AMERICAN FUTURE

I have to say that I love the International Herald Tribune. I know that may sound strange coming from me, but when they publish headlines like this: “Iranian-born female space tourist inspiring women back in homeland” it is hard not to love them since all I have to do to make my point is type this: “... to flee the mullahcrocy for the United States of America .”

You see Anousheh Ansari became the first female space tourist, the first female Muslim in space and the first Iranian to venture off planet when she blasted off yesterday from Russia en route to the International Space Station. As you may know by know “Ansari and her family left Iran a few years after the 1979 Islamic revolution that toppled the pro-U.S. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and brought hard-line clerics to power, in part because the opportunities for a young girl to study science were becoming limited there.” Not only did Ansari study science in the United States, she turned that knowledge into billions of dollars. Hard to imagine what the morality police in Iran must think of all this if they even know about it—TIME is reporting that satellite dishes are being confiscated in Iran.

Unfortunately, the government of the United States failed to capitalize on this historic event. In a day and age where the Pope has to apologize for quoting a 14th century text in the face of violence (a nun killed and churches attacked, death threats made) the United States should be trumpeting the success of women such as Ansari. Her family could have fled anywhere in the world, and they chose the U.S., as millions of people have done and continue to do. Instead, we deny Ansari the chance to wear the Iranian flag with the American flag on her flight suit. This was a mistake for several reasons. First, she planned to wear the pre-revolution Iranian flag, and second, as our leaders have said so many times, our arguments are not with the people of countries such as Iran, but with their leaders. Imagine the power of the symbol that Ansari could have become as a Muslim woman who fled oppression to find love and fortune in the United States. I can picture her reminding the world that the new Iran is hardly improved, and that United States can still be the shining city upon the hill. Instead, we have demonstrated a knack for petty jealousy. Ansari’s story is still inspiring, don’t get me wrong. It is simply that you can’t make stuff like this up, and we have missed a golden opportunity.

The February 10th edition of Time Magazine features Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes in its “10 Questions” column- leaving much to be desired in both the questions and the answers. From Hughes opening quote:

“The morning after the President announced my appointment, the Vice President saw me and said, “Karen, my condolences. You just took the hardest job in government.”

To her observations that lots of kids around the world like soccer, there is very little in the way of substance in the piece. I realize that Time magazine is not a policy magazine, but Hughes does not often speak with the American press (which might be indicative of the lack of success she is having), making this article a waste of her time and the space it occupies in the magazine.

One of the ten questions though, or more accurately the answer to the question, leaps off the page as a shining example of the type of problem we face where public diplomacy is concerned:

Q: DO YOU SEE THE FURY OVER THE MUHAMMAD CARTOONS AS A SETBACK OR AN OPPORTUNITY?

A: Well, I think this highlights the need for dialogue. The violence is wrong and counterproductive. I can understand why people are offended. That said, in a free society, people have the right to speak out even if others are offended. With freedom of the press also comes responsibility. We need to do a better job of talking through these difficult issues in a peaceful way.

With all due respect to the Undersecretary and to the policy folks who are helping her, they have all missed the one glaring lesson we should be taking away from the “cartoon jihad.” The tens of thousands of people taking to the streets, burning Embassies and flags (where do you buy a Danish flag in Pakistan, anyway?), fighting with police and killing people (including an 8 year old boy) do not want a dialogue, they care nothing for freedom of the press or responsibility. They have no desire to be part of any “we” that Hughes, the President, Kofi Annan or anyone else might speak of. An un-named protester, quoted in the same issue of Time (“Fanning the Flames”) stated it clearly and succinctly: “We are calling for the death of Jews and Christians.” Such sentiments do not leave much room for dialogue.

We, the United States of America and the Western world, have made the current struggle in which we are engaged into our problem. It is not our problem- the problem belongs to the Muslim world, as does the solution. What the world is currently seeing, and largely condemning us for, is our solution. What we, the Western world and any and all moderate Muslims, need to do is to make it painfully clear to the the rest of the Muslim world that a peaceful solution to the current state of affairs can only be found through dialogue.

I am not pleased to see U.S. troops fighting and dying in foreign lands, I am not gladdened by the site of destroyed villages and dead and wounded civilians. But neither am I happy with the idea that our leaders think we can talk to the Islamofacsists from a position of weakness and expect them to change their stripes.

Our efforts in the Middle East must remain a blend of force and humanitarian aid. Every effort must be made to better the lives of the Iraqi and Afghan peoples; our aid dollars must be wisely spent and every success trumpeted loud and far- be it the reconstruction of a school or the completion of a major public works project. At the same time every threat or attack must be dealt with decisively. We must let the enemy know that we are ready to talk, but that the terms are not negotiable- violence on their part will not be met with pleas for tolerance and understanding from us, it will be met with efficient and ruthless destruction of those who perpetrate, plan and support such acts. The decision is theirs to make, not ours, and we should be hammering this fact home in our PD efforts in the region, not blaming ourselves by saying “we need to do a better job of talking through these… issues.”

We are losing the war of ideas, in fact in many ways we have already surrendered. The Japanese admiral who lead the assault on Pearl Harbor is reported to have said “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.” He was right. There were no cries for better understanding of Japanese feelings- there was outrage and a general consensus that Imperial Japan had to be destroyed. Today there is none of that. Muslims burn embassies over cartoons and we worry about what we did to provoke it, and what we should have done to prevent it. What has changed in our character in the last 60 years? Why do we look to blame ourselves, first, last and always?

Repeat after me- it is not our fault.

It is time to get on message with our PD efforts, and to stay on message. If the overarching theme is that Islam has been hijacked by radicals, that is fine- but the bottom line has to be something along the lines of this: we stand ready to help all moderate Muslims to reclaim their religion and place in the world, but our patience is not boundless. Either you fix it, or we will. This mess is not our fault, but we will not stand by, wringing our hands, as it becomes worse.

Much has been said about the need to vastly improve U.S. public diplomacy. To my knowledge, nobody has suggested that our ordinary citizens could or should contribute to a renewed effort to win hearts and minds.

It wasn’t always this way. Recently, I purchased a used copy of William Langer’s The Challenge to Isolation. Bound into the back of the Harper & Row edition of this book (published in 1964) is the following letter from Edward R. Murrow, who was then the Director of the U.S. Information Agency:

A LETTER TO THE READER

Overseas, there is considerable belief that we are a country of extreme conservatism and that we cannot accomodate to social change.

Books about America in the hands of readers abroad can help change those ideas.

The U.S. Information Agency cannot, by itself, meet the vast need for books about the United States.

You can help.

Harper Torchbooks provides three packets of books on American history, economics, sociology, literature and politics to help meet this need.

To send a packet of Torchbooks overseas, all you need to do is send your check for $7 to Harper & Row. The U.S. Information Agency will distribute the books to libraries, schools, and other centers all over the world.

I ask every American to support this program, part of a worldwide BOOKS USA campaign.

I ask you to share in the opportunity to help tell others about America.

Murrow’s letter was written during a critical period of the Cold War and one year before the buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam began. This was a time when nearly every American had faith in our government and belief in the principles for which our country stands.

Like the Soviet Union in 1964, today’s enemies—be they state sponsors of terrorism or transnational terrorist organizations—stand in total opposition to these principles. Unlike 1964, there now exists a sizable, vocal minority of Americans who would dismiss a program similar to the one advocated by Murrow as a propaganda exercise. Modern communications being what they are, their propaganda would diminish the effectiveness of any program similar to the one described by Murrow.

This is most unfortunate, as the idea of enlisting ordinary people in an effort to counter the widespread and sometimes virulent anti-Americanism of today is, in my view, highly appealing.

Posted by Dr. Demarche

It was with great interest that I read the comments to my last post, regarding the influence of Islam in our children’s textbooks and in the continuing education classes that their teachers attend. Solomon2 cut right to the heart of my thesis:

…foreign supporters offer to pick up part of the tab for school expenses, just like our government does. Unlike our government, however, this support is discretionary, dependent both on the subject matter and how it is taught. Oil-gorged governments now have the resources to increase these efforts.

Critical thinking thus takes a back seat to raw indoctrination. If you tell your child to stick to the Enlightenment spirit of inquiry, proof, and reasoning you may discover that you are doing him or her a grave disservice, as the result may be low grades from the teacher or professor. The retreat to rote and regurgitation meshes perfect with the leftist need to avoid their failures in the twentieth century.

Stehpinkeln, never one to mince words however, dismissed the idea as “trivial and a non-problem”, with Alpha Otter agreeing that “the educational establishment can over-estimate its influence.” While the establishment may think more of itself than is merited, I disagree that there is no problem.

While I may have overstated the influence that groups like campus dawa can have, it is unlikely after all that they will have much success converting American kids into jihadists, just as Kitsune says in her comment. However, I find the foreign Islamic influence in our schools to be very pernicious. The Islamists have much more to gain, after all, than a few American al-Qaedas. At stake is the goodwill of generations to come—the hearts and minds, precisely the battle we are losing in the Islamic world. Our children are learning that there is no reason to question the religion of peace. They are not learning about the death penalty under sharia for the “crime” of being raped, they are not learning about the Taliban. They are learning to be acolytes of Juan Cole and Michael Moore. That is all the Islamists need.

This is a tried and true technique for making sweeping societal changes in America. Think back to the 1970’s—huge, gas guzzling cars with kids in the “way back” and an occasional candy wrapper tossed out the window with nary a second thought. Now think about the educational campaigns against pollution, for the use of seatbelts and energy conservation. Who were those campaigns aimed at? Need a hint? Ask Smokey the Bear (who, by the way, now teaches that forest fires are okay, but wildfires are bad).

The battle for hearts and minds might begin in our grade school classrooms, but it reaches its pinnacle in our colleges and universities. If you doubt this spend some time on the Campus Watch web site, where I found these facts concerning the balanced teaching of Islam in our institute of higher learning:

Middle East studies tend to evade, ignore, or apologize for topics that do not fit their politicized agenda:

• Internal repression in Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran , and the Palestinian Authority.

• Palestinian Authority support for suicide bombing against Israeli civilians.

• The long-term goals of Islamist movements.

• The suffering caused by insurgencies in Algeria and Turkey.

• The Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

• The anti-American, anti-Christian, and anti-Semitic incitement that pervades state-run media through most of the region.

As an example of this evasion, out of the Middle East Studies Association’s four-day conference in November 2002 where more than 550 papers were presented, exactly one dealt with Al-Qaeda and one with “fundamentalism.” “Militant Islam” was not the subject of a single paper.

Of course it is not just through academic papers, books or teacher training that the “truth” about Islam reaches into our schools- we often facilitate the matter by inviting speakers from abroad to teach our kids. Case in point: Dr. Abdullah Muhammad Sindi, a Saudi professor of political science from King Abdulaziz University in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Sindi has taught at the University of California in Irvine, California State University at Pomona, Cerritos College and Fullerton College. He has also been a United Nations Fellow. His claim to fame? Holocaust denial and Zionist conspiracy theories. Here are some of his more memorable quotes:

I agree wholeheartedly with President Ahmadinejad. There was no such a thing as the ‘holocaust.’ The so-called ‘holocaust’ is nothing but Jewish/Zionist propaganda. There is no proof whatsoever that any living Jew was ever gassed or burned in Nazi Germany or in any of the territories that Nazi Germany occupied during World War II.

The Jews and the Zionists control the Western media and the publishing houses, both in Europe and the U.S., and they prevent anyone from expressing a free opinion on the so-called ‘holocaust.’ I agree with President Ahmadinejad that no one in the entire West can prove any of the Jewish/Zionist lies on the “holocaust”.

Anyone who attacks Israel or its lies is either banned, attacked, labeled as racist, or loses his job and career. In short, Israel controls the West, and not the other way around. The Jews and the Zionists rule the world by proxy. That is exactly what former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamed said in October 2003 during the 10th Islamic Summit Conference in Malaysia.

If you want more from the good Doctor just Google his name to find his home page—hosted, I might add, by America Online. I will not provide a link to him.

As a follow up to Dr. Sindi’s theories I want you to ask yourself the following: what might the repercussions be if Bob Jones University dug up an old South African professor who claimed that black slavery in the Americas was a myth? Do you think that professor would have the chance to lecture at FOUR American colleges and universities? Would the U.N. name him a Fellow? Or would there be mass protests, perhaps riots and allegations of hate thought, speech and crimes?

The battle for hearts and minds is being fought in the United States every bit as aggressively as it is being fought abroad. Our excellent education system and freedom of thought, not to mention stingy school budgets and lack of choice in public education, are being used against us. The President recently announced the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI), a program aimed at expanding our pool of critical needs language speakers. While I think that this is an excellent program, $114 million dollars a year is pitiful, and at this rate all we will be doing is teaching Johnny how to read the Koran in Arabic for Professor Cole’s class

In his op-ed in the Washington Post, Reuel Marc Gerecht hits the nail on the head:

Once again we are confronted with stories about how the Pentagon and its ubiquitous private contractors are undermining free inquiry in Iraq. “Muslim Scholars Were Paid to Aid U.S. Propaganda,” reports the New York Times. Journalists, intellectuals or clerics taking money from Uncle Sam or, in this case, a Washington-based public relations company, is seen as morally troubling and counterproductive . . .

There is one big problem with this baleful version of events. Historically, it doesn’t make much sense. The United States ran enormous covert and not-so-covert operations known as “CA” activities throughout the Cold War. With the CIA usually in the lead, Washington spent hundreds of millions of dollars on book publishing, magazines, newspapers, radios, union organizing, women’s and youth groups, scholarships, academic foundations, intellectual salons and societies, and direct cash payments to individuals (usually scholars, public intellectuals and journalists) who believed in ideas that America thought worthy of support.

[ . . . ] As is well known, the CIA for years financially maintained the British journal Encounter. This magazine, which was perhaps the most important English-language outlet for anti-communist U.S. and European writers, influenced debates among the Western intelligentsia from the 1950s through the ‘70s. By bang-for-the-buck calculation, it may be the most effective nonmilitary highbrow covert action the United States has funded.

Does anyone seriously believe that the French intellectual giant Raymond Aron was compromised by regularly writing for this publication or for French magazines also funded by the CIA? Regardless of whether Aron or others at Encounter might have suspected that their checks were cut by the U.S. taxpayer, are their insights and reporting any less relevant and true?

[ . . . ] Why did the United States spend so much covert-action money in Western Europe after World War II? Washington was unsure of Western Europe’s commitment to democracy and its resolve to oppose the Soviet Union and its proxy European communist parties. The programs had to be clandestine: The foreigners involved usually could not have operated with open U.S. funding without jeopardizing their lives, their families or their reputations. Did these CA projects retard or damage the growth of a free press and free inquiry in Western Europe after World War II? I think an honest historical assessment would conclude that U.S. covert aid advanced both.

Surely democracy in Iraq is at least as shaky as it was in Western Europe after the defeat of Hitler.

At least someone has provided a needed historical perspective.

Posted by Dr. Demarche

Those readers who know me from my days at the Daily Demarche know that public diplomacy (PD), the practice of getting our message out into the world, is one of my primary concerns. As a Foreign Service Officer I constantly come into contact with people from around the world who echo the same message: “It’s not Americans I dislike, it is your policies, the way you insist on interfering on the global stage, and the way your “culture” is imposed on the rest of the world.” And yes, you can actually hear the quotations on the word culture in that sentence. In fact, many folks point to our PD programs as examples of our “interference” and cultural assault- an article entitled ” Real Men Moisturize” for a Department of State Arabic language magazine being a prime example (see my old post here about that fiasco). Many people, including myself, have at times been highly critical of our PD efforts, but what might be even worse than our paltry and often pathetic attempts at outreach is the amount of foreign PD that we put up with at home.

As the sole superpower and world leader it is only reasonable that our actions are highly scrutinized on the world stage. The actions, and inactions, of our government have a ripple effect around the globe. Having said that, should we allow, let alone welcome, foreign governments and non-state actors (everything from al-Qaeda to Bono) to interject themselves into our system of governance? Because, whether you realize it or not, we do. Over the course of my next few posts I plan to examine topics ranging from the Islamic influence in our grade schools and Universities to the blatant interference of the Mexican government in our politics to the hold the Bonos of the world have over our consciousness.

Let’s start with former President Clinton’s favorite special interest: the children.

Everyone in the United States has at one time or another seen the commercials exhorting you to talk to your kids about drugs before the drug dealers do. Those commercials, of course, do not exist for topics such as religion, or history. But have you ever asked your kids what they know about the Middle East, Islam and terrorism? Ever looked at their history or social studies books? You jut might be surprised- many of the sponsors of hatred, if not outright terrorism, have beaten you to the punch. Much ado has been made about radical mosques in America, and the movement of many violent criminals towards Islam in our prisons. Very little has been mentioned about what our children are taught, or who underwrites the continuing education classes their teachers attend.

In October of last year JTA: Global News Service of the Jewish People ran a four part series entitled Tainted Teachings: What your kids are learning about Israel, America and Islam. Ignored by the MSM, this series focuses on the influence of Saudi Arabia (hence Wahhabi Islam) in education, detailing three methods by which the Haus of Saud enters into our classrooms:

The first is through teacher-training seminars that provide teachers with graduate or continuing-education credits.

The second is through the dissemination of supplementary teaching materials designed and distributed with Saudi support. Such materials flood the educational system and are available online.

The third is through school textbooks paid for by taxpayers, some of them vetted by activists with Saudi ties, who advise and influence major textbook companies about the books’ Islamic, Arab, Palestinian, Israeli and Middle Eastern content.

In 2004 Daniel Pipes published Spreading Islam in American Public Schools , which provided a link to DawaNet.com’s (da’wa meaning to proselytize) Dawa in public schools page. This site emphasizes:

Students of all grades and their parents should regularly scan textbooks to detect any biased material on Islam. If any is found, it should be brought to the attention of the teachers and the school authorities, providing them with the correct information with evidence, and have the teacher announce to the students the correct information.

This is of course, valid advice for all parents. Our children should learn that the world is a place of wondrous variety, but just as they learn to look both ways before crossing the street, or not to touch a hot stove, they should learn to think critically when approaching any subject, and it is up to us to teach them that. Read your kid’s textbooks and talk to their teachers- find out what they are learning, and whenever possible, who is backing their education.

The folks at DawaNet.com know that young minds are indeed impressionable:

Students are routinely exposed in their classroom to new information and opinions, hence they tend to be more receptive to new beliefs and ideas.

Schools are therefore fertile grounds where the seeds of Islam can be sowed inside the hearts of non-Muslim students. Muslim students should take ample advantage of this opportunity and present to their schoolmates the beautiful beliefs of Islam.

It is 2006, do you know what your kids are studying?

(Part two of this series will look at the President’s announcement of the National Security Language Initiative and what college students are learning about the world today, and from whom.)

Eric Martin and I have decided to conclude our debate. There was a winner, but it wasn’t Eric, and it wasn’t me. The winner was rational discourse and civility, both of which have been in rather short supply for the past three years. We challenged each other’s arguments without resorting to polemics or name-calling. Neither of us converted the other, but we now realize that our differences are not as great as we thought they were when the debate began.

[If you haven’t read my Fourth Rebuttal and Eric’s Fourth Rebuttal, please do so before continuing here]

It’s my turn to be confused.

In my Third Rebuttal, I outlined a scenario having as its last act a threatened veto by France of a Security Council resolution authorizing air strikes that had been introduced by the US following the detection of an Iranian underground nuclear test. I said that, under these circumstances, I would favor unilateral US air strikes. I then asked whether this was where Eric and I would part company on Iran. The context for this question was my earlier agreement with Eric’s statement (in his Second Rebuttal) that “launching an invasion of Iran right now, with the intention of nation building and neutralizing their nuclear capacity, would be a disastrous turn of events for many reasons.”

Eric’s response (in his Fourth Rebuttal) to my question is “this is where we would part company—though not necessarily for the reasons [Marc] implies.” He refers to a framework first discussed in his Second Rebuttal, describing it as follows:

Under that framework, there is a multi-tiered approach that would involve courting the UN’s approval (preferably by people who do not view the institution as worthless), absent the UN’s approval (perhaps regardless), appealing to NATO and other smaller but still well respected international organizations, followed by an attempt to secure the consent and cooperation of our close allies and then, finally, making our case on the stage of public opinion to the world population at large (against a rhetorical backdrop that appreciates cooperation, allies, international organizations and the opinions of others). Despite these guiding principles, and the presumption of deference thereto, if the threat were urgent enough, then exigency would demand action regardless of the realization of any of those various levels of approval.

A nuclear Iran could fit into the definition of urgent, and as such, I would not necessarily wait on any approval of the UN or NATO before acting. [emphasis added]

Having earlier said that “this is where we would part company,” Eric now seems to be agreeing—not disagreeing—with me. Or is he?

At this point in his Fourth Rebuttal, Eric asks: “What would a campaign of air strikes against Iran look like and how would it affect the situation on the ground in Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan?” He then references an article in The Atlantic that war-gamed air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities and concludes that such strikes would probably fail to eliminate all of the crucial sites and their infrastructure.

Next, Eric asks: “But wouldn’t something be better than nothing . . .?” His answer: “No. Not in this case.” Citing the same Atlantic article, he says that “Iran would not just sit back and take this aggression sitting down.” Iran, according to The Atlantic, “would use its influence to inflame anti-American violence in Iraq, and . . . would use its leverage to jack up oil prices . . . ”

Eric then depicts a downward spiral of events, involving a cycle of retaliations that undermine our position in Iraq (and, possibly, in Afghanistan), lead to pressures to institute a draft, and hurt our economy.

This leads him to the following conclusions:

my counsel would be against such a provocative, and ultimately far from effective, action. That being said, as I’ve maintained all along, I would like to see the Bush administration rattle the saber as frenetically as possible in order to try to intimidate the ruling regime in Iran, creating the incentive for them to negotiate a halt to their quest to acquire nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, I think the regime in Iran is all too aware of the leverage they have over the situation as it currently stands, so I don’t expect them to acquiesce on this issue. Thus, as unsavory as this might sound, we might just have to get used to the idea that Iran will have nuclear weapons at some point in the future. [emphasis added]

In the end, then, Eric and I have parted company. I don’t deny the possibility that some or all of consequences he mentions could occur. The essential difference between our perspectives boils down to this: whereas, under the scenario I detailed in my Third Rebuttal and summarized here, Eric’s concern is the possible consequences of our acting, my concern is the possible consequences of our not acting.

Near the beginning of his Fourth Rebuttal, Eric offers these words:

Despite the fact that Israel, arguably, has the will and the means to use force against Iran, I think such a strike would be so disastrous for US interests in the region, that I would table that discussion for now. I think Marc agrees with me on that as well, though I could be mistaken.

I couldn’t agree more. It would be a disaster, and, forestalling such a disaster is, perhaps, the strongest reason for advocating US air strikes (with or without NATO’s involvement) against an Iran that has conducted a nuclear test. Given the hatred and threats that spew forth from the mullahs’ mouths, not to mention their support of terrorism, any Israeli government would view a nuclear Iran as an existential threat. No, as long as the theocrats are in control, we can’t “get used to the idea that Iran will have nuclear weapons at some point in the future.” Israel will never get used to that idea. Our failure to act would severely heighten the risk that the disaster that both Eric and I wish to avoid would eventuate. Let’s hope that Iran never tests the Bomb. But, if it does, then we, with or without allies, must pre-empt an Israeli attack on Iran. It would be in our interest to do so.

In his Third Rebuttal, Eric asks me to provide a fuller explanation of my premise that the more seriously you take the terrorism threat, the more likely you are to endorse military actions that target it. He does so as someone who, as a resident of lower Manhattan, personally experienced the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath and “lives with the knowledge that my domicile is the most attractive target for any future attack.” Understandably and justifiably, Eric claims that he takes the threat of terrorism “pretty seriously.” It’s no surprise, then, that he objects to my premise: if it were valid, Eric asserts, he would be at least as willing than I am to endorse military action. But he isn’t.

Let’s suppose that Eric and I are equally concerned about terrorism. This wouldn’t invalidate my premise, which is stated in statistical terms:

the more seriously you take the terrorism threat, the more likely you are to endorse military actions that target it.

My premise admits of exceptions. Eric is one of them and I’m glad he is: having a debate with someone who denies the reality of the threat would be a waste of time.

This exercise in semantics doesn’t get me completely off the hook; it’s still incumbent on me to provide the fuller explanation that Eric wants:

(1) I plead guilty to having thought that my premise was so self-evidently true that it didn’t need to be explained. To see why, here’s an example from everyday life. Consider three instances of one individual being threatened with bodily harm by another: in the first, the threatening party is armed only with his fists; in the second, with a knife; and, in the third, with a gun. Suppose that the party being threatened has a gun within easy reach. Some people would reach for the gun in the first instance, more would in the second, and almost everyone would in the third. In other words, the more serious the threat, the more likely it is that the threatened party would resort to lethal violence.

(2) Terrorism is obviously more complicated, but the logic is the same. It’s more complicated because (i) the threat has two dimensions (magnitude and frequency), rather than one, (ii) it’s much more difficult to identify the attacker (he’s not staring you in the face), and (iii) the consequences (the blowback) of responding to the threat are more difficult to assess. The logic is the same because the the lethality of the actions that will be considered to either prevent or respond to a terrorist threat depend on the severity of the threat. Suicide and car bombings with conventional explosives are one thing; dirty bombs and nuclear weapons are another.

Unfortunately, the terrorist threat we face or will face is in the realm of dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. We know from documents captured in Afghanistan that al-Queda has attempted to acquire nuclear materials, and we know from bin Laden’s words that al-Queda considers it to be a sacred duty to acquire them. We also know that Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, and we are virtually certain that the mullahs are intent on developing nuclear weapons. If and when Iran’s effort bears fruit, who can say that the theocrats in Tehran won’t use Hizbollah as one of their delivery system? And, further down the road, Iran will likely have missiles that could be launched against the US, not just the Middle East and Europe. In view of persistent reports that Iran has given sancturary to al-Qaeda operatives, we can’t even rule out the possibility that the Sunnis of al-Qaeda and the Shia of Iran’s ruling clique will join forces against the Great Satan. Those who dismiss this possibility should recall that it was the unthinkable—the Nazi-Soviet Pact—that set the stage for the outbreak of World War II.

Nothing I have said here is in opposition to Eric’s statement that

the person who takes the threat of terrorism most seriously is the person that seeks to promote the optimal strategy for defeating, containing and neutralizing the threats terrorism present. This should combine many aspects, tools and methods, but this approach will undoubtedly realize that using military force in some contexts would be counterproductive and that advocating such a route would be to actually fail to appreciate the threat of terrorism – not appreciate it more. [emphasis in the original]

The first part of this statement is tautological: we all want to promote the optimal strategy for defeating, containing and neutralizing the threats terrorism present. Where we differ is in what constitutes the optimal strategy. And I of course realize that using military force in some contexts would be counterproductive. Where we differ is in what those contexts are.

At this point in his Third Rebuttal, after he correctly notes that “sometimes wars end up sending negative shockwaves through entire regions—reverberating to the detriment of all parties involved (World War I),” Eric says this:

My favorite example in this arena is Ronald Reagan’s commendable, and history altering, cooperation with Mikhail Gorbachev in the joint pursuit of glasnost and perestroika – the momentum of which ultimately resulted in the unraveling of the USSR. Remember, there were Right wing pundits at the time who vehemently criticized Reagan and then Bush for their “soft” stances on Communism.

Eric doesn’t present the whole story. When Reagan ran for President in 1980, he scared a lot of people—including me. The virulence of his anti-communism and his commitment to greater defense spending led many Americans and Europeans to believe that his election would heighten the risk of nuclear war. While it was Right-wing pundits that criticized Reagan as he and Gorbachev came to terms, it was Left-wing pundits who showered abuse on him both before and after he was elected to his first term. Both here and in Europe, he was widely depicted as a simple-minded, gun-slinging cowboy. On both sides of the Atlantic, his “Evil Empire” speech solidified this perception. In Europe, Reagan had to fight tooth and nail to gain agreement for the deployment of our Pershing missiles. And it was that deployment and the announcement of the “Star Wars” anti-ballistic missile system that immediately preceded the meeting of his and Gorbachev’s minds.

Yes, Reagan and Gorbachev chose the “soft” route. But what made that route possible were the hard-nosed words and deeds of Ronald Reagan. I’m reminded of another hard-nosed President. While I never was and still am not an admirer of Richard Nixon, he was able to accomplish what nobody with weaker anti-communist credentials could have: he “opened” China. Now, we have another hard-nosed president who, like Reagan, is portrayed as a simpleton with six-shooters around his waist. While only time will tell whether Bush’s handling of the war on terror and efforts to spread democracy will result in accomplishments that will be likened to those of Reagan and Nixon, this much is certain: the two recent soft-nosed presidents—Carter and Clinton—accomplished nothing of lasting positive significance in the international arena.

After duly noting that my support of the invasion of Iraq was not grounded on its involvement in terrorism and, relatedly, its WMD programs, Eric admits “to still being somewhat puzzled by [my] overall theory [which he calls the “Schulman Doctrine”] and how it applies to facts on the ground” and asks “how should the Schulman Doctrine guide our policy?” In what I hope is at least a semi-facetious manner, he poses the following questions:

Should we invade Saudi Arabia and Egypt – the two countries from which most terrorists (or at least the crucial leadership) are spawned? Apparently not according to Marc’s stance vis a vis Saudi Arabia. Indonesia then? Maybe a Patton-esque campaign across North Africa? I’m not sure, but if the premise is that those who take the threat seriously will use force, and the targets should be countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, should we be preparing for those invasions once the military assets are available?

There’s a surprising omission from this list of questions: Iran. In my First Rebuttal, the issue of what should be done if a sequence of events culminating in an Iranian nuclear test unfolded was prominently featured. I devoted even more space to this issue in my Third Rebuttal, although, to be fair, I don’t know whether Eric read it before he posted his Third Rebuttal.

In any event, as should be clear from my earlier rebuttals and my earlier comments in this rebuttal, I consider Iran to be at the center of the terrorist threat. Currently, we are in a race against time, with the hope being that the Iranian opposition groups will unseat the theocrats before the theocrats have their Bomb. So here’s how the Schulman Doctrine should guide our policy:

(1) The overriding objective of our policy is to prevent the Iranian government, as presently constituted, from developing and/or acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

(2) This objective can be achieved in three ways: (i) through the successful conclusion of the on-going negotiations between the EU-3 and the current Iranian government; (ii) through the overthrow of the current regime by indigenous, democratic forces; or (iii) through US-led airstrikes that would forestall, if not eliminate, the development of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.

(3) Options (i) and (ii) are preferable to option (iii). However, I’m highly skeptical that the negotiations will succeed. While I believe that we should provide extensive aid to the democratic forces, it’s far from clear to me what form(s) this aid should take, and whether such aid, whatever its form(s), will be efficacious. Accordingly, I believe that we must be prepared to implement option (iii).

By invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, we completed our encirclement of Iran. Viewed from this perspective, Iraq is a theatre in what remains to this day our cold war with Iran. Had it not been for 9/11 and Bush’s response to 9/11, this would not have happened: US flags would not now be planted in the soil of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Do I know whether surrounding Iran was Bush’s unspoken Grand Design? No. Am I happy that the mullahs see us everywhere? Yes.

Finally, Eric attacks the Bush administration for being selective in its advocacy of democracy:

In other places, like Uzbekistan and Pakistan, the administration has actually increased support for brutal dictators like Islam Karimov – whose regime has shown the gruesome penchant for boiling political dissidents alive in giant cauldrons . . .

Do I like supporting brutal dictators? No, I don’t, but my objection is within the context of these words from my initial post:

Above all, we should not heed the advice of those who argue that if we don’t try to spread democracy everywhere, we shouldn’t attempt to spread it anywhere.

Ours is not a perfect world. Sometimes, we must do business with a lesser evil in order to confront a greater evil. Today, the greater evil is the terrorism that threatens our lives. During World War II, Churchill, when asked about the alliance with the Soviet Union, responded that he would ally himself with the devil if it meant defeating Nazi Germany. As devils, Musharraf and Karimov pale in comparison with Stalin. Would Eric terminate our alliances with Pakistan and Uzbekistan and thereby fracture our encirclement of Iran in the name consistency?

After a brief respite, it’s time for the debate to resume . . .

In his Second Rebuttal, Eric disagrees “pretty strongly” with my characterization of his initial post as not providing a “linkage between spreading democracy and 9/11, terrorism and national security.” After noting several linkages between “imposing democracy through invasion” and national security that are present in his initial post, he continues with these words:

As far as links to terrorism and 9/11, in Marc’s defense, I really took up that conversation in my first rebuttal and not the initial post. But, due to the enormity of the topic, I had to leave out some aspects of the discussion . . .

I readily concur with Eric that the topic is enormous and, like him, I didn’t cover everything in my initial post. Quite naturally, I covered what I deemed to be the most important aspects of the discussion: 9/11 and terrorism were among them. Eric had a different emphasis.

Next, Eric takes exception to my assertion that his statement that “we should eschew the calls to impose democracy on others through the use of military force” constitutes an unwise “blanket dismissal of using military force.” In his Second Rebuttal, he states that his original syntax may have been imprecise and clarifies his position as follows:

My position is that there should be a presumption against using military force to spread democracy in and of itself because it is risky, has a poor chance of success, costly, drains our military’s capacity, can incite extremism, can create failed states and chaos which are breeding grounds for terrorism, and, at least in the case of Iraq, can provide terrorists and aspiring terrorists with a central node for recruitment, indoctrination, learning skills and tactics, networking and, unfortunately, more.

Clearly, “A presumption against using military force to spread democracy” is a different position than is “We should eschew the calls to impose democracy on others through the use of military force.” I take Eric at his word that the former is what he meant to say in the first place. I don’t always say what I mean to say, either.

This revision narrows the differences between us. Important differences in emphasis remain, however. Eric focuses on the risks of attempting to impose democracy, as in Iraq. These risks are real, but they need to be assessed relative to the risks that would prevail if no attempt were made to impose democracy, also as in Iraq. Had we not toppled Saddam, he would by now have been given a clean bill of health by the UN, the sanctions imposed at the end of the Gulf War would have been terminated, and France, Russia, and China would be facilitating the reconstitution of his WMD programs. Can I prove this? No. Can I persuasively argue that the risks Eric enumerates pale in significance to those we would now be facing? I think so.

I’m both pleased and surprised that our differences over Iraq apparently do not extend to Iran. I fully agree with Eric’s statement that “launching an invasion of Iran right now, with the intent of nation building and neutralizing their nuclear capacity, would be a disastrous turn of events for many reasons.” Despite what some commenters have said, I have never advocated an invasion of Iran; what I have said is that I can envisage circumstances in which it would be necessary to take military action against Iran. Air strikes to take out their nuclear weapons capability is what I have had in mind.

In addition, I’m on the same page with Eric when he says, with respect to Iran, that “Without the credible threat of force, other diplomacy is weakened.”

The issue is what, exactly, constitutes a “credible threat of force.” Only one thing is certain: a credible use of force means a credible use of force by the US. The other parties to the dispute with Iran –- the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) –- lack the means and, arguably, the will to take military action against the theocrats in Tehran.

Suppose that the scenario I outlined in my First Rebuttal unfolds:

(1) Negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran fail

(2) The resulting Security Council resolution emboldens, rather than dissuades, the mullahs

(3) An underground Iranian nuclear test is detected

Further, suppose that a sequence of events similar to those preceding the US-led invasion of Iraq takes place at the Security Council:

(1) The US (and, possibly, Britain) introduces a resolution calling for air strikes against nuclear targets in Iran

(2) France (and, possibly, Britain) declares that it will veto any resolution providing international legitimacy to the use of force against Iran

Under these circumstances, I would favor unilateral US air strikes. Further, if the threat of force is to be credible to the Iranian government, the mullahs must believe that the US would again be willing to undertake unilateral, “illegitimate” military action.

Is this where Eric and I would part company on Iran?

In his first rebuttal, Eric Martin correctly observes that a basic premise of my thesis is that “the more seriously you take the threat of terrorism, the more likely you are to endorse military actions that, at least ostensibly, target terrorism.” He then points out, again correctly, that some counterterrorism officials, scholars, and experts who are very concerned about terrorism do not advocate military intervention in all contexts. Next, Eric, after indicating that my thesis is “pretty solid” with respect to our intervention in Afghanistan, has this to say about Iraq:

The invasion of Iraq, however, is not so clear cut. Iraq was not the locus of international terrorism, it contained no major training facilities, leaders or recruitment hubs, nor was Iraq involved in sponsoring international jihadist movements. Thus, it is quite plausible to argue that attacking a Muslim nation only tangentially related to the problem, with images of death and destruction broadcast nightly on satellite television, could actually inflame passions, bolster the US-as-crusader propaganda spewed by Bin Laden and increase recruitment capacity and support for jihadists. So, one could reasonably argue, precisely because terrorism is so serious a threat, we should be reluctant to endorse military interventions – reserving them for only the most exigent circumstances.

While my conclusions regarding the degree of involvement of Saddam’s Iraq in international terrorism apparently differ from Eric’s, there’s no gainsaying the fact that it was not as involved as, say, Saudi Arabia.

Where Eric errs is that he evidently assumes that my support for our intervention in Iraq was grounded on its involvement in terrorism and, relatedly, its WMD programs. Others may have supported the intervention for these reasons, but I did not. Instead, as I explained in my post endorsing President Bush’s re-election, my concern was that the UN was following in the footsteps of the League of Nations:

(1) The roots of my decision to support President Bush stretch all the way back to my teenage years. I can still remember the day in 1960 when I rushed out to buy William Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. I was 14 years old. It was the first “adult” book I ever purchased, and it still has a honored place in my personal library.

(2) Even at my then-tender age, I couldn’t understand the myopia of the leaders of the Western democracies in the 1930’s. The League of Nations was created to prevent aggression and to respond militarily when prevention failed. By reacting with words, not deeds, when Japan invaded Manchuria and again when Italy invaded Ethiopia, the League failed to live up to its responsibilities and reassured Hitler that he had nothing to fear. [...]

(3) During the 1930’s, Hitler correctly anticipated that neither a multilateral League of Nations force nor England and France acting on their own would resort to military means to prevent or reverse Germany’s territorial aggrandizement. Saddam lacked Hitler’s prescience; he didn’t anticipate that the U.S. would organize a coalition to remove him from Kuwait and contain him thereafter. The cease-fire that terminated the 100-hour ground war was formalized in UN Security Council Resolution 687, which went into effect on April 3, 1991. [...]

(4) Thereafter, numerous Security Council resolutions found Iraq to be in breach of its cease-fire commitments. Many of them were passed unanimously. Notwithstanding these resolutions, the UN’s Security Council never authorized the use of force to compel Saddam’s compliance. Because the UN failed to enforce its resolutions, it showed itself to be as toothless as the League of Nations.

Far from being a unilateralist, I wanted multilateralism to work. Due largely to the efforts of the French, it didn’t. The choice, then, was between intervening with the “coalition of the willing” and repeating the mistakes of the 1930s by appeasing a dictator. Imagine what would have happened to Saddam’s status in the Arab world if we had allowed France to dictate our actions. And imagine what would have happened if the Security Council had unanimously approved armed intervention. Would there have been a war, or would Saddam have backed down? If there had been a war, would it have been legitimate? While these questions may be off-topic, I’d be interested in Eric’s response.

If, as I hope, you’re willing to accept the foregoing as a truthful rendition of my rationale for supporting our armed intervention in Iraq, then there is no contradiction (1) between that support and my argument that priority should be given to those countries from which terrorists are most heavily recruited, and (2) between my willingness to countenance an indirect approach to Saudi Arabia (which, it should be noted, is not in violation of any Security Council resolutions), while ruling out a “more cautious” approach to Iraq. As to Eric’s statement that Iraq should be put at the bottom of the list of potential military targets, “well below some Western European countries”—well, I’ll just treat this as a red herring, as these are democracies, not authoritarian regimes.

As to the relationship between authoritarianism and terrorism, I admit that the evidence—at least, the superficial evidence—is mixed. It’s certainly true that Saddam’s Iraq bred fewer terrorists than Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Eric may have inadvertently provided the explanation for this by noting that “Saddam was the most brutish authoritarian.” Perhaps he was so brutish that he killed anyone who showed the slightest signs of becoming a religiously-inspired terrorist. After all, he’s a secularist, despite his Islamic pretensions. Because of their intimate relationship with Wahhabi clerics, the Saudi royal family didn’t emulate Saddam’s use of terror to quell terrorists—at least until Al-Qaeda started to attack targets within Saudi Arabia.

My rather pessimistic attitude toward the efficacy of public diplomacy—in particular, that many years must pass before its benefits will be reaped—does not imply, as Eric asserts, that I believe that democracy promotion is an instant cure. I’ve looked over my initial post and I can’t find anything that supports this assertion. There’s always the possibility that I interpret my own words differently, however.

Will democracy promotion work? There’s no way to prove that it will, and no way to prove that it won’t. So it’s a gamble. But the alternative is a sure thing. We know that supporting authoritarian governments in the Arab world didn’t work, and that our support of such governments earned us the enduring enmity of the “Arab Street.”

Having read and digested Eric Martin’s initial post, I’m pleased to report that we have several areas of agreement:

(1) The most prominent among them is what Eric refers to as “philosophical foundations.” We both believe that (1) people are both good and bad, and because of the latter, sovereigns are required if a Hobbesian state of nature is to be avoided, (2) no set of beliefs has all the answers, (3) power corrupts, and (4) liberal democracy is the optimal form of government.

(2) As evinced by the Bush administration’s handling of Iraq, we are far better at overthrowing tyrannies than we are at nation building. In particular, I fully agree that the administration recklessly neglected comprehensive post-war planning. Note, however, that my agreement with Eric pertains to the execution of the war, not to its justification or legitimacy.

(3) I do not dispute Eric’s assertion that our public diplomacy efforts in Iraq “have been underfunded, poorly designed and almost completely ineffectual.”

(4) Nor do I take exception to his recommendation that we provide non-military support to “movements that struggle from within tyrannies to realize the spoils of liberal democracy.”

(5) Citing an article by Stephen Cook in Foreign Affairs that describes the carrots and sticks offered to Turkey in order to gain admission to the EU, Eric recommends that we adopt a similar approach in our effort to spread democracy. In return for creating “political space” in which liberalizing movements could emerge, ruling regimes would benefit from our facilitating their entries into international organizations and treaty groups. Inclusion of such trade-offs would be a step toward structuring our foreign aid packages “to provide more weight to the decisions taken to move toward real democratic change or not.” This recommendation makes eminent good sense.

Notwithstanding these agreements, I’m struck by the very different perspectives Eric and I bring to bear on the issue of spreading democracy. I view the issue through the lens of 9/11, terrorism and national security. Because it empowers and respects the individual, spreading democracy is an end unto itself. On this, there’s almost certainly no disagreement between Eric and me. But I also view the spread of democracy as a means to an end: greater security, not just for our country, but for all countries that have been, or may become, the stages for terrorist atrocities.

I cannot so neatly summarize Eric’s perspective. I know that his lens is very different from mine: there’s no linkage between spreading democracy and 9/11, terrorism and national security in his post. Instead, there’s a lengthy discussion of Iraq in which he focuses on its human and financial costs (which are undeniable) and what for him is the war’s illegitimacy (a questionable point that I don’t think is in the scope of our debate). Eric sees Iraq as the latest example of a long string of failed attempts to build democracy at the point of a gun, and endorses the view that successful democratization is far more likely to be the result of slow, laborious, internal developments. It is this history (along with the aforementioned mistakes of execution), that results in what I sense as a pessimistic outlook on the eventual outcome in Iraq. In his own words,

we should eschew the calls to impose democracy on others through the use of military force because the success rate for such ventures is low, and even when successful it is far too costly in terms of the drain on economic and military assets, coupled with the commitment of time required. And of course, imposing democracy in such a fashion inevitably results in death and injury to tens of thousands (though probably more) of the people you are intending to help—a part of the equation which undermines the moral arguments for attempting to create liberal democracy as a way of improving lives (death is not an improvement).

This blanket dismissal of using military force is unwise. In the future, there may be situations in which all other avenues to defusing a serious threat may turn out to be dead ends. If the choice is between using force and doing nothing, would Eric always choose the latter? Iran, which is almost certainly intent on developing nuclear weapons and which is the leading state sponsor of terrorism, illustrates the point. Should (1) the negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran fail, (2) a subsequent Security Council resolution embolden, rather than dissuade, the mullahs, and (3) nuclear tests be detected, what choice, other than the military option, would there be?

Having ruled out the use of force, Eric recommends that

we should continue to employ our diplomatic and soft power tools, while making a deliberate effort to repair our image and the perception that we act with legitimacy in the world stage.

Yes, we should do all of these things. But, no, we should not take the military option off the table. The Bush administration can be justly criticized for speaking harshly and carrying a big stick; it would be even worse to speak softly and carry no stick.

In my initial post, I identified four obstacles to a successful public diplomacy program: foreign media (e.g., Al-Jazeera) propagating anti-American messages, Islamic religious authorities that preach hate, domestic media that, for whatever reason, publish articles that become the raw material for anti-American propaganda, and supposedly apolitical NGOs that have anti-American agendas.

Asking a public diplomacy program to overcome all of these obstacles is asking a lot. At best, it will take many years to change the minds of those who wish us ill. Many years is too many years: terrorism is today’s threat, not just tomorrow’s. Public diplomacy may work in the long-term, but it won’t in the short-term. I’m far less optimistic than is Eric that, at least for the next several years, it will have much of an effect on the spread of democracy.

A recent post at the Daily Demarche invited bloggers from the left and the right to pair up for cross-blog debates on “the future of global democracy and the role that the United States should play in the spread of democracy to oppressed or less developed nations.” I’ve paired up with Eric Martin, author of Total Information Awareness. His post can be found here.

While I’m to the right-of-center (or so I’m told) and he’s to the left, we both believe that America does have a role in spreading democracy. We aren’t isolationists, and we reject the realist notion that the internal affairs of other countries are of no consequence to our country. Thus, our debate will be over issues such as these:

In what circumstances should the US attempt to spread democracy?

What means should the US employ in attempting to spread democracy?

While attempting to spread democracy, what are the constraints that the US should abide by?

In our initial posts, Eric and I will stake out our positions on these (and other) issues. Subsequently, I’ll respond to what he’s said and he’ll react to what I’ve said.

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The security of the United States – the safety of Americans – is more intimately related to the spread of democracy than ever before in our history. Gone are the days when some states with authoritarian governments were the threats to our safety and security. When our concern was the unleashing of violence by the armed forces of an unfriendly government, spreading democracy had philosophical and moral justifications, but little impact on our security. It was more prudent to achieve modus vivendis than to undertake diplomatic or military actions designed to remove authoritarians and support democratic forces. Our refusal to lend a helping hand to democratic uprisings in Eastern Europe during the Cold War is a case in point.

Today, terrorism is the primary threat. The transition from the old to the new threat started in 1983, when Hiz’bullah terrorists attacked the American embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon. While Hiz’bullah received, and continues to receive, financial support from Iran and elsewhere, its cadres are filled with people from a number of countries who voluntarily join the ranks. States may influence terrorist organizations, but they don’t control them. No one is drafted into Hiz’bullah, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, or any other such group.

People choose to become terrorists. Several academic studies have shown that poverty is not the breeding ground for terrorists; the poor are pre-occupied with sustaining their miserable existence, lack access to the modern ways of delivering propaganda (e.g., the Internet), and don’t possess the education and skills that are in demand by terrorist groups. As evinced by Al-Qaeda’s leadership and the 9/11 hijackers, well-educated individuals of above-average means are readily susceptible to recruitment by terrorist organizations. This, along with their countries of birth, lends credence to the argument that authoritarianism breeds terrorism, and the replacement of authoritarian by democratic regimes providing freedom and liberty is the most effective way to reduce the threats to our lives.

Against this backdrop, the question of the circumstances in which the US should attempt to spread democracy answers itself. We should give priority to establishing democratic regimes in those countries from which terrorists who view America as their enemy are most heavily recruited. The authoritarian/totalitarian governments of North Korea, China, and Zimbabwe are repugnant, but these countries haven’t produced terrorists intent on killing us. It’s the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East that should be targeted for democratization. Above all, we should not heed the advice of those who argue that if we don’t try to spread democracy everywhere, we shouldn’t attempt to spread it anywhere. These are the same people who would have us believe that, because America is less than perfect, it’s no better than any other country, including those that would do us harm.

Saudi Arabia heads the list of terrorist recruitment centers. Should we not, then, focus on spreading democracy to the Saudis above all other Middle Eastern peoples? If Saudi Arabia is our primary enemy, shouldn’t it be our first target? Those who answer affirmatively to this question are implicitly assuming that a direct approach is the most efficacious way to democratize Saudi Arabia. Arguably, however, an indirect approach may be more effective. If progress towards democracy is achieved in the countries, such as Iraq, that border on Saudi Arabia, as appears to be happening, the resulting demonstration effect could and should facilitate a less disruptive transition to democracy. Needless to say, our unfortunate dependence on Saudi oil makes this highly desirable.

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In the remainder of this essay, I discuss three methods available to the US in its effort to spread democracy: public diplomacy, forceful diplomacy, and military intervention. The methods -– which, borrowing Joseph Nye’s terminology, range from soft power to hard power –- one is willing to endorse depends on the seriousness with which one takes the terrorist threat. Among Americans, opinions on this question span a broad spectrum. I believe this is attributable to the fact that, since 9/11, not a single life has been lost (with the possible exception of those killed by anthrax) to Islamic terrorism on American soil. This is truly remarkable: who among us, watching the Twin Towers fall, would have predicted that, almost four years later, not even a single suicide bombing would take place?

For some, this means that terrorism need no longer be taken seriously; for others, who remember the long planning cycle that preceded 9/11, it means that another plan is being hatched. The former view represents something of a conundrum for those who believe it: on the one hand, it implies that the counter-terrorism actions taken by the Bush administration have been exceedingly effective, while, on the other, these very same people are among the administration’s most vocal critics. As for myself, I’m the first to admit that I don’t know what I don’t know. Has the Iraq war attracted Al-Qaeda terrorists who would otherwise have traveled to America? Who knows?

The one thing that I do know is that several Al-Qaeda’s spokesmen have continued to threaten Americans with death and destruction. Given their words and the overall level of uncertainty, I prefer to err on the side of caution. Naturally, this has a significant bearing on the means for spreading democracy that I’m willing to endorse.

Public Diplomacy

I wish it were otherwise, but I’m highly skeptical that soft power – in particular, public diplomacy – will do the trick. Regardless of its content and method of dissemination, any public diplomacy effort has to contend with Muslim populations that have been brainwashed for many years with anti-Americanism propaganda by government-controlled newspapers and television stations and by religious authorities. In recent years, the Internet has added new sources of indoctrination to these “traditional” ones: Al-Jazeera and Islamist websites.

In-country media propagating anti-American messages isn’t the only problem. As recently and best exemplified by Newsweek’s Qur’an-flushing story, some of the most widely known and highly respected representatives of the Western media have also fueled the fires of America hatred. Saying this does not mean that I favor censorship. What it does mean is that there’s a price to be paid – sometimes in the form of human lives – for freedom of the press. Some media denizens – the New York Times and the BBC come to mind – have political agendas that lead them to ignore the possible, if not the probable, consequences of their publication decisions. In the Muslim world and elsewhere, the distinction between an alleged and a substantiated American misdeed is often of little or no consequence. Even though Newsweek has retracted its story, many Muslims (and others) still believe that it’s true.

There’s still another problem: NGOs. Amnesty International’s depiction of the Guantanomo prison as the twenty-first century’s gulag was a reflection of its political agenda and a misrepresentation of reality. Its words were immediately flashed around the world, leading to headlines in Al-Jazeera and elsewhere condemning the United States as the world’s jailer.

Can any public diplomacy program – no matter how well thought out—overcome the obstacles placed in its way by in-country media and religious authorities, the Western media, and NGOs? The most optimistic answer to this question is that it might over a span of many years. But we don’t have many years. Because the threat from terrorism is here and now, we can’t rely on public diplomacy to spread democracy. While soft power may be effective in the long-term, it’s woefully inadequate in the short-term.

Forceful Diplomacy

If educating the publics of countries that are terrorist recruitment centers and which are governed by authoritarian regimes doesn’t meet our needs, there’s only one alternative: educating the governments. “Educating governments” is a euphemism for compelling governments. Compelling a government in order to spread democracy means insisting that reforms be undertaken and warning of the consequences if they are not.

The list of reforms need not and, in most cases, should not be limited to the holding of free and fair elections and the establishment of an independent judiciary. The others can be lumped together into reforms that facilitate the transition to and the maintenance of democracy. In this category are efforts to crack down on terrorist groups and measures aimed at excising hatred between and among a country’s ethnic and religious groups and hatred of America from the body politic. We should insist that these sentiments be removed from the media, textbooks, and religious orations. Tolerance – a necessary condition for a democracy to thrive – should replace intolerance.

The consequences of failing to implement the tolerance-enhancing reforms we demand should take be economic sanctions. During the Cold War, economic sanctions were ineffective, as the Soviet Union was only too willing to fill any breaches we opened. Now, the viability of a sanction strategy is largely dependent on the willingness of the major European states to join with us in their development, implementation and enforcement. Sometimes this isn’t achievable, either because of differing threat perceptions or because Europeans see the imposition of unilateral US sanctions as opportunities for them to close large business deals helpful to their struggling economies.

Spreading democracy through forceful diplomacy always requires that US and Europe cooperate and almost always necessitates agreement among the veto-carrying members of the UN Security Council. What, then, should we do when the necessary cooperation and agreements aren’t forthcoming? Should our policy of spreading democracy depend on the approval of other nations, whose motives for withholding their handshakes may include a desire to establish a multipolar international order, as well as to strengthen their economies?

Military Intervention

While a forceful diplomacy must be multilateral for it to be effective, the overwhelming military superiority of the US means that it doesn’t need allies if it attempts to spread democracy through the use of force. Can such attempts succeed? It may be too soon to know the final outcomes of our interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but this we do know: totalitarian governments have been toppled, and elections held in both countries. Many lives have been lost to bring about these results, but many lives would have been lost if the Taliban and Saddam Hussein had remained in power.

When forceful diplomacy can’t be used to spread democracy, the choice is not between unilateral US military intervention and leaving the status quo in place. Instead, it’s between unilateral US military intervention and an appeasement of authoritarians and totalitarians that grants them the time and freedom of action to further threaten American security and repress their people. If the Taliban were still in power, the Afghani madrasses would still be teaching hatred of Americans and sending their graduating students to Al-Qaeda camps, where training for further terrorist attacks would be taking place. If Saddam were still sitting on his throne, he would by now have received a clean bill of health from the UN’s weapons inspectors, the sanctions implemented in 1991 would have been terminated, and the reconstitution of his WMD programs would be underway.

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I’ve discussed three methods the US can use in our effort to spread democracy: public diplomacy, forceful diplomacy, and military intervention. In the case of Iran, the first two of these methods are already being employed: we are encouraging (however inadequately) the Iranian dissidents, and we—along with Britain, France, and Germany—are warning the mullahs that, if their government doesn’t agree to permanently suspend uranium enrichment, Iran will face Security Council sanctions. If it comes to that, it remains to be seen what those sanctions will be and whether and for how long they will be strictly enforced. For the French and Germans (and the Russians and Chinese), enforcement would entail a sizable economic penalty. Would these sanctions, which would presumably impinge on the Iranian economy, strengthen the pro-democracy forces in Iran? Would the mullahs be willing to introduce pro-tolerance reforms in return for an easing of the economic sanctions? If not, and if they continue to provide financial support and manpower to terrorist organizations, will we ultimately resort to military intervention to eliminate the threat posed by a nuclear-armed, anti-American, theocratic, authoritarian regime?