On the subject of Europe and Iran’s nuclear program, Dan had this to say earlier today:
A great many right-wing blogs advance a strange interpretation of the latest developments in Iran’s apparent quest for nuclear weapons: the current failures of European-Iranian negotiations provide more evidence that Europeans are soft, ineffectual, and otherwise feminized.
He then identified three problems with this argument:
1. It ignores the obvious comparison between Iran and North Korea. The Europeans haven’t convinced Iran to drop its nuclear program, but the United States, for its part, hasn’t exactly had much success with the North Koreans either.
2. The failure of the talks is also a failure of US policy. The US has no effective “Iran policy” and few significant diplomatic channels with Iran, so it decided to back the European-Iranian negotiations.
3. It really isn’t very clear whether, or how, a more militarized approach to Iranian proliferation would work. It is difficult to believe the Iranians haven’t taken countermeasures against air strikes and the costs of military action for American Iraq policy might very well be enormous. We now recognize that the Israeli bombing of the Osirik reactor – the most obvious analogy for preemptive action against Iraq – was a long-term counter-proliferation failure.
Dan closes by recommending an exercise:
Imagine that you are leader of the Iran. Would you want nuclear weapons? If so, why? What would it take to convince you to give up their pursuit? Now add domestic political considerations into the mix.
I agree with the second of the three problems he identified, but take exception to the first and, even more so, to the third:
(1) I don’t see anything “obvious” in the comparison between Iran and North Korea. There are at least two critical differences:
- It’s certainly true that diplomacy failed to prevent North Korea from joining the nuclear club and that this failure can’t be blamed on the Europeans. Whether the failure should be pinned on the Clinton Administration or the Bush Administration (or both) is besides the point. The fact is that North Korea now has nuclear weapons. The diplomatic task is to persuade North Korea to unilaterally disarm. With respect to Iran, the diplomatic task is precisely the opposite: it is to persuade the government not to develop the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
- The only thing that the North Korean and Iranian regimes have in common is that they are both autocracies. The North Koreans are atheists whose only interest is their survival; there is no evidence to suggest that they want to spread communism to other parts of the world. The Iranians are religious fanatics who “don’t shy away from declaring that Islam is ready to rule the world”. Taking into account the greater instability of the region of which Iran is a part, I conclude that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a far more serious threat to world peace than is a nuclear-armed North Korea.
(2) I’m willing to concede that the Iranians have taken countermeasures against air strikes and, further, that they have multiple, hardened nuclear sites. I’m even willing to concede that only through regime change would it be possible to eliminate, once and for all, the threat of Iran becoming a nuclear power. But it’s not an all-or-nothing situation we’re dealing with. If part of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure were destroyed, it’s fair to assume that its emergence as a nuclear power would be delayed.
(3) I strongly disagree with Dan’s assertion that “the Israeli bombing of the Osirik reactor . . . was a long-term counter-proliferation failure.” In the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, it was discovered that Iraq was much closer to having a nuclear weapons capability than had been previously thought. Had Israel not destroyed the Osirik reactor, it is probable that Iraq would have had a nuclear capability when Saddam’s army invaded Kuwait. If so, the recent history of the world would likely have been very different—and not for the better. My view, then, is the exact opposite of Dan’s.
As to Dan’s recommended exercise, I freely admit that I understand why Tehran would want to have nuclear weapons. Iran is surrounded by enemy—i.e., American—military bases.
As a basis for policy, however, I dismiss this “put yourself in their shoes” argument. This was precisely the thought process that was the foundation of Britain’s appeasement of Nazi Germany. Chamberlain and others put themselves into Hitler’s shoes, and, having done so, concluded that, because his objections to various clauses in the Versailles Treaty were reasonable, his actions to overturn them were proper. So it is today with those who, failing to consider the nature and intentions of the Iranian regime, conclude that attempting to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear capability is unjust and discriminatory.
Another thought to consider. Besides being surrounded by US bases, Iran isn’t exactly on friendly terms with its Sunni Muslim neighbors. There are other advantages to obtaining nuke capability besides “wiping Israel off the map” as their president so delicately put it. They would become an 8,000 pound nuclear gorilla and would be able to intimidate Sunni neighbors like Saudi Arabia and Jordan. And then, in sweeping irony, the other non-nuclear Muslim nations might run to Israel for protection under her vast umbrella of 120 kilo nukes (a nuclear Iran might force Saudi Arabia to acknowledge Israel’s existence). Not that I’m advocating a nuclear Iran. That would be disastrous. My point is that we can’t assume Iran is just comfy cozy with all of her Muslim neighbors. And that is an important consideration when “putting yourself in the shoes” of the Iranian president.
Excellent rebuttal. It should also be recognized that another motivation behind Tehran’s nuclear ambition is its popularity, or really lack of, with the Iranian people. An widely unpopular regime may gain some legitimacy with its own population if it acquire instant international respect, as opposed to respectability, via nukes. It’s also possible that Tehran want to provoke an international crisis which it believes it can survive. If the world backs down, the mullahs win. If Iran is attacked, the regime may benefit from a public that will rally around the flag and come out stronger than before, a la Nassar after the Suez Crisis.
To comment on Mr. Nixen’s attitude, which is shared by the pacifist Left, I find their inability to do anything but criticize and offer any solution beyond appeasement to be a constant reminder why I’m a neo-con and a default Republican. If I put myself in the shoes of the mullahs, I would be relying on Mr. Nixen and his ike to stand aside wring their hands as I arm myself. When did they start teaching that grabbing your ankles is the preferred way to handle an international crisis at Georgetown?
The Rules Of Engagement
If our continuing and tireless efforts to warn of the looming danger and to unmask these evil leaders with their heinoIt may very well be that we have to thank the most vitriolic and loudmouthed of opponents of the Iraqi Freedom mission. And all of us,...
I’m not entirely clear what you’re rebutting, Marc. I never argued that Iranian proliferation was justified or a good idea, merely that the failure of the current negotiations don’t demonstrate very much about European “softness” or “ineffectualness.” In that light, I’m not sure how the “North Korea and Iran are different regimes” arguments actually tackle the point of my comparison. I didn’t pose the exercise at the end of the post to justify Iranian nuclear proliferation, but as a serious set of questions to consider if one thinks about what kinds of strategies the US, Europe, and others ought to adopt to stop Iranian proliferation.
As for the question of Osirik, see the developing comment thread on the post.
Addendum: indeed, the fact that North Korea now has nuclear weapons is consistent with the implications I draw from the comparison, i.e., that failure to reach a deal with Iran is not evidence of essential problems with European diplomacy.
For some interesting arguments concerning regime change, see my discussion of Alex Montgomery’s International Security article..