civil rights organizations would have filed suits to prevent the new rules and procedures from being implemented. This serves to explain why Administration spokesman Baker opined that the Administration was concerned that the courts might decide that the “reasonable suspicion” standard was unconstitutional.

This leads me to the other part of the context for debating the legality and constitutionality of warrentless surveillance. From his most recent audio tape, we know that Bin Laden pays close attention to our domestic goings-on:

I plan to speak about the repeated errors your President Bush has committed in comments on the results of your polls that show an overwhelming majority of you want the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. But he (Bush) has opposed this wish and said that withdrawing troops sends the wrong message to opponents, that it is better to fight them (bin Laden’s followers) on their land than their fighting us (Americans) on our land.

In 2002, part of the goings-on was the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing from which I have liberally quoted. If, as should be assumed, Al Qaeda was aware of this hearing, our enemy would have learned to its delight that the FISA process wasn’t functioning properly. In particular, Al Qaeda would have relished Senator DeWine’s assertion that “the interpretation of the original FISA law has become tighter and tighter and more burdensome and more burdensome over the years.”

Had the Administration supported the DeWine proposal or submitted legislation of its own, Al Qaeda would have learned even more. While the initial hearings might have been held in camera, eventually a bill incorporating the proposed changes would have reached the floors of Congress. There would then have been no more secrets, and Al Qaeda would have been able to draw its own conclusions regarding the implications of these changes for its modus operandi.

This the Bush Administration couldn’t countenance. Instead, it chose to do an end-around on the FISA process. While it’s yet to be determined whether it acted unconstitutionally in doing so, I believe that the Administration made the right choice.